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The beginning of this project dates back to 2005. Back then, Miriam 
and Michael participated in a workshop on EU policy-making at the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany. When 
discussing our papers, we discovered that EU annulment cases consti-
tuted decisive turning points in our respective policy case studies. We 
became curious whether this was a mere coincidence or whether there 
was more to annulment cases from a policy analytical perspective. As we 
found virtually no political science literature on annulment litigation, we 
decided to work more systematically on this topic. This was the begin-
ning of an intellectual journey that led to the present monograph.
After some initial data mining and the development of a first paper 
on the issue, the Young Scholar Fund of the University of Konstanz 
kindly supported the project—and Christian Adam joined in. Together 
with Christian, we brought the annulment project to a new level of the-
oretical analysis and empirical data basis. In 2013, Christian submitted 
his doctoral thesis on the politics of judicial review in a closely related 
area. Around that time, Emmanuelle Mathieu completed our team on 
a grant from the German Research Institute for Public Administration 
Speyer funded by the German Leibniz Association. Since then, we have 
addressed selective aspects of annulments in the EU multilevel system in 
controversial discussions among the four of us and in several conference 
papers and journal articles published inter alia in the European Journal 
of Political Research, the Journal of Common Market Studies, and the 
Journal of European Integration. This book constitutes as complete a 
picture of the role that annulment conflicts play in the EU multilevel sys-
tem as we were able to deliver. It has been a truly collaborative endeav-
our of hard but exciting work, especially over the last four years.
The production of this book received much help. We are indebted to 
numerous people and institutions. Over forty experts in a wide range of 
regional national administrations and EU institutions patiently answered 
our questions in what often turned out to be very long interviews. We 
are thus grateful to all our discussion partners in the German, Saxon, 
Bavarian, Spanish, Galician, and Basque administrations; in the European 
institutions—especially the Legal Service of the European Commission; 
in various law firms; and in private and public companies.
We are particularly grateful to Michael Blauberger, Mark Dawson, 
Markus Jachtenfuchs, Daniel Kelemen, Ellen Mastenbroek, Susanne 
K. Schmidt, and Michael Zürn for valuable input at earlier stages of 
the project. A special thanks goes to the participants of the workshop 
‘Implementation and Judicial Politics: Conflict and Compliance in the 
EU Multilevel System’, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. 
We organized this workshop hosted by the Berlin Social Science 
Center, WZB, on behalf of the German Research Institute for Public 
Administration Speyer in March 2016. The debates we led at our work-
shop turned out to be a defining moment for our theorizing of annul-
ment litigation. Furthermore, we are indebted to many dear colleagues 
who challenged and commented upon our research papers on various 
occasions and thus shaped our thinking of annulment litigation.
We would also like to thank our student assistants for their support 
in coming to grips with an immense amount of empirical data: Paula 
Protsch, Julia Feldkötter, Sabine Mehlin, Frieder Bürkle, and Charly 
Uster. A special appreciation goes to Nora Wagner, Tamara Ulrich, and 
Kim Greenwell, who helped us finalize the manuscript—a challenging 
task by itself that was made more complicated by the geographical dis-












PrAise for Taking The eU To CoUrT
“This is an excellent book on the link between politics and law. In 
the growing political science literature on the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the authors have managed a real tour de force in show-
ing to what extent initiating action for annulment is, in fact, a political 
decision of stakeholders. Empirically rich and theoretically subtle, the 
book is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding legal conflict 
management in a multi-level system such as the EU.”
—Sabine Saurugger, Sciences Po Grenoble, Laboratoire Pacte, France
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1In September 2016, Ireland and Apple announced that they were  taking 
the European Commission to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).1 They questioned the legality of a Commission decision 
that demanded that Ireland reclaim billions of euros from Apple, the 
multinational technology company.2 The Commission regarded the Irish 
tax arrangement with Apple as violating European Union (EU) state aid 
law. According to the Commission, Apple enjoyed an undue tax advan-
tage that it had to pay back. The subsequent Commission decision was 
thus bound to have ample consequences for both Ireland and Apple. Yet 
although the decision would flush thirteen billion euros into the Irish 
public budget, the Irish government was dominated by the fear of losing 
jobs if business-friendly tax deals with Apple and other companies were 
no longer an option. In addition, Apple’s profits would take a considera-
ble cut, putting pressure on its management and sending shivers through 
its shareholders. On the other side of this conflict, the Commission 
strongly emphasized its obligation to prevent collusive tax pacts that 
might spiral into self-defeating fiscal competition among member states.
Despite the political drama surrounding the case, little attention 
was paid to the supranational legal instrument—the annulment proce-
dure—used as a last resort by Apple to prevail in this conflict with the 
Commission. According to EU law, the annulment procedure con-
stitutes the only legal route to contest a supranational act or particular 
Commission decision about the national implementation of European 
CHAPTER 1
The Neglected Politics Behind EU 
Annulment Litigation
© The Author(s) 2020 
C. Adam et al., Taking the EU to Court,  
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policies (Article 263 TFEU).3 By launching an annulment action against 
the EU executive, Apple was thus asking to review the lawfulness of 
the supranational decision, hoping that the Court would find it to be 
in violation of EU law and therefore annul it. Ireland actively and offi-
cially supported Apple’s case in court by intervening with legal argu-
ments in its favour, while the Commission found a legal supporter in 
the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority. Even the 
United States government tried to take on an active role by supporting 
Apple and Ireland in court. The Court rejected the United States’ appli-
cation, however, and denied it formal access to these court proceedings.4
The extraordinary attention the Apple case received most likely 
stemmed from the involvement of a world-famous company and 
the enormous amount of money that was disclaimed by politicians. 
However, the case also carries substantial political implications for the 
emerging EU multilevel order. ʻIf the Commission prevails in court, 
the decision will reset the balance of power on tax policy in Europe. 
While governments will still be able to set their own tax rates, the 
Commission will have established itself as a watchful referee of how 
national rules are implemented. Success on appeal for Apple and Ireland 
might relieve some of that pressure and give national governments more 
leeway’, analysed the Financial Times (Houlder et al. 2016). Whether 
the Court will rule in favour of the Commission or in favour of Ireland 
and Apple is still an open question at the time of writing. At any rate, 
this instance highlights that annulment actions have become an impor-
tant legal battleground for EU policy making and system development.
If one single annulment decision can crucially affect the future bal-
ance of power in tax policy in the EU, then what about the other several 
dozens of annulment cases that are decided each year? Are they equally 
important? The frank answer to this question is that we do not know. 
Considering the potential impact of EU annulment actions, it is striking 
that they evaded the focus of students of the European multilevel sys-
tem for so long. In view of this gap, the aim of this book is to explore 
EU annulment actions and their political relevance for EU multilevel 
governance.
As we will argue in this book, annulment actions are part of the strug-
gle over policy decisions and system development in the emerging mul-
tilevel political order of the EU. They often represent what seems like a 
measure of last resort with which national governments, regional gov-
ernments, interest groups, companies, and even other EU institutions 
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try to fight off interferences of (other) EU institutions. Moreover, we 
will argue that the initiation of an action for annulment is by no means 
an automatic and legalistic reaction to EU institutions breaching their 
mandates and overstepping their competences. Even blatant breaches of 
EU law will only attract annulment litigation when this is in the political 
and/or financial interest of stakeholders. At the same time, even where 
the pleas for actions for annulment seem highly dubious, with very slim 
chances for success, initiating an action for annulment can be in the 
political and/or financial interest of some actors. Simply put, annulment 
actions are a legal instrument that is typically used for political reasons 
and often has the power to yield significant political consequences as a 
result of its impact on policy content, political procedures, and the EU’s 
constitutional order. This calls for political science research to comple-
ment legal scholarship on annulment actions. The common multilevel 
nature of annulment conflicts underlines yet again the importance of 
understanding the EU as a multilevel system. If we fail to understand 
the role of these conflicts in which public actors from multiple levels of 
government, as well as interest groups, companies, and EU institutions, 
directly accuse (other) EU institutions of violating EU law, we arguably 
fail to understand a substantial part of this multilevel system. This book 
intends to improve our understanding of these conflicts by focussing first 
on the motivation of actors to litigate, second on the configurations of 
actors involved, and third on the outcome of the rulings and their effect 
on policy substance and competence distribution in the EU multilevel 
system.
Unsurprisingly, annulments as devices of EU law have so far been the 
concern primarily of legal scholarship. As we argue in the following chap-
ters, to understand the role of annulment actions within the EU mul-
tilevel system, it is essential to consider their political dimension as well 
(Bauer and Hartlapp 2010; Adam et al. 2015; Adam 2016; Hartlapp 
2018; Mathieu et al. 2018). Without investigating their political nature, 
without looking at the underlying motivations of actors, and without 
gauging the potential impact of such litigation, our understanding of 
annulments will remain partial and inadequate. As the Apple case sug-
gests, annulments may be politically and economically highly relevant—
in our view, reflecting an increasingly important feature of emerging 
multilevel conflict over supranational decision making and implementa-
tion. This makes annulment litigation a fascinating subject for political 
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scientists, especially for those interested in multilevel politics and EU 
policy making.
Against this background, this book provides a political perspective 
of EU annulments, combining qualitative and quantitative empirical 
insights and theoretical analysis. Essentially, our argument centres around 
two concepts: actors’ motivations and actor configurations.
First, we argue a legalistic understanding of actions for annulment 
that expects annulment actions to emerge only when the suspicion that 
an EU institution has breached its mandate and overstepped its com-
petences falls short of the empirical reality. Instead, annulments are 
regularly initiated in the attempt to influence policies and competence 
allocation in the EU by a variety of actors with different motivations. 
The literature on private litigants typically presumes that companies are 
motivated by financial gains, while non-governmental organizations go 
to court to push forward ideological and policy preferences. This pre-
sumption seems overly simplistic for the context of litigating public 
actors that are motivated by keeping or expanding institutional com-
petences in addition to seeking policies and material gains. Here, moti-
vations cannot simply be presumed, but instead must be uncovered by 
research. To do so, it is essential to identify and analyse the conflict that 
underlies and precedes the decision to litigate. We distinguish four ideal 
types of motivations for litigation: material gains, institutional compe-
tences, ideology and policy preferences, and political trust. We derive 
these motivations by analysing actors’ problems, demands, and prefer-
ences within the multilevel policy process that gives rise to annulment lit-
igation. This allows us to describe actors’ motivations for going to court 
(why they consider litigating), as well as the conditions that influence 
when actors go to court, such as the legal opportunity structures and the 
merits of a case. On this basis, we try to move beyond simple risk-benefit 
analysis to explain litigation behaviour. After all, for some motivations, it 
is very difficult to quantify the expected benefits of litigation. Moreover, 
different actors feel very differently about legal uncertainty and even 
the slim chances of legal success. In fact, we have to take into account 
that for public litigants, even losing cases can be beneficial for them 
(Adam et al. 2015).
Second, next to motivations, our argument puts actor configurations 
centre stage. Sometimes, annulment conflicts are fought between just 
one applicant and one defendant EU institution—a member state litigat-
ing against the Council of the European Union, or a private company 
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litigating against the Commission, for example. Quite frequently, how-
ever, the litigant configuration in court is much more complex than that, 
including actors from multiple levels of government, and private and 
public actors on both sides of the conflict. While we are far from able to 
predict the emergence of such complex constellations in individual cases, 
we present evidence that suggests that the emergence of complex mul-
tilevel configurations is more likely during times of institutional turbu-
lence at the EU level, for example, in times of treaty change or—at a 
smaller scale—in response to disruptive policy changes. In such situations 
of institutional turbulence, established legal paths and orders become 
unsettled. Moreover, the incentives to go to court increase in times of 
turbulence. This is because disrupted legal regimes create more legal 
grey areas for the Court to colour in with its rulings. After all, the Court 
has not had the chance to interpret and specify new or altered treaty arti-
cles or directives. Provoking influential precedent rulings is more likely 
to occur soon after turbulence and can be very valuable to litigants for a 
number of reasons. Particularly when there is a chance to have the Court 
colour in rather large legal grey areas due to turbulence, litigation can 
be chosen for various motivations, be it for material gain, to gain insti-
tutional competences, of to attain ideological goals. For the same reason 
that institutional turbulence increases the stakes for potential litigants on 
either side of conflicts, it also makes court rulings less predictable. Since 
there is no long history of court rulings interpreting new or modified 
treaty articles or directives, the Court’s take on these new and revised 
legal acts remains unknown until such a history of rulings is established. 
Existing case law cannot easily be used to predict court behaviour with-
out considerable uncertainty. Therefore, institutional turbulence creates 
legal uncertainty and incentives to try to provoke precedent rulings. This 
not only incentivizes more actors to take an active role in annulment lit-
igation resulting in a greater number of complex actor configurations. 
This also creates a situation in which the success rate for these complex 
actor configurations is much closer to 50% than for simple actor config-
urations. Simply put, when court rulings are easy to foresee—as would 
be the case with a long history of relevant court rulings on an issue—
fewer actors will be drawn to take an active part in annulment proceed-
ings than when court rulings are rather difficult to foresee; that is, where 
chances of success are close to 50:50. Consequently, we argue that we 
should not be too quick to attribute the significantly different success 
rates for simple versus complex actor configurations to a causal impact of 
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the actor configuration on the judges at Luxembourg. Instead, it rather 
indicates that the legal cases that give rise to simple actor configurations 
are significantly different from the cases that trigger complex actor con-
figurations in court.
Annulment actions thus serve one rather clearly defined legal purpose: 
to keep supranational institutions in (legal) check. And yet we hope to 
convincingly show that at the same time, they also serve various political 
purposes. These political purposes reach all the way from gaining polit-
ical trust from domestic constituents, to reaching ideological goals, to 
expanding institutional competences, all the way to hoping for material 
gains. While (Article 258 TFEU) infringement proceedings have helped 
the Commission to push the Europeanization of national policies ahead 
(e.g. Tallberg 2002), and preliminary reference proceedings (Article 
267 TFEU) have helped to boost the European integration process 
(e.g. Burley and Mattli 1993), it is more difficult to pinpoint the role of 
annulment actions. Annulment proceedings have helped to restrict the 
power and influence of EU institutions in some areas but also helped to 
expand their competences in other areas. Most importantly, however, 
annulment actions have given various types of actors and the Court the 
chance to continuously adjust and fill in the (legal) gaps within the devel-
oping EU polity. Thereby, they have influenced not only policy content 
but also the competences of EU institutions and their relationship to 
member states, regional governments, interest groups, companies, and 
citizens.
Policy And institutionAl relevAnce  
of Annulments
Annulment actions are thus one important channel for judicial review in 
the EU. Judicial review is a process under which the actions of public 
actors are subject to the review of the judiciary. The competent court 
may invalidate an executive or legislative decision for being unlawful or 
unconstitutional. Judicial review is a key element of the checks and bal-
ances in the separation of powers. It allows the judiciary to put a halt on 
executive or legislative decisions that go beyond their competences.
Research in the area of law and politics provides abundant exam-
ples of how judicial review can lead to far-reaching policy and institu-
tional changes. Many social movements have used judicial review to 
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push forward their agenda, achieving impressive results in some cases 
thanks to the United States Supreme Court’s relative judicial openness 
in certain policy issues, such as the defence of minorities (Meyer and 
Boutcher 2007). We also know from the literature on federalism that 
judicial review can lead constitutional courts to play a prominent role in 
the redefinition of central-regional competence distribution (Laufer and 
Münch 1998; Swenden 2006, 79–89).
In the EU, judicial review through annulment actions can have 
far-reaching policy and institutional impacts. The policy impact of annul-
ments is particularly visible in the context of state aid policy. EU state 
aid policy prohibits governmental subsidies to economic actors when 
they distort competition on the internal market (there are nevertheless 
exceptions to this rule under specific circumstances). The crucial and 
decisive task of assessing whether a subsidy is compatible with the inter-
nal market belongs to the Commission. How the Commission interprets 
the compatibility with the internal market is often subject to examination 
that also includes the Court and the case law it has produced in the past. 
Annulment actions, raised against the Commission’s state aid decisions, 
have therefore often contributed to clarifying the conditions under which 
the Commission may and may not prohibit national aids. Thereby, these 
annulment rulings have not only affected the substance of state aid policy 
but also influenced the balance of power between the Commission and 
the member states.
One example for the effect of annulment litigation on the balance of 
power between the Commission and the member states is case T-21/06, 
initiated by Germany in 2006. In the course of its annulment ruling, the 
Court legitimized the Commission’s newly established practice of tying 
acceptable state aid provision to the occurrence of market failure. In the 
specific case, Germany had subsidized two private broadcasting com-
panies (ProSiebenSat.1 and RTL Group) in order to successfully rollout 
digital TV receivable through antenna in the Berlin-Brandenburg area. 
The Commission declared these aids illegal and justified this decision 
with reference to the newly established concept of market failure: the 
subsidy is authorized only if it was an effective and proportionate instru-
ment to address a market failure. This connection between market failure 
and the legality of national state aid policy was not included in the trea-
ties. It was only established in the Commission’s State Aid Action Plan 
(SAAP) adopted in 2005 (European Commission 2005, 4). Due to the 
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indeterminate legal nature of this concept, its introduction would ensure 
a maximal level of discretion for the Commission. This is why in its advi-
sory statement during the consultation period of the SAAP in 2005, the 
German government explicitly complained that the concept of market fail-
ure as introduced by the Commission was not an appropriate foundation 
for assessing national state aid (Federal Republic of Germany 2005, 3). 
The Commission’s use of the market failure concept in this particular case 
provided Germany with the opportunity to involve the CJEU to either 
revoke or specify the role of market failure in the context of state aid con-
trol. Germany, however, lost this case and helped to clarify that the Court 
would accept market failure as a criterion for evaluating the legality of state 
aid measures. Due to the substantial room for interpretation this concept 
gives to the Commission, this annulment conflict has arguably tilted the 
balance of power over state aid policy further towards the Commission.
Annulments can also have significant effects on national politics, as 
the following case dealing with suckler-cow premiums (C-344/01) indi-
cates. This case, related to EU agricultural funds, had a profound impact 
on the relationship between central and regional levels of government 
in Germany. In Germany, as is often the case in federal or regionalized 
countries, the practical management of EU agricultural funds is dele-
gated to lower levels of government—in the German case, to the Länder 
(German states). In case a state fails to comply with EU requirements 
in terms of supervision and control of how the funds are spent, the 
Commission refuses to refinance the corresponding amount of money to 
the member state. In Germany, this sanction primarily hurt the federal 
budget from which the money had been advanced, because no compen-
sation rule that would transfer the financial burden of the sanction to the 
non-compliant state’s budget existed. The German federal government 
had been eager to change this situation. But because of the states’ col-
lective opposition to such a change, the status quo remained. Yet this 
situation changed in response to the so-called suckler-cow premiums 
case, which took place during lengthy negotiations between the federal 
government and the states about important reforms of German feder-
alism. This was yet another instance in which the Commission found 
that several German states had failed to follow EU rules when paying 
out premiums to farmers for suckler cows and imposed financial sanc-
tions. Again, the federal government would be stuck with these sanctions 
without a mechanism to divert them to the noncomplying states. In this 
situation, annulment litigation must have seemed like an obvious course 
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of action. After all, in the event of success in court, the financial sanction 
would just disappear. Even more importantly, in the opposite outcome of 
legal defeat, the court ruling would put further pressure on the states to 
compromise about the redistribution of financial responsibilities in case 
of financial sanctions related to the spending of EU money. When the 
Court ruled against Germany, the federal government was able to instru-
mentalize the ruling and managed to successfully negotiate an amend-
ment to the German constitution (Article 104a), specifying that where 
the Länder are the regional entities implementing Germany’s suprana-
tional responsibilities, 15% of resulting financial corrections would be 
covered by the federal budget, while 85% would from then on be cov-
ered by the Länder budgets (Adam et al. 2015). In other words, the 
German federal government lost this annulment case, rather successfully 
leaving a mark in the German constitution.
Moreover, annulment actions can also have a profound impact on the 
distribution of competences between EU institutions. The ERTA case 
(C-22/70) is proof of this. Here, the Commission sued the Council 
for having prevented the Commission from negotiating an international 
agreement in the field of transport. Traditionally, member states would 
negotiate international trade agreements only in those areas of external 
policy where the EU is not competent. In that case, the Council had 
authorized member states to negotiate and conclude an international 
transport agreement that included social rules for the protection of driv-
ers. While the Council claimed that transport was a national competence 
(currently, Article 95 TFEU), the Commission felt that the Council had 
overstepped its competences and launched an annulment to shift the 
legal base so negotiation powers would fall on the Commission (today 
Article 207 TFEU). The Court additionally granted that the existence 
of an acquis communautaire harmonizing social provisions in transport 
(Regulation 543/69) necessarily vested any international agreement 
in community powers—consequently excluding concurring powers of 
member states in trade negotiations. This legal interpretation implied 
that the Commission could expand its external policy competences to 
areas where the EU holds internal competences. This became known as 
the principle of implied powers and was further developed and eventually 
codified in the Nice Treaty (Cremona 2011), leaving a lasting effect in 
primary law.
Such far-reaching institutional adjustments triggered by annulment 
actions may also take place below the level of formal treaty changes, for 
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example, through the modification of administrative practices. After hav-
ing lost numerous annulment rulings on the application of the post-Lis-
bon comitology structure, the Commission secretariat general issued 
an internal guideline to its policy directorate generals to be particularly 
vigilant during law making. Annulment cases had the effect of limiting 
the Commission’s influence on the delegation and implementation of 
acts. To compensate its loss of influence at the level of comitology, the 
Commission changed its approach, favouring the inclusion of detailed 
policy preferences in the drafting of legislative acts. Because of annul-
ment actions, the Commission thus developed a new procedural strategy 
consisting of fixing things at an earlier stage rather than leaving room 
for policy making to the Council and the European Parliament (EP) via 
implementing and delegating acts (COM_1).5
In all these examples, annulment actions emerged from conflicts 
among a few actors and appear, at first sight, to be of minor impor-
tance because they seemed to deal merely with sector-specific issues 
and individual implementation decisions. Nevertheless, they brought 
about long-lasting and far-reaching formal and informal policy and insti-
tutional adaptations to the EU multilevel system, at times shifting the 
balance of policy-making powers. In the digital TV case, for example, a 
conflict between the Commission on one hand and Germany and two 
broadcasting companies on the other resulted in a wide extension of 
the Commission’s room for interpreting EU state aid law, thanks to the 
Court’s acknowledgement of the concept of market failure. In the suck-
ler-cow premiums case, a conflict between Germany and the Commission 
on an apparently highly technical issue allowed the federal state to signif-
icantly reshape its financial relationship with German states in agriculture 
policy with respect to paying for supranational fines. An annulment case 
also coined the far-reaching and now famous doctrine of implied pow-
ers, allowing the Commission to significantly expand its competences 
in external affairs to the detriment of the Council and of the member 
states. Finally, annulment actions also led the Commission to revise its 
procedural strategy with a view to maximizing its influence on EU poli-
cies, leading to the expansion of detailed legislation to the detriment of 
delegation and implementing comitology acts. There should thus be no 
doubt that annulment actions play a crucial role in the EU’s multilevel 
system. Ignoring the political role of annulment conflicts carries the risk 
of missing important aspects of how conflicts shape policy contents and 
policy process in the EU’s multilevel system.
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Annulment over time And Across Policy AreAs:  
emPiricAl evidence
Annulments are relevant not only in qualitative terms; they also emerge 
in quite significant numbers. Due to expanding competences of the 
European Commission and other EU institutions, such as the EP, the 
need to keep these supranational institutions in check via judicial review 
has increased over time, and so has the number of annulment cases 
directed against legal acts adopted by these institutions. Since the 1960s, 
there has been a clear increase in the number of annulment actions filed 
against EU institutions (see Fig. 1.1). At the same time, this increase is 
characterized by fluctuations. Chapter 5 offers a much closer look at the 
peaks and lows in the number of annulment actions over time.
But annulment actions have not only increased in number. They have 
also captured more and more policy sectors, slowly spreading across the 
whole spectrum of policy sectors in which EU institutions have become 
Fig. 1.1 Total number of actions for annulment by year of initiation (Source 
Own collection based on Stone Sweet and Brunell [2007] and updated from 
CURIA [cut off 31 December 2012])
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active (see Fig. 1.2). While annulment actions occurred early in tradi-
tional areas of EU activity—such as agriculture or state aid and compe-
tition policy—expansion of supranational competences in foreign affairs 
(broadly defined with external affairs, trade policy, and foreign and secu-
rity policy) have been accompanied by rising numbers for annulment 
actions in those areas, too.
Quite importantly, all major EU institutions have been confronted 
with annulment actions. While filing actions for annulment was ini-
tially meant to be a way for national governments to keep the High 
Authority—as predecessor of today’s Commission—in check, actions for 
annulment are no longer raised only against the supranational executive. 
Around 20% of the annulment actions are directed against the Council, 
the EP, or the European Central Bank (ECB). The bulk of annulment 
cases—around 80%—however, still object to executive measures adopted 
by the Commission (see Fig. 1.3).
Fig. 1.2 Share of actions for annulment by policy sector (Source Own collec-
tion based on Stone Sweet and Brunell [2007] and updated from CURIA [cut 
off 31 December 2012])
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A look at the types of actors that initiate actions for annulment com-
pletes the rather complex picture we have drawn so far. While initially, 
annulment litigation was thought to be an instrument of judicial con-
trol for national governments against supranational institutions, today, 
a rather broad range of litigants launch annulment actions. Figure 1.4 
indicates that private actors (individuals, companies, and interest 
groups), regional entities (regional or local authorities), national gov-
ernments (i.e. member states), as well as EU institutions themselves 
actively use and initiate annulment actions in their struggles with 
(other) EU institutions. By 2012, private actors initiated the majority 
of annulments. Among public claimants, member states and EU institu-
tions file a similar number of annulments. Subnational public actors are 
clearly less active.6
Concerning applicants, we observe interesting dynamics over time. 
The number of actions initiated by private applicants has boomed. 
Fig. 1.3 Share of actions for annulment by defendant (Source Own collection 
based on Stone Sweet and Brunell [2007] and updated from CURIA [cut off 31 
December 2012])
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Remarkably, EU institutions themselves increasingly sue each other, a 
tendency that has consolidated over time and even exceeded the num-
ber of actions initiated by the member states in the mid-2000s (Hartlapp 
2018). At the same time, national governments have become somewhat 
more reluctant to litigate against EU institutions. As for regional actors, 
they have consistently been among the least active applicants.7 We thus 
see an interesting changing structure of conflict cleavages over time in 
annulment litigation (Adam 2018).
These changes over time and the increased diversity in the type of 
litigants are partly the result of the evolution of actors’ standing rights. 
The conditions under which each type of actor (other than member 
states governments, the Commission, and the Council) can initiate 
annulment actions are detailed in the treaties. Their interpretation by 
the Court and the corresponding treaty-based provisions have, how-
ever, evolved over time, leading to an extended access to the CJEU in 
Fig. 1.4 Total actions for annulment by type of applicant (Source Own collec-
tion based on Stone Sweet and Brunell [2007] and updated from CURIA [cut 
off 31 December 2012])
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the form of judicial review for an ever greater variety of litigants (Arnull 
1995, 2001; see also Chapter 3). To some extent, these developments 
regarding standing rights for different actors factor into the empirical 
patterns of annulment litigation that we observe. And yet, the devel-
opment of these standing rights was driven by politically motivated 
annulment litigation in the first place. Actors that had not enjoyed the 
right to initiate annulments or had only limited rights to do so, such 
the EP, for example, bring litigation despite little to no chance of being 
admitted to the Court in the hope of provoking influential precedent 
rulings extending their standing rights; something the EP managed to 
accomplish with their annulment action in the so-called Chernobyl case 
(70/88 Parliament v. Council).
In sum, empirical patterns of annulment litigation suggests that 
actions for annulment have become an increasingly relevant judicial tool 
in the struggle over policy content and decision competences in the EU. 
Corresponding with the expansion of EU competences over time and 
across policy fields, the rising powers of EU institutions such as the EP 
and the ECB, the need for (and use of) judicial review has also grown 
in proportion. Initially restricted to actions against the Commission in a 
limited number of policy sectors such as agriculture and state aid, the use 
of annulment actions rose in frequency, covered an ever greater range of 
policy fields, and came to be directed against virtually all EU institutions. 
The list of applicants has grown more heterogeneous as well. Private 
actors, regional authorities, the EP, and EU institutions themselves file 
annulment actions ever more frequently.
structure of the book
The next chapter has two parts (Chapter 2). First, we review the lit-
erature on multilevel governance, public policy, and judicial poli-
tics in the EU and highlight what the analysis of annulment actions 
brings to each of these literatures. Secondly, this allows us to identify 
three questions (on motivations, actor constellations, and outcomes 
of the rulings and effects) that organize the litigation chain we pres-
ent in our book. Next, we present the legal background of annulment 
actions (Chapter 3) to the extent that it structures opportunities and 
constraints for our policy actors when considering raising annulment 
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actions. We proceed with a presentation of our data collection strategy 
and of the logic behind the empirical analysis that we employ (Chapter 
4). We do so before presenting three chapters that present empiri-
cal evidence and develop theoretical arguments related to our four 
research questions. The first of these empirical chapters explores the 
different types of motivations underlying public actors’ decisions to 
turn policy conflicts into annulment actions (Chapter 5). The second 
empirical chapter explores the factors behind the emergence of com-
plex and multilevel actors’ constellations in annulment proceedings 
(Chapter 6). The third empirical chapter covers our last two questions: 
the impact of actors’ constellations on success in court and the impact 
of annulment actions on the multilevel policy conflicts they origi-
nate from (Chapter 7). The conclusion summarizes our findings and 
wraps up our main argument, while also suggesting avenues for further 
research in the area (Chapter 8).
We hope that this book makes a strong case for the need to under-
stand annulment actions as a class of legal proceedings with political 
intent and impact in EU multilevel policy making. Yet even if we only 
manage to set out a new area waiting for empirical analyses in the field 
of law and politics—or just add to the intellectual controversy over the 
political importance of EU annulments, for that matter—we will be sat-
isfied. Annulment litigation has become too important to continue being 
ignored by political analysis.
cAses cited
See Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Cases cited in this chapter
C-22/70 Judgment of 31 March 1971, Commission v. Council, C-22/70, 
EU:C:1971:32
C-344/01 Judgment of 4 March 2001, Germany v. Commission, C-344/01, 
EU:C:2004:121
T-21/06 Judgment of 6 October 2009, Germany v. Commission, T-21/06, 
EU:T:2009:387
T-892/16 Order of 15 December 2017, Apple v. Commission, T-892/16, 
EU:T:2017:925f
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notes
1.  Throughout this book, we refer to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union as ‘the Court’. Thereby, we typically refer to both the Court of 
Justice and the General Court, depending on the competent court in the 
respective case, without specifying this court more specifically.
2.  Order of 15 December 2017, Apple v Commission, T-892/16, 
EU:T:2017:925f.
3.  TFEU stands for Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. A list 
of abbreviations is provided at the beginning of the book.
4.  The legal dispute did not end there. Despite the pending annulment deci-
sion, Ireland is obliged to recover the state aid deemed illegal. As Ireland’s 
progress was too slow in the eyes of the Commission—several deadlines 
for calculating and collecting the illegal state aid were missed by the Irish 
government—the Commission decided to take Ireland to the Court of 
Justice for failure to implement the Commission decision, in accordance 
with Article 108(2) of the TFEU (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-17-3702_en.htm, accessed 4 October 2017). In response to this, 
Ireland collected the money from Apple in September 2018; funds are cur-
rently being held in escrow while the annulment case is still pending in 
court.
5.  The acronym COM indicates that the interviewee works for the European 
Commission. The logic behind codifying the interview sources is explained 
in more detail in Chapter 4. All interviews conducted in the preparation of 
this research are listed in the Annex.
6.  In some countries, subnational authorities have formal agreements with 
their national governments stating that in case a subnational government 
wants to file an annulment against EU institutions, the case is formally 
brought forward by the member state’s central administration.
7.  Regional governments and private actors face stricter legal requirements 
than governments or EU institutions for CJEU consideration of the cases 
that they raise (cf. Chapter 3).
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Annulment actions are a legal weapon in the political fight between 
actors. The aim of engaging in annulment litigation is to shape the mak-
ing of public policies and to influence the distribution of competences 
or the flow of funds. To explore the politics of annulments, our  starting 
point is the proposition that courts can only speak in reaction to litiga-
tion initiated by actors enmeshed in complex policy conflicts. In that 
 perspective, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its 
rulings are just a result of conflicts deliberatively escalated to the judicial 
arena in the struggle between opposing actors to trigger favourable deci-
sions that serve their regulative and redistributive interests. Annulment 
actions can thus be conceived as tools employed by stakeholders fight-
ing to defend their interests in a multilevel policy context. With this ana-
lytical vantage point come several questions. Most importantly, we must 
answer the question of how to conceptualize annulment conflicts and 
their underlying struggles. What are the relevant analytical questions to 
raise? In this chapter, we seek orientation from existing scholarly works 
in order to develop an analytical framework allowing us to engage in the 
empirical analysis of annulment actions and the respective motivations of 
actors.
In the following, we engage with three specific strands of literature 
that potentially enrich and orient our understanding of annulment liti-
gation. They do so from different angles and thus contribute to different 
aspects of our research. First, scholars interested in multilevel governance 
CHAPTER 2
Towards an Analytical Framework  
to Study Annulments in the EU
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and evolution of the European Union’s (EU’s) political system inform 
our understanding of how conflict emerges in the EU. Second, public 
policy analysis forms our view on implementation and the role of  judicial 
proceedings in EU policy making. Moreover, third, judicial politics 
underline that actors strategically shape legal conflicts. Based on commu-
nalities and differences with the arguments presented in these strands of 
literature, we develop three specific research questions, which will further 
guide our empirical analysis of EU annulment conflicts in the remain-
der of this book. In a nutshell, we argue that analyses of annulment 
 litigation need to focus on three aspects. First, we need to analyse the 
motivations—particularly those of public actors—to understand why they 
raise such cases. Second, we need to assess the actor configurations that 
characterize and influence judicial proceedings. Third, we must identify 
judicial outcomes (who loses and who wins?) along with their impact on 
policy substance and distribution of competence in the EU multilevel 
setting.
reseArch Questions
Essentially, we address three research questions. They are related to (1) 
the use of annulment actions, (2) their structure, and (3) their outcome 
and impact.
Our first question deals with the emergence of annulment actions: 
why do actors decide to litigate? The EU’s multilevel policy process 
involves many distinct actors located at different governmental levels and 
active in different arenas. As a result, a wide array of interests, political 
preferences, values, cultures, and understandings interact and sometimes 
clash in the policy process. Conflicts between these actors have been 
widely studied in the context of policy making in the legislative arena. 
Sometimes, however, these policy conflicts are resolved within the judi-
cial arena. Annulment actions constitute one legal channel for resolving 
some of these policy conflicts within the judicial arena. The question, 
however, is what motivates actors to turn to annulment actions to pursue 
their goals in the EU’s multilevel policy context?
The second question deals with the structure of annulment actions. 
On a descriptive level, we ask about which actor configurations charac-
terize annulment actions. The multilevel governance approach conceives 
EU governance as composed of a variety of interactions between a wide 
range of actors in the EU public policy process. What kind of actor 
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configurations can we observe in annulment actions? Who litigates most 
and why? Are the conflict lines observable in the policy process reflected 
in litigation constellations? Which alliances and lines of cooperation are 
we likely to observe, and why? On a more analytical level, we therefore 
ask about determinants of different actor configurations and explore the 
impact of structure in this regard.
Third, we explore the outcome of annulment actions (i.e. rulings). 
How often are annulment actions successful, and why? Are some actors 
more likely to win than others? And are some actor configurations more 
successful than others? Most importantly, we explore the question of 
how certain we can be that any observed link between litigant configu-
ration and judicial outcome results from a causal impact of that litigant 
configuration on the Court and not from unobserved factors that give 
rise to different litigant configurations and legal outcomes at the same 
time. In this regard, we also assess the impact of annulment actions on 
the multilevel policy context and on policy stakeholders and explore 
whether legal success in court is always aligned with political success or 
not. The discussion below will elaborate these different lines of inquiry.
multilevel governAnce And conflict in the eu
Much of the literature on multilevel governance looks at the EU as a 
specific political system. It provides important insights on actors and 
shapes our thinking on how conflict emerges from their interactions in 
the European political arena. Since the early 1990s, the EU system has 
been increasingly characterized as multileveled. In contrast to classical 
political systems, the multilevel concept stresses vertical collaboration, 
the multiplicity of actors taking part in EU governance, and the loose 
coupling of levels and arenas (Marks 1993; Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe 
1996; Benz and Eberlein 1999; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Tatham and 
Bauer 2014b). The multilevel governance perspective focuses—at least 
conceptually—on the opportunities emerging from interaction, coordi-
nation, and cooperation of governments and non-state actors on mul-
tiple levels, forming institutional linkages and politics beyond a clear 
hierarchy (Tatham and Bauer 2014a). Implicitly, in these interac-
tions, conflicts about policy and the distribution of competences play a 
key role. They do so, for example, in the form of rivalry between sub-
national actors and national governments in their relationship with the 
EU (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 115). However, the conceptualization 
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of the conflict surrounding multilevel governance arrangements has been 
afforded less room than the analysis of new forms of collaboration and 
engagement. On the rare occasions that policy conflict gets more atten-
tion, as in the cases with the joint decision trap (Scharpf 1985, 2006; 
Falkner 2011), multilevel conflict is conceived as a constraint for col-
lective action. Conflict is typically associated with a form of blockage 
rather than as a dynamic process able to escalate diverging views to an 
eventual (court) decision. Thus, although conflict is implicit in this litera-
ture, it has not been a central concern for multilevel governance scholars. 
Consequently, it seems fair to stress the limitations of existing works on 
EU multilevel governance when it comes to the emergence of conflicts 
among actors of various political levels, the mediation of such conflict 
over policy decisions by the judiciary, and the potentially resulting new 
dynamics, feedback effects, and structuring elements for public policy. To 
be fair, Stone Sweet (1999) and Kelemen (2011) have laid some ground-
work for analysing the role of legal conflict from a perspective of multi-
level governance. In particular, Kelemen’s argument about an emerging 
Eurolegalism stresses how features of the EU system link to litigation. 
Yet these works focus on the emergence of court rulings rather than their 
specific characteristics and outcomes.
It is not that multilevel conflict has been completely absent from 
 pertinent scholarly conceptualizations. Empirical accounts found that 
the propensity for multilevel conflict has increased in the EU in recent 
 decades (Bauer and Trondal 2015a, b). This rise has occurred for a num-
ber of reasons. With the intensification of EU integration in level and 
scope (Biesenbender 2011; Börzel 2005), there was just more to argue 
about. Since each treaty change increased the scope of issues the EU is 
able to legislate, the potential for disagreement about how to legislate, 
implement, and enforce legislative decisions automatically expands.
Besides, with the delegation of new powers to the supranational level, 
the boundaries of the competences and the precise procedures applying 
to the related decision-making processes often become—before accepted 
routines emerge—a matter of contest (see, for example, Farrell and 
Héritier 2007; Hartlapp 2018). Thus, the legal transfer and the practical 
wielding of new supranational powers do increase the potential for 
national resistance (Saurugger and Terpan 2013; Crespy and Saurugger 
2014; Mathieu and Bauer 2018), as well as for conflicts between 
 supranational and national authorities. Even in spite of an increasingly 
 differentiated integration process (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012), 
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the trend towards vesting ever more competence at the supranational 
level remains unbroken; every revision of the founding treaties has con-
ferred more powers to Brussels. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise 
that the potential for contesting the usage of these powers and the proper 
application of emerging rules become ever more likely (Bauer 2001).
If the range of issues to argue about has increased, so has the num-
ber and diversity of actors taking part in the policy process. At the insti-
tutional level, the days when the Commission and the Council were 
the sole relevant actors of EU policy making are long gone. With the 
increasing influence of the European Parliament (EP) (Corbett et al. 
2011), the formal integration of the Council of the European Union 
(Naurin and Wallace 2008), political moves of the European Central 
Bank (Glöckler et al. 2016), and the boom of EU agencies, EU regu-
latory networks, and various types of committees (Dehousse 1997; 
Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Egeberg 2006), the EU institutional 
landscape has become considerably more complex. First, each new actor 
comes with its own institutional interests, which may clash with those 
of the preexisting actors. Second, as these emerging actors are gradually 
empowered, their incentive and capacity to engage in conflictive rela-
tionship with the remaining actors increase as well (Bauer and Becker 
2014). Enlargement has had a similar effect, as it increased the diversity 
of interests and political preferences (Meardi 2000; Kvist 2004) and gen-
erated distributional tensions between the member states (Pluemper and 
Schneider 2007). In short, with the growth of the EU and changes in 
its institutional setting, the propensity for tensions and conflicts among 
its components has increased (Ege et al. 2018). Indeed, the heteroge-
neity of identities, interests, and situations among actors pertaining to 
the same political system increases the likelihood of conflict (Blau 1977; 
Horowitz 1985). Yet the constitutional and therefore locked-in status 
of much of EU governance and the high number of veto players make 
it very difficult for each institution individually to influence the course 
of EU policies via the legislative channel. These rising constraints have 
been shown to foster informal politics (Christiansen and Neuhold 2013) 
and may well encourage the use of litigation as an alternative strategy to 
achieve political objectives (Swenden 2006, 79).
At the same time, the EU’s policy process shifted from technocracy 
to a more contentious style of decision making. From the mid-1980s, 
with the turn from government to governance and with the broad-
ening scope of issues covered by EU policies, a multitude of interest 
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groups (financial institutions, industry, non-profit organizations, and 
regional and local governments) began to mobilize and intervene in 
the policy process, intensifying the political pressures on decision-taking 
elites (Mazey and Richardson 1993; McLaughlin and Greenwood 
1995; Tömmel and Verdun 2008). Subnational governments have also 
entered the picture, with the establishment of representative offices in 
Brussels (Bauer 1996) and via their participation in regional policy mak-
ing through the partnership principle (Bauer 2002). Far from fostering 
consensual decision making across governmental levels, this has fuelled 
political conflict and rivalry between central and subnational governments 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001, 115; Trondal and Bauer 2017).
In parallel, not only has the EU policy process been permeated by 
interest groups and subnational actors, it has also become increasingly 
vulnerable to pressures from public opinion (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 
Hix 2011). The popular opposition to the EU project expressed by cit-
izens via referenda (Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and the recent 
British refusal to remain in the EU) has further made clear that public 
opinion matters. As they take part in the confrontation of interests that 
mark the EU political process, public opinion, interest groups, and sub-
national governments have significantly increased the potential for con-
flict in the EU.
Finally, in the last few years, the rise of tensions and crises on the 
global scene has intensified the potential for conflict within the EU. 
With the financial crisis and Great Recession, the explosion of armed 
conflicts in its southern and eastern neighbourhood, and the ascent of 
a new nationalism, the EU has been jumping from one crisis to another. 
Caught between gravity and urgency, the EU and the member states 
search for ways to manage and solve these crises. The results are often 
situations with high distributional stakes, which increases the propen-
sity for conflict, as illustrated by the Greek crisis, the refugee crises, and 
the Brexit process. Solidarity crumbles with the growing divergence of 
interests between net donors and net recipients of EU spending policies 
(Scharpf 2017), between the Visegrad Group and the remaining member 
states about refugees, and between pro-European and Euro-sceptics—
to name just a few of the cleavages along which the EU currently risks 
being broken apart.
In sum, we see a changing nature of the EU political system and 
of policy making towards ever greater complexity and ever greater 
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fragmentation. Competence and influence are shared and contested 
between many more actors at different levels than was traditionally the 
case. Kelemen (2011) argues that this has led to the substitution of 
consensus-oriented styles of policy making and embedding of policy 
 struggles within networks with a more adversarial style of policy making  
and conflict. Such policy making—much like in the United States—
increasingly relies on the threat and use of litigation. The strength of 
his argument is to link system features to litigation, therewith providing 
much support for an increasing relevance of litigation, including annul-
ment actions. At the same time, the argument raises many new questions 
that engage more deeply with the link between system and litigation.
When do multilevel policy conflicts among the different actors 
 populating the EU lead to litigation? What motivates policy actors to 
take the judicial step and turn to courts? Litigation may make sense 
for private actors that do not formally take part in the policy decision- 
making process. To them, activating judicial policy making through judi-
cial review may appear as a promising mechanism. Litigation is more 
puzzling, however, when initiated by public actors who do take part in 
the EU decision-making process and most likely have done so in the very 
process from which the contested act or decision emerged. Yet annul-
ment actions are regularly raised by member states, the Commission, the 
Council, and the EP. Why do these public actors litigate? What do they 
expect from a CJEU ruling? Which benefits do they draw from engag-
ing in judicial proceedings? These are a first set of key questions that will 
structure our research.
Even more so, the multilevel structure of EU governance creates 
 conflict that exhibits a multilevel structure as well. In fact, raising aware-
ness of the fact that the EU’s governance arrangement is characterized 
by multilevel actor configurations and thus requires interaction, coop-
eration, and coordination among different kinds of policy stakeholders 
and policymakers at different levels of government has been one of the 
main achievements of research on multilevel governance. When ana-
lysing annulment actions as one mechanism to resolve such multi-
level conflicts, we should thus assess to what extent multilevel conflict 
 configurations translate into multilevel litigant configurations during 
judicial proceedings.
After all, annulment proceedings do not always comprise only 
one applicant attacking only one defendant. While those simple 
 configurations make up for the majority of cases, there are a significant 
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number of judicial conflicts that exhibit a more complex structure, where 
several actors can simultaneously challenge one EU measure or where 
additional policy stakeholders decide to intervene in the conflict in sup-
port of the applicant or the defendant. Annulment conflicts are thus 
often complex, multi-actor, and multilevel. So far, however, we know 
rather little about the conditions under which multilevel governance sys-
tems give rise to simple and/or complex judicial conflicts.
eu Policy mAking And litigAnt configurAtions
Research on EU policy making, the second literature strand relevant to 
our interest in annulment actions, provides insights into actors’ motiva-
tions to engage with litigation. Students of EU public policy making have 
explored the interaction between judicial proceedings and policy making. 
Some are interested in the effect of litigation on policy making, others on 
litigation during implementation as a later stage in the policy cycle.
There is an important body of research on judicial policy making and, 
more generally, on the increasingly prominent role of courts in policy 
making and governance (Stone Sweet 1999; Hirschl 2008). In the EU, 
we know that the Court has played a crucial role in the construction of 
the EU legal order (Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Brunell 
1998) and in favour of market integration and harmonization (Alter and 
Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994; Scharpf 2010). More recent work has empha-
sized the influence of rulings in other areas such as social policy (Conant 
2006; Martinsen and Falkner 2011), gender equality, environmental 
issues (Cichowski 2007), health care policy (Martinsen 2015), and gam-
bling policy (Adam 2015). Thus, litigation matters politically because it 
shapes public policy.
Frequently, these studies explore interactions between the Court, the 
legislative process, and other relevant stakeholders in detail, even if the 
overall impact of rulings on policy making is constrained (Martinsen 
2015; Mathieu et al. 2018). Yet while a great share of this literature is 
interested in understanding court agency and the power of the CJEU to 
influence the course of integration, the full scope of the Court’s agency 
and power relative to other actors and forces in EU policy making is yet 
to be determined. Among other things, this is due to the prevalence of 
different theoretical perspectives on the Court and the methodological 
difficulty inherent in researching court agency when decisions are taken 
behind closed doors (Vauchez 2015).
2 TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY ANNULMENTS IN THE EU  29
In contrast to these studies, this book focuses mainly on motivations  
and structural conditions that lead to litigation. In this context, we 
distinguish political and legal opportunity structures that influence 
actors’ decisions to turn conflict into litigation. In his seminal study 
on anti-nuclear protest movements, Herbert Kitschelt showed that 
 differences in the openness of national political systems for input and dif-
ferences in their capacity to implement policies shape the level of pro-
test (Kitschelt 1986; see also Epp 1998; Boyle 1998). Where more access 
points exist in a political system, for example through separation of pow-
ers between the executive and the legislature or centralization of the 
state, there are fewer structural opportunities for protest and litigation.
While political opportunities certainly play a role in the use of litiga-
tion, the literature on social movements’ legal mobilization shows that 
legal opportunities are decisive. Some even argue that legal opportu-
nity structures explain more of the across-country variation in litiga-
tion than the respective political opportunity structures (Hilson 2017). 
Legal opportunity structures comprise two elements: access to courts and 
legal stock (Hilson 2002; Vanhala 2011). From a procedural perspec-
tive, access is enabled or constrained by laws on locus standi or standing 
rights of the claimant to file suits, court control of their docket, or length 
of procedures (Vanhala 2012), as well as by rules about who carries the 
costs of legal procedures. In addition, what matters from a substantive 
perspective is available precedent case law and the relevant statutory basis 
to which the conflict can be linked. This legal stock helps lawyers formu-
late and carry through with legal disputes (Andersen 2005). Social move-
ments obviously have alternative instruments at their disposal to push 
forward their policy goals. They can rely on lobbying, public protest, or 
litigation (Bouwen and McCown 2007). The literature found that the 
extent to which they rely on litigation is highly dependent on the relative 
openness of the legal system in which they are operating. Where access 
to courts and judicial review is restrained, social movements tend to turn 
away from litigation and favour other strategies. By contrast, in countries 
with a largely unrestricted access to courts, social movements are much 
more active within the judicial arena (De Fazio 2012).
Turning to EU studies, Alter and Vargas explain variation in the use of 
litigation strategies to push for equal pay with a combination of political 
and legal opportunity structures (Alter and Vargas 2000). Conant et al. 
(2017) state that the increasing relevance of formal law and lawyers who 
interact with cultural and legal institutions go hand in hand with rises 
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in litigation activity. Besides legal and political opportunity structures 
they deem micro-level characteristics, such as information or available 
resources in the form of in-house lawyers or pro bono legal advice as well 
as identity politics, to be important. Hartlapp (2018) has shown that 
differences in the level of litigation between the Council, the EP, and 
the Commission can be explained by their different organizational char-
acteristics. According to her, organizational structures inside and across 
EU institutions must be taken into account when trying to understand 
legal mobilization in horizontal annulment actions. In the legislative pro-
cess, the Council can assure its positions most easily. The Commission 
as agenda setter, in contrast, faces the strongest incentives to mobilize. 
The EP does so as well to an increasing extent, particularly since the 
Treaty of Maastricht entered into force. According to Hartlapp (2018), 
the internal decision-making process provides the Commission with the 
greatest freedom to launch annulment actions, the Parliament is some-
what constrained by a possible negative vote in the plenary, while the 
Council needs proactive agreement from all member states to launch an 
annulment. However, her analysis also indicates that agency inside these 
institutions matters a great deal.
More generally, mobilization studies have addressed the link between 
the rise and the impact of litigation. While litigation has initially raised 
much enthusiasm among social movements, researchers found that 
judicial success was generally unable to bring about the social changes 
pursued (Scheingold 1974; Handler 1978, 24; Rosenberg 1991). 
Nevertheless, social movements were able to draw indirect benefits 
from litigation, such as raising their own legal capacity and the public 
awareness of their cause. Litigation was able to consolidate movements’ 
struggling culture and collective identity and thereby triggered mobi-
lization and support to improve their bargaining position in the politi-
cal arena and change predominant legal understandings and paradigms 
(Scheingold 1974; Lobel 1994; McCann 1994, 1998, 2008). All of 
this echoes the argument by Adam et al. (2015) that member states use 
annulment actions without always aiming at judicial success, as judicial 
success can be unrelated or even negatively related to the litigant’s goal 
of raising an annulment action in the first place (see also the examples 
presented in Chapter 1).
Besides its relevance for policy making, litigation also matters at later 
stages in the policy cycle. We discern three ways in which judicial pro-
ceedings matter for implementation and compliance research. Research 
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has repeatedly shown that subnational actors play a decisive role dur-
ing policy implementation. The national failure to comply with EU 
law and the subsequent initiation of the infringement procedure by the 
Commission are often related to conflicts taking place within the mem-
ber states. For example, the dispersion of powers within the member 
states (visible as veto players interfering in the implementation of EU 
policies), can favour implementation failures (Haas 1998; Haverland 
2000; Mbaye 2001; Guiliani 2003). Likewise, compliance conflicts with 
the Commission relate to national party politics (Treib 2003, 2010) 
and interest-representation systems (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; 
Mbaye 2001). Where such conflicts lead to late or incorrect implemen-
tation, subnational actors, in particular private actors, may litigate before 
national courts to bring their state into compliance with EU law (Börzel 
2000; Van der Vleuten 2005; Hartlapp 2008; Hofmann 2016).
Following the top-down perspective of the first generation of 
American policy implementation scholars (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973; Dunsire 1978; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979), EU implemen-
tation studies often have an inherent pro-compliance bias. Litigation is 
either an indicator of an instance in which the Commission has been able 
to uncover implementation failure (i.e. litigation emerges when mem-
ber states fail to comply with EU law) or even as an indicator showing 
how implementation outcomes improved over time. When analysing the 
role of judicial proceedings in the policy process, implementation schol-
ars want to uncover the conditions of implementation failure. They ana-
lyse the conditions under which legal proceedings are used in the EU’s 
system of multilevel governance to bring domestic policies in line with 
existing European requirements (Mbaye 2001; Hartlapp 2005; Börzel 
et al. 2010; Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010; Börzel et al. 2012).
From this classical top-down implementation perspective, litiga-
tion can be interesting whenever it helps us to capture implementation 
outcomes and to understand compliance failure. This perspective over-
looks, however, that litigation can be chosen as a strategic option by the 
Commission to advance their goals in the EU policy process (Schmidt 
2000; Blauberger and Weiss 2013). By threatening to trigger CJEU-
driven policy making in areas where the Council resisted legislation pro-
posed by the Commission, the Commission has managed to change the 
Council’s default position, coaxing member states into action. Related 
scholarship analyses how policy actors can strategically use the shadow 
of litigation in order to influence the policy process (Falkner 2011). 
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Here, litigation or the threat of litigation matters because it affects 
the Council’s calculations of the cost benefits of adopting new legisla-
tion and, as a consequence, affects the balance of power between the 
Commission and the Council.
Finally, litigation can be looked at as a component of the struggles 
taking place between implementing actors, along the lines of the bot-
tom-up approach of the American policy implementation literature 
(Lipsky 1971, 1980; Elmore 1979; Barret and Fudge 1981). Here, turn-
ing the implementation perspective on its head, implementation is con-
ceptualized to depend primarily on the multiple actors at the application 
level. From this perspective, conflict and struggle is not an anomaly but 
rather a natural component of the policy process. Consequently, litiga-
tion is best understood as part of these struggles about the outcome of 
EU public policy making.1
In sum, the literature on implementation, compliance, and Europeanization 
has so far underlined three ways in which judicial proceedings interact with 
the EU public policy process. First, scholars interested in compliance have 
shown that proceedings can help improve national compliance with EU legis-
lation. Second, we also know that the shadow of litigation can be used by the 
Commission to increase its power vis-à-vis the Council in the EU policy-mak-
ing process. Third, it has shown that domestic politics often determines the 
way in which member states react to the CJEU’s rulings. With these analyt-
ical focal points, this literature has predominantly focused on the impact of 
the judicial proceedings (or the threat thereof) on multilevel policy dynam-
ics. However, what about the inverse relationship? How do multilevel politics 
affect the emergence of litigation?
If we combine the insights concerning litigation from the multilevel 
governance literature and from the implementation and Europeanization 
literature, it should be clear that litigation and jurisprudence do not 
emerge in a political vacuum. Neither does annulment litigation. On the 
one hand, we need to study the impact of annulment rulings by analys-
ing how they feed back into conflictive multilevel policy processes. Who 
are the winners and losers of annulment actions? Are actors losing the 
legal battle also always losing the underlying political battle? On the 
other hand, we need to assess how annulment litigation emerges from 
(supranational) compliance failures as well as from more general dys-
functionalities and conflicts in the multilevel governance process. What 
can different kinds of litigant configurations tell us about the underlying 
political conflicts in this regard?
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JudiciAl Politics And JudiciAl success
Finally, the literature on judicial politics and judicial behaviour provides 
obvious insights that need to be taken into account in any kind of anal-
ysis of annulment litigation. In the EU context, the question of judi-
cial behaviour relates to how judges of the CJEU make their decisions. 
Legalists emphasize judicial objectivity, claiming that judges’ decisions 
are predetermined by EU law (Barav 1979). They reject the idea that 
judges’ decisions are influenced by political or ideological preferences. 
Judges’ work is conceived as purely technical, apolitical, and based on 
methodologies of legal interpretation. Yet several alternative models of 
judicial behavioural models, strongly informed and influenced by judi-
cial politics in the United States, have been developed. Proponents of 
an attitudinal model of judicial decision making claim that judgements 
and legal interpretations are never fully determined by the objective 
merits of a case or by a specific legal method (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 
53). Rather, there is a margin of interpretation of the law and of the 
case. This gives judges a lot of freedom within these margins and grey 
areas, which they can use to rule in accordance with their ideological 
preferences. In the case of the CJEU, judges are said to be ideologi-
cally biased in favour of European integration (Mattli and Slaughter 
1998). Moreover, there are proponents of a strategic approach to judi-
cial behaviour. This approach acknowledges judges’ discretion and the 
need for interpretation, too. Yet proponents of the strategic approach 
contend that judges cannot freely use their freedom for interpretation 
to impose their ideologically preferred outcomes. Since they rely on the 
acceptance of their judgements and wish to uphold their authority as a 
well-accepted institution, they have to take the expectations of key liti-
gants and societal stakeholders into account as well. In this sense, they 
will adjust their judgements to the specifics of the respective (political 
or social) situation and rule in a way that will avoid widespread disa-
greement and political retaliation (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 100). In 
the context of the CJEU, for example, judges’ capacity to follow their 
preference for EU integration is argued to be limited by the anticipated 
reactions to their rulings by key member states (Garrett et al. 1998; 
Carrubba et al. 2008; Larsson and Naurin 2016; Dederke and Naurin 
2018). The presumed need to rule strategically in order to avoid non-
compliance or political retaliation constrains the Court’s formal inde-
pendence. Carrubba et al. (2008) show, for example, that when a large 
34  C. ADAM ET AL.
number of powerful member states oppose the Commission in court, 
the Commission’s chances for success are substantially lower than when 
it does not face such an opposition. According to Carrubba and his col-
leagues, this effect is due to the Court’s anticipation of the member 
states’ reactions to its rulings. When several strong member states take 
part in a judicial conflict, the Court may anticipate that a ruling that 
would be negative for them could be neutralized through legislative 
override. Besides, member states enjoying the status of strong political 
power in Brussels are less vulnerable to reputation pressures and, there-
fore, are more likely (than weak member states) not to comply with a 
ruling that is problematic for them.
Interestingly, the scholarly debate about whether or not the CJEU 
is in fact contained by member state influence (Conant 2002) is—by 
and large—a debate about whether the Court is independent or not. 
Consequently, this debate risks losing track of the possibility that the 
Court might be very independent in some context but rather con-
strained in other contexts. According to Mathieu et al. (2018), it is, 
however, essential to keep this possibility in mind and to explore to 
what extent the policy context from which litigation emerges system-
atically mediates the Court’s behaviour. This policy context might 
lead the Court to be more concerned with strategic concerns, giv-
ing it more room for ideologically biased interpretations, or it might 
confront the Court with very different kinds of legal questions. Since 
extant research has mainly looked at CJEU behaviour in the con-
text of preliminary reference procedures, it has mainly looked at the 
involvement of member state governments submitting legal briefs to 
the Court. Whenever we deal with actions for annulment, however, 
we are likely to encounter a more diverse and complex actor constel-
lation, which can include member state governments, regional govern-
ments, interest groups, companies, and EU institutions all at the same 
time. In light of extant research on judicial behaviour, this empirical 
fact highlights the need to analyse the conditions that give rise to 
such complex actor configurations. Moreover, it feeds the interest in 
whether these litigant configurations influence the Court in any kind 
of way. In any case, an exploration of the role and impact of annul-
ment litigation cannot ignore judicial behaviour and the potential rela-
tionship between potentially quite complex actor configurations and 
judicial behaviour.
2 TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY ANNULMENTS IN THE EU  35
concePtuAlizing multilevel  
Annulment conflict
Actor configurations in multilevel policy conflicts and in annulment 
actions are key analytical interests to us. Essentially, we distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical annulment conflicts depending on the 
location of the main opponents in the multilevel system. Moreover, we 
distinguish between simple and complex actor configurations.
Horizontal v. Vertical Conflict
In cases in which supranational institutions litigate against another supra-
national institution, the cleavage is horizontal. The conflict runs between 
actors situated at the same level of the EU system. Take the EP as an 
example. Traditionally, the EP held powers to decide about non-com-
pulsory budget spending and has used these competences to strategically 
expand its powers, for example by increasing non-compulsory expendi-
tures. When the Council challenges the legality of the general budget 
(e.g. C-34/86), it carries conflict between the two EU institutions to the 
judicial arena. Such conflict may emerge between other institutions situ-
ated at the supranational level of the EU system, too. We refer to these 
cases as horizontal cases, since both opponents are located at the supra-
national level (see Fig. 2.1).
In contrast, in actions initiated by actors from the national level—
whether these are national governments, regional entities, or private 
actors—the dominant conflict cleavage is vertical. Therefore, we refer to 
these cases as vertical conflicts throughout the book (see Fig. 2.2). Good 
examples for this are conflicts over the appropriation of EU funds when 
these supranational funds are spent and administered by national enti-
ties. Where EU institutions try to interfere in a legally binding way with 
how to spend and administer that money or decide that national entities (8,QVWLWXWLRQ (8,QVWLWXWLRQKRUL]RQWDOFRQIOLFW
Fig. 2.1 Horizontal conflicts (Source Own compilation)
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have misspent that money, we often witness vertical conflict that regu-
larly leads to annulment litigation with vertical actor configurations (as 
depicted in Fig. 2.2).
Based on the location of the applicant for legal action within the mul-
tilevel system, we thus distinguish between different kinds of annulment 
conflicts. Since the legal defendant in these situations is always situated 
at the EU level, this distinction is mainly driven by the location of the 
applicant at either the national level (vertical conflicts), or the suprana-
tional level (horizontal conflicts).
Simple v. Complex Conflicts
Moreover, we consider conflicts to have complex actor configurations 
where they involve more than one actor on either side of the judicial 
conflict. Whereas the primary conflict cleavage determines whether con-
flicts are considered as vertical or horizontal conflicts, the annulment 
conflicts are often characterized by additional secondary conflict cleav-
ages. Member state governments or other EU institutions can join hori-
zontal conflicts by acting either as additional litigant or as intervener in 
support of the supranational litigant. Thereby, these horizontal conflicts 
acquire an additional vertical conflict cleavage. In these cases, the mem-
ber state and the supranational institution form a multi-actor, and in fact 
multilevel, alliance against the defending EU institution. Importantly, 
however, this vertical cleavage can exist on either side of the conflict. 
Fig. 2.2 Vertical 
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Member state governments can act in ways other than in support of 
applicant institutions. They can also oppose them by joining the case in 
support of the defendant. In these cases, the litigant institution faces a 
multi-actor defence coalition. We can even find configurations charac-
terized by a situation in which multi-actor applicant coalitions confront 
multi-actor defence coalitions (see Fig. 2.3). All of these multilevel 
horizontal conflicts are complex conflicts. Such a conflict configuration 
emerged, for example, over the regulation of the hazardous substance 
decabromodiphenyl ether (DecaBDE) in which the EP and Denmark, 
with the support of Finland and Sweden, initiated, actions for annul-
ment against the Commission, which was itself supported by the United 
Kingdom (C-14/06).
Yet complexity is not always induced by the involvement of member 
state governments joining horizontal conflicts. Additional EU institu-
tions that join cases on the side of the applicant institution or on the side 
of the defendant institution can also induce complexity. A good exam-
ple of this is the negotiation of an agreement between the EU and the 
United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger KRUL]RQWDOFRQIOLFWZLWKFRPSOH[DFWRUFRQVWHOODWLRQV
OHJHQGIRUDUURZFRORXUV SULPDU\FRQIOLFWV VHFRQGDU\FRQIOLFWV
06 (8,QVWLWXWLRQ06(8,QVWLWXWLRQ
Fig. 2.3 Complex horizontal conflicts (Source Own compilation)
38  C. ADAM ET AL.
name record data. The Council had proposed that air carriers should 
be allowed to transfer the data to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, while the EP—being concerned with citizens’ data 
privacy—questioned this practice. Sharing these concerns, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor sided with Parliament once an action for 
annulment was initiated (joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04). 
On the defendant side, the Council found support from the European 
Commission and the United Kingdom, all of whom defended the agree-
ment in court (Hillion and Wessel 2009, 576). Whenever such secondary 
cleavages are relevant, we consider conflicts to be complex actor configu-
rations as opposed to simple actor configurations.2
Similarly, vertical cases can also be characterized by more than one 
conflict, with additional and important secondary conflict lines. Other 
member state governments might object to the application for annul-
ment and join to support the defending EU institution. The same is true 
for other subnational actors. This way, the conflict between two member 
state governments can find expression in them supporting different sides 
in the conflict as illustrated schematically (see Fig. 2.4).
A multilevel And multi-steP  
AnAlyticAl APProAch
This conceptual approach guides and structures the remainder of this 
book. While we address each research question individually, our analyt-
ical goal is to formulate a more general argument about how elements 
of the public policy process and elements of the judicial process feed 
into each other to determine the political role of actions for annulment. 
While the policy context of the cases may explain actors’ decision to 
take use annulments, these decisions influence—but do not determine—
eventual litigant configurations. In turn, the litigant configuration rep-
resenting the structure of the legal conflict is able to affect the legal 
discourse during proceedings. After all, litigants take part in proceedings 
because they hope to influence these in their favour. The information 
and arguments made by the different kinds of litigants can influence—
but hardly determines—the Court’s interpretations and judgement. 
These interpretations and judgements not only determine legal winners 
and losers, but also affect the policy substance and the distribution of 
competences in the EU’s system of multilevel governance by influencing 
current and future policy context from which new conflicts arise.
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The process that in the end determines the impact of court  rulings 
thus resembles an analytical chain that has been studied already. 
Referring to a filtering process, delta, or funnel, these works look at the 
chain of events as a narrowing passageway and seek to understand what 
shapes the eventual litigation (Klages 1983; Glenn 1999; Van Waarden 
and Hildebrand 2009). In contrast, the principal contribution of this 
book consists of promoting a comprehensive approach to studying the 
role of judicial proceedings by analysing them within multiple interre-
lated steps as one element within a continuous multilevel policy process. 
Thereby, we try to go beyond looking merely at the use of litigation, 
at litigant configurations, or at judges’ decisions in isolation. Instead, 
we consider them to be linked in a chain-like fashion. A comprehensive 
understanding of annulment litigation in the multilevel system must 
take this chain-like linkage into account. This view has affinities with the 






Fig. 2.4 Complex vertical conflicts (Source Own compilation)
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feed into each other (agenda setting, policy making, policy implementa-
tion, evaluation, agenda setting). Likewise, the way judicial proceedings 
intervene in the multilevel policy process can be looked at as a sequential 
chain, where multilevel policy conflicts lead to litigation and structures 
litigant configuration. This, in turn, affects judicial outcomes, which, 
through their policy and institutional impacts, feed back into the multi-
level policy process. The chain-like approach that centres on litigants as 
the starting point to policy change is thus very similar to the bottom-up 
approach within the implementation literature.
Based on this analytical and conceptual foundation, the next chap-
ter will provide the relevant information about the legal background of 
annulment actions (Chapter 3). We will then briefly explain our meth-
odological approach (Chapter 4) before presenting three empirical chap-
ters addressing the questions mentioned above. First, we will explore 
the motivations underlying policy actors’ use of annulment actions 
(Chapter 5). Second, we will address the rise of complex actor con-
stellations in annulments proceedings (Chapter 6). We will finalize our 
empirical investigation with judicial success and the impact of annulment 





1.  Following this line of reasoning, some authors integrated court rulings and 
the CJEU into Europeanization research emphasizing the way national 
struggles co-shape the policy implementation process. These works dis-
cuss conflict structures in the national arena as an explanation for national 
Table 2.1 Cases cited in this chapter
C-34/86 Judgment of 3 July 1986, Council v. Parliament, C-34/86, 
EU:C:1986:291
C-317/04; C-318/04 Judgment of 30 May 2006, Parliament v. Council, Joined 
Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, EU:C:2006:346
C-14/06 Judgment of 1 April 2008, Parliament v. Commission, 
C-14/06, EU:C:2008:176
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response to the CJEU’s case law (Blauberger 2012, 2014; Schmidt 2012, 
2014).
2.  In a recent article on Norwegian Supreme Court judgements, Skiple 
et al. (2016) use a similar but wider definition of complex cases identified 
‘through the number of third parties supporting a litigant (i.e. legal inter-
venient), the number of justices who voice their opinion and the number 
of words in the majority opinion’ (Skiple et al. 2016, 9).
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Litigation describes the process of taking disputes to court. With the 
help of Article 263 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) annulment litigation, different kinds of actors can take to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) disputes with European 
Union (EU) institutions over the legality of these institutions’ actions. 
The Court will review the legality of these actions and decide whether to 
declare them void.
Annulment actions thus constitute an important part of the EU’s 
system of judicial protection (Arnull 2011), which also comprises the 
infringement procedure and the preliminary reference procedure. 
The infringement procedure, set out in Article 258 TFEU, allows the 
Commission to address and challenge member states’ violations of EU 
law. In this context, the Commission enjoys the privilege of transferring 
cases to the EU’s judicial arena whenever member states fail to modify 
their application of EU law in response to reasoned opinions in which 
the Commission explains why it believes the respective member state to 
be in violation of its treaty obligations and demands further information 
and appropriate adjustments from the member state (Tallberg 2002; 
Börzel 2003; Hartlapp 2005, chapter 6). Even though most infringe-
ment proceedings do not reach this judicial phase, infringement cases 
eventually brought before the Court still represent a substantial part of 
its overall workload (Arnull 2006, 35; Falkner 2018). In contrast, the 
activation of the CJEU in the context of Article 267 TFEU preliminary 
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reference procedures is the privilege of national courts. Under this pro-
cedure, national courts can refer to the CJEU questions regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty and the validity and interpretation of acts of 
the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the EU. Preliminary rul-
ings have played a significant role in the development of Community law, 
as it is through these exchanges between national courts and the CJEU 
that crucial concepts, such as, for example, the direct effect and the 
supremacy of EU law, have been developed (Craig and de Burca 2011, 
461). As such, preliminary reference proceedings have been an impor-
tant channel through which the constitutionalization of the European 
treaties has emerged. This channel has been turned from being an instru-
ment to assure equal application of EU law before domestic courts into 
being an instrument to challenge national laws and even national consti-
tutional law in breach of EU law in national courts (Alter 1998).
Yet while research on the role of infringement procedures on the 
Europeanization of national policies, as well as research on the role of 
preliminary rulings on the trajectory of European integration, abound 
in political science research, actions for annulment have attracted much 
less attention from this group of scholars. This is rather striking. After 
all, the action for annulment is the only legal instrument with which 
member states, EU institutions, and even citizens, companies, interest 
groups, and regional governments can directly activate the CJEU and 
ask for judicial review. Annulment actions thus constitute a direct road 
to Luxembourg without having to take a detour through national courts, 
although—as will be discussed below—this direct route is not open to all 
applicants under all circumstances at all times.
While we are mainly interested in the political role of annulment liti-
gation, this is hardly possible without appreciating the legal background. 
To understand why disputes are taken to court, we need to understand 
the legal context specifying when actors will actually be able to go to 
court successfully. The use of any legal instruments will be influenced by 
rules regulating their use. This is the essence of the message conveyed by 
the literature on legal opportunity structures. Depending on the options 
a legal system provides, for example the rights attributed to certain 
kinds of actors to file suits in particular constellations, actors’ decisions 
to take recourse to litigation are conditioned, with respective effects 
(Andersen 2006; Conant 2006; Hilson 2002; Wilson and Rodriguez 
Cordero 2006; Vanhala 2012). Social movements’ litigation strategies 
provide good examples. The more open the legal system is for bringing 
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policy-related decisions into the legal arena, the more options social 
movements enjoy to employ litigation in the struggle for their cause. 
However, legal access is nothing “static” or a priori given nor refused 
forever. Quite the opposite. The judges tend to develop the underly-
ing law in their judgements; their judgements on individual cases thus 
bring novel interpretations that, in turn, often influence constitutional or 
treaty-base revisions. Therefore, rules regulating the access to courts in 
certain matters may change over time—thus altering the dynamic of the 
policy processes due to a redistribution of access rights to litigate (Wilson 
and Rodriguez Cordero 2006). As we want to understand policy stake-
holders’ decisions to litigate with the help of annulment actions, the legal 
framework regulating these actors’ capacity to launch annulment cases 
are of great interest. Before this background, this chapter revisits the EU 
legal framework that specifies the use of annulment actions.
This endeavour is actually quite challenging. After all, political sci-
entists are inclined to quickly skim such legal elaborations or to skip 
them completely when these elaborations seem detailed and technical. 
This is a pity, however, since knowing this legal background is impor-
tant for understanding the political role of any kind of legal instrument. 
At the same time, no matter how detailed and technical those writers 
with a background in political science think their writings are, it will be 
tough for them to meet the high standards of legal scholarship. We try 
to find a compromise that is as accessible as possible to political scien-
tists without being perceived by legal scholars of annulment actions to 
be overly simplistic and superficial. This means that the following can-
not be a complete history of relevant case law and judicial interpretations 
on annulment actions. Instead, we try to eclectically describe the most 
important legal developments that seem relevant to understanding the 
political role of annulment litigation in the EU.
Actions for Annulment: some essentiAls
Annulment actions have been a part of the treaties ever since the Treaties 
of Rome. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, we find the legal provisions guid-
ing the application of actions for annulment in Article 263 TFEU.1 This 
article essentially defines three key aspects that determine the possibil-
ity of initiating a successful action for annulment: the range of legal acts 
that can be challenged, the grounds on which legal acts will be annulled, 
and the types of actors that may initiate annulment proceedings. More 
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specifically, Article 263 comprises six paragraphs. In the first paragraph, 
the treaty lists the type of acts that can be reviewed by the Court. The 
second paragraph deals with privileged applicants and the grounds 
that may justify starting an annulment. The third paragraph is about 
semi-privileged applicants, and the fourth is about non-privileged appli-
cants. A new fifth paragraph specifies conditions related to non-priv-
ileged applicants, and the last paragraph presents the time limit for 
initiating annulment actions.
Until 1989, the European Court of Justice was solely responsible 
for decisions on annulment actions. This changed with the creation 
of the Court of First Instance, which relieved the Court from many 
of these cases. This was the case at least at the first instance of these 
cases, whereas the European Court of Justice remained responsible for 
appeals against annulment judgements by the Court of First Instance. 
Initially, the Court of First Instance was competent on annulment 
actions brought by private applicants (mainly regarding competition 
policy). In 1993 and 1994, it became competent to examine all annul-
ment action cases initiated by private parties (Bellamy 2010, 35–36). 
In 2004, the Court of First Instance’s competences have been further 
extended. Among other things, it is charged with deciding actions ini-
tiated by the member states that are directed against the Commission 
and against the Council in certain cases in the fields of state aid and 
(external) trade protection. Moreover, it should hear actions for annul-
ment brought against the Council that resulted from the exercise of 
its implementing powers, and it was charged with deciding actions 
directed against the European Central Bank (ECB) (Fairhurst 2010, 
182). The Treaty of Lisbon further rearranged the distribution of com-
petences between the two Courts. Not only does it rename the Court 
of First Instance the General Court, it also charged this General Court 
with hearing all actions for annulment, except those that involved only 
EU institutions (e.g. horizontal cases), and actions brought by the 
member states against the European Parliament (EP) or the Council 
as long as these had not already been transferred to the Court of First 
Instance in 2004.
When deciding annulment cases, both Courts have and will assess 
whether actions are founded based on four legal grounds specified in 
Article 263(2) that applicants may invoke: lack of competence, infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the treaties 
or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.
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There are two main types of lack of competence. The first consti-
tutes a breach of the principle of conferral entailed in Article 5(2) Treaty 
on European Union, which stipulates that the EU may act only in 
those areas in which it has been conferred powers through the treaties. 
However, the Court has generally relied on a generous interpretation of 
the powers conferred to the EU (Hartley 2007, 398). For example, it 
has developed the doctrine of implied powers (ERTA C-22/70) and has 
only rarely recognized a breach of the principle of conferral (Horspool 
and Humphreys 2012, 255). The second type of lack of competence 
occurs where an EU institution breaches the principle of institutional 
balance by overstepping the powers of another EU institution. Frequent 
conflicts between the Council and the EP arose in this context about the 
appropriate legal basis for legislative action. Since the influence of the EP 
in the decision-making process depends on the legal basis on which an 
act or a policy is adopted, the Court was often called to assess whether 
an act of the Council was adopted under the correct legal basis. This 
type of situation has also been addressed through the second ground for 
annulment: the infringement of essential procedural requirements.
A classic example of violation of procedural requirement is the failure 
to consult an EU body when the procedural rules applying to the deci-
sion required the consultation of that body. In Roquette (C-138/79), for 
example, the Court annulled a measure adopted by the Council under 
the consultation procedure because the Council had adopted the act 
without the opinion of the EP. Moreover, the obligation to provide an 
adequate statement of reasons, in particular a statement of the legal basis 
upon which the measure is adopted, constitutes another important pro-
cedural requirement for annulment actions. Finally, the breach of the 
rights of defence (e.g. the right to be heard, or access to documents for 
stakeholders during the preparation of the act) is also frequently used to 
justify an annulment action.
The third ground to invoke annulments is the infringement of the 
treaty or any rule relating to its application. This is the widest ground 
for actions in annulment. It covers not only all constitutive treaties and 
Community legal acts but also some of the EU’s international agree-
ments, as well as unwritten general principles of law that have been 
developed by the Courts themselves (Türk 2009, 127–128), such as the 
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. These principles 
are particularly relevant when the Community adopts rules that concern 
events that lie in the past. Retroactive rules are allowed only when the 
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public interest weights more than the private interest in the maintenance 
of the status quo. The other three important principles are the principles 
of equality, proportionality, and fundamental rights.
Finally, the actions of EU institutions will be annulled when these 
institutions have misused their powers in taking that action. More specifi-
cally, a misuse of powers seems to have occurred when disputed measures 
‘appear[s], on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to 
have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end 
other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by 
the Treaty’ (T-415/03). Annulment actions based on misuse of powers 
are, however, rarely successful because of the difficulty for applicants to 
provide objective evidences of the motives of the author of the act (Türk 
2009, 142–145) and thus attract fewer litigation decisions.
From a legal perspective, a thorough explanation of the grounds on 
which one initiates an action for annulment is obviously essential. From a 
political science perspective, however, it is interesting to see that in prac-
tice, the majority of annulments that we coded were not initiated with 
reference to any single one of those grounds. Instead, applicants typically 
try to make the case for several of these grounds at the same time.
It is important to highlight that successful actions for annulment must 
not only be founded, they also must be initiated within the appropriate 
time limits stipulated in Article 230(5). Specifically, proceedings ‘shall be 
instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of 
its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on 
which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be’. This 
can be quite a demanding deadline for potential applicants. After all, in 
case no action for annulment reaches the Court before this deadline, it 
considers that all potential applicants have implicitly accepted the legality 
of the EU legal act. For example, in the event that member states fail to 
challenge an unwelcome decision by the Commission on domestic state 
aid arrangements with an action for annulment, they miss the chance to 
have the Court review the legality of the decision later on. Consequently, 
if member states simply ignore such a decision by the Commission, the 
Commission can involve the Court under the infringement procedures 
without running the risk of having the Court review the legality of that 
decision in the process of these proceedings. Consequently, actions for 
annulment are imminent manifestations of conflict that indicate conflict 
without substantial delay. Moreover, they are not simple substitutes for 
infringement proceedings but fulfil their own distinct legal role.
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In case actions for annulment are founded—based on any of the legal 
grounds discussed above—and have been initiated in time, the Court 
shall, according to Article 231(1), declare the respective EU legal act 
void. That means the Court deprives this legal act of its legal effect. In 
fact, the annulment of the act applies retroactively and has effect erga 
omnes in that annulments apply generally and are not limited to the 
applicant.
But before the Court will even assess whether an action for annul-
ment is founded, it will first evaluate whether the case is admissible at 
all. Two aspects that have raised considerable controversy in this regard 
are the types of legal acts that can be subjected to annulment review and 
the types of actors that can make use of annulment actions. In fact, the 
wording of Article 263 TFEU has been modified several times since its 
original conception with respect to these two questions. Most of these 
treaty changes have been motivated by the intent to accommodate the 
Court’s interpretation of both aspects within its respective case law at 
the time. While legal scholars continue to criticize the restrictive rules 
that make it difficult—particularly for private actors to access the Court 
through annulment actions—this evolution has overall led to a consider-
able extension of the list of reviewable acts and of eligible applicants.
An evolving set of reviewAble Acts
Article 263(1) lists the type of acts that can be reviewed by the Court 
of Justice under the annulment regime. These are legislative acts, acts of 
the Council, acts of the Commission, and acts of the ECB, other than 
recommendations and opinions. Acts of the EP and of the European 
Council, as well as acts of bodies, offices, or agencies of the EU can also 
be reviewed—as long as these acts are intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties.
Primary law thus explicitly states that annulment actions can be initi-
ated against EU legislative acts. These legislative acts are defined within 
Article 289 TFEU as those legal acts adopted under the ordinary leg-
islative procedure or under the special legislative procedure. The ordi-
nary legislative procedure corresponds to the former co-decision 
procedure, which grants equal weight to the EP and the Council in the 
decision-making process. Special legislative procedures replace the for-
mer consultative, cooperation, and assent procedures. In those proce-
dures, the Council of the EU is the main legislator, while the EP is less 
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influential as its role is restricted to consultation or approval. Moreover, 
in Article 263(1), primary law also explicitly holds that annulment 
actions can be directed against acts of the Council, the Commission, and 
the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions.
While these provisions seem rather clear on a first glance, they have 
been the subjects of quite a few legal controversies. Very prominently, 
the Commission and the Council found themselves in disagreement 
over whether atypical actions, other than clearly reviewable regulations, 
directives, and decisions other than the explicitly non-reviewable rec-
ommendations and opinion, should also be reviewable through annul-
ment actions. In ERTA (C-22/70), the Court declared for the first time 
that instead of focusing on the form of a challenged act, it would first 
consider its substance when reviewing the applicability of an action for 
annulment. The specific conflict erupted over the renegotiation of the 
European Agreement concerning work of crews of vehicles in interna-
tional road transport in the context of the United Nation’s Economic 
Commission for Europe. This agreement specified regulatory aspects 
such as standardized rest periods for drivers. In preparation of these 
negotiations at the international level, EU member state governments 
had discussed their negotiation strategy within a Council meeting and 
had synthesized the results of these discussions within written proceed-
ings. The Commission demanded that the Court declare these proceed-
ings void since it saw itself competent and responsible for negotiating 
this treaty at the international level. While the Court in this case has left 
a substantial mark on the organization of the EU’s external relations,2 it 
also influenced the annulment procedure itself by stating that according 
to its interpretation of the treaties, annulment actions could be initiated 
against ‘all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature 
or form’ as long as they were ‘intended to have legal effects’ (C-22/70). 
With this interpretation, the Court substantially extended the range of 
acts subject to annulment actions to also involve atypical acts, such as, for 
example, conclusions adopted by the Council, letters written by the staff 
of the Commission, or oral decisions (Türk 2009, 12).
While the question of what constituted such legal effects remained, 
however, the Court clarified in IBM, more than ten years after ERTA, 
that it considered acts to be exerting legal effect when they are ‘bind-
ing on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bring-
ing about a distinct change in his legal position’ (C-60/81). With 
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this interpretation, the Court has also made clear that simply disguis-
ing legal acts as non-binding acts by label would be insufficient to 
make them immune to review through annulment litigation. In case 
C-57/95, the Court, for example, annulled a communication issued by 
the Commission because it saw this communication as having clear legal 
effects for the member states.
Moreover, in Les Verts v. European Parliament (C-294/83), the 
Court further extended the range of reviewable acts by including those 
acts adopted by the EP that have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
Since the original treaty provision had not listed the EP as a potential 
defendant in annulment litigation (Arnull 2000, 182–183), legal acts by 
the EP were not considered to be the subject of annulment litigation. 
Yet with the extended competences of the EP, this provision came to 
be questioned more and more strongly. In this specific case, the French 
ecological nonprofit Les Verts, a predecessor of the French party Les 
Verts, Confédération Écologiste—Parti Écologiste, which subsequently 
became the party Europe Écologiste—Les Verts, had initiated a series of 
actions for annulment against various EU institutions over the allocation 
of EU funds to reimburse political information campaigns in the con-
text of the European elections in 1984. Specifically, they claimed that by 
the manner in which (in this case) the bureau of the EP had allocated 
these funds, the Parliament had unduly used its power to favour those 
parties that had already been elected to the EP before the 1984 election. 
With this application for an annulment of how these funds were allo-
cated, the Court had to consider whether it would even be competent 
to review the legality of actions by the EP. Interestingly, at the oral stage 
in the proceedings, the EP held that its legal acts could not be subjected 
to annulment litigation at least as long as the Parliament itself did not 
have the right to challenge other institutions’ legal acts via annulment 
litigation. This was an interesting suggestion that could have helped the 
Parliament to either reject the legal challenge in this case or at least gain 
the right to bring annulment cases against other EU institutions itself. 
As the advocate general and the Court did not follow this reasoning, this 
became known only for adding the EP to the list of potential defendants 
in annulment litigation. With the Maastricht Treaty, the member states 
followed up on this by formally extending the list of reviewable acts of 
Article 263 to include acts of the EP, acts adopted jointly by the EP and 
the Council, and acts adopted by the ECB.
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Particularly the last episode in this brief overview over the evolution 
of actions reviewable through actions for annulment highlights the fact 
that actions for annulment emerge where EU institutions are competent 
to adopt binding legal acts or where these institutions presume to have 
this right. Consequently, the historical pattern of annulment litigation 
is reflective of the (successful) strive for increasing competences by EU 
institutions. As long as EU institutions are unable to adopt typical legally 
binding acts and as long as they do not try to impose legal effects in 
other ways, actions for annulment are irrelevant. Yet, as the example of 
the EP has indicated, as soon as EU institutions start to gain compe-
tences and try to use these competences to influence politics, they start 
to attract actions for annulment.
The (presumed) right to adopt legally binding acts not only shapes 
empirical patterns of annulment litigation by influencing the list of 
potential defendants. It also influences the sector-specific prevalence of 
annulment litigation. Institutions’ ability to adopt legally binding acts 
can vary from policy sector to policy sector as well as over time. For 
example, the Commission’s competence to adopt legally binding meas-
ures varies across sectors (Franchino 2007). While the Commission may 
adopt legally binding decisions in the field of competition law, it does 
not enjoy this privilege to the same extent in the contexts of the EU’s 
social policy or public health policy. Consequently, it cannot be surpris-
ing that we find a higher number of actions for annulment in the context 
of competition law than in the context of public health policy. Similarly, 
we see more actions for annulment in the context of state aid policy, as 
the Commission is able to enforce EU state aid law by adopting legally 
binding decision. In contrast, wherever the Commission fulfils its role as 
guardian of the treaties on the basis of adopting reasoned opinions in the 
context of infringement proceedings, we do not observe many actions 
for annulment. After all, reasoned opinions do not fall under the cate-
gory of reviewable acts. Overall, this creates an exciting tension; while 
actions for annulment are particularly frequent in areas where EU insti-
tutions have far-reaching competences, they can be particularly influen-
tial in areas in which EU institutions are just starting to fight for these 
competences. After all, an aggressive push for more binding influence by 
an EU institution is likely to attract an action for annulment and will give 
the Court a chance to weigh in on whether this institutional power grab 
is compatible or incompatible with EU law.
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An evolving list of APPlicAnts
The unique feature of actions for annulment is that they allow actors to 
directly activate the Court. Yet EU law does not grant this right to all 
types of actors to the same extent. Different types of actors enjoy dif-
ferent privileges to directly challenge EU institutions at the CJEU. In 
fact, EU law distinguishes between so-called privileged applicants, semi- 
privileged applicants, and non-privileged applicants, where privileged 
applicants are the major institutional actors, the group of semi-privileged 
applicants consists of the more peripheral EU institutional actors, and 
the group of non-privileged applicants basically comprises regional gov-
ernments, interest groups, companies, and individual citizens.3
Privileged applicants, listed in Article 263(2), do not have to fulfil 
any specific conditions for initiating annulment actions. When evaluat-
ing the admissibility of a case, the Court does not evaluate the stand-
ing rights of these applicants. Individual member states, the Council, 
the Commission, and since 1992, the EP make up the group of such 
privileged applicants. With respect to individual member states, the 
right to initiate annulment proceedings is limited to its governmental 
authorities and ‘cannot be extended to regional governments or self- 
governing communities, regardless the extent of their powers’ (joined 
cases T-32/98 and T-41/98, as well as joined cases T-132/96 and 
T-143/96). The Court thus treats regional authorities as non-privileged 
applicants (see below).
Semi-privileged applicants can be admitted to initiate an action 
for annulment when they are able to demonstrate that they do so ‘for 
the purpose of protecting their prerogatives’—as stipulated in Article 
263(3). In contrast, privileged applicants are admitted even when 
cases do not involve their individual prerogatives. Today, the Court of 
Auditors, the ECB, and the Committee of the Regions make up this cat-
egory of semi-privileged applicants. Before 1992, the EP was a part of 
this group as well. The inclusion of a semi-privileged group of applicants 
has been the result of an evolving EU polity and an evolving jurispru-
dence of the Court. Before the Treaty of Maastricht, the treaties only 
spoke of privileged and non-privileged applicants; with the EP not being 
part of the privileged applicants. Yet over time, the Parliament not only 
passively gained more power but also tried to actively increase its influ-
ence. Since these developments went hand in hand, the Parliament was 
62  C. ADAM ET AL.
able to make more and more convincing cases that the Council and the 
Commission were trying to interfere with its (newly gained) preroga-
tives. In Chernobyl (C-70/88), the EP attacked the legality of a Council 
regulation that established permitted levels of radioactive contamination 
of food because this regulation had been adopted on the basis of an inap-
propriate legislative procedure. It should have been adopted under a pro-
cedure that would involve the EP more substantially. In this particular 
case, the Court rejected the Council’s objection that the EP was not an 
eligible applicant in this regard and established for the first time that it 
would generally consider the Parliament able to bring such cases wher-
ever its own prerogatives were at stake. There are many cases in which 
EU institutions accuse each other of adopting legal acts on a wrong 
treaty base and to strategically pick an inappropriate legal procedure just 
to maximize their institutional influence (McCown 2003; Jupille 2004). 
The Courts interpretation of the Chernobyl case laid the ground for this 
new category of semi-privileged applicants. Subsequently, the Maastricht 
Treaty formalized this category and explicitly extended this right to 
the ECB. The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon followed 
by further extending this list to include the Court of Auditors and the 
Committee of the Regions.
Finally, Article 263(4) TFEU extends the right to initiate annulment 
proceedings to ‘any natural or legal person’. This group of applicants is 
commonly referred to as non-privileged applicants or private applicants, 
a label that indicates the stricter conditions of admissibility that these 
actors face. Although the term ‘private applicants’ is often used as a syn-
onym of non-privileged applicant, this category can also entail public 
authorities. In fact, regional governments, such as state governments or 
also municipalities, are an important part of this group of non-privileged 
actors.
The classification of regional governments, such as the German 
Länder, as non-privileged actors is quite consequential in this regard, as 
this keeps them from sending to the CJEU their own lawyers, who are 
not officially recognized at the CJEU bar. Unlike member states’ gov-
ernments, whose internal lawyers can plead before the CJEU, regions 
have to delegate their legal representation. This represents an additional 
hurdle when trying to initiate an action for annulment.
Overall, legal scholars have repeatedly described the conditions that 
non-privileged actors have to fulfil to be admitted to court with annul-
ment actions to be ‘notoriously strict’ (Arnull 2001, 7) or even as an 
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‘almost insurmountable barrier’ (Barav 1974). And yet today, this group 
of applicants brings the majority of annulment actions to the Court’s 
attention despite facing a relatively strict admissibility test. Nevertheless, 
the Court has been a bit more self-restrained when developing the stand-
ing rights of this applicant group then it has with respect to the EP and 
other EU institutions.4 To a large extent, this conservative position 
is justified with reference to the role of the Article 267 TFEU prelim-
inary reference proceedings. The Court has held that both procedures 
have to be seen in combination to understand the EU’s system of judicial 
review. After all, in most cases, it should be sufficient for citizens to turn 
to national courts to enforce their rights and—where necessary—to press 
the national court to demand a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. In 
the context of such preliminary rulings, the CJEU can be asked to assess 
the validity of acts adopted by EU institutions. Only where this prelim-
inary reference procedure is unavailable, should non-privileged actors 
have the chance to turn to the CJEU directly.
Consequently, actions for annulment are not available to non-privi-
leged actors in case the contested EU legal act is not of direct concern 
to them. To the Court, this direct concern requirement means that 
the ‘measure must directly affect the legal situation of the person con-
cerned and its implementation must be purely automatic and result from 
Community rules alone without the application of other intermediate 
rules’ (T-69/99). Therefore, non-privileged actors can have a hard time 
demonstrating that they are directly concerned by a European directive 
or by a decision addressed to a member state, for example. This does not 
mean, however, that non-privileged actors have never been able to suc-
cessfully challenge such acts (e.g. C-386/96P or C-291/89).
In addition to having to demonstrate their direct concern, non- 
privileged applicants have to demonstrate that they are individually con-
cerned by EU legal acts as well. What this means has essentially been 
developed in the Court’s Plaumann ruling (C-25/62), where the Court 
held that ‘persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may 
only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by 
reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and 
by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the 
case of the person addressed’. One of the ironies of this interpretation 
is that particularly in those cases where the adverse effects of EU legal 
acts are rather widespread and affect many non-privileged actors at the 
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same time, each of them will have a very hard time fulfilling the individ-
ual concern criterion and challenging the respective legal act before the 
Court (Moser and Sawyer 2008, 84f.).
Generally speaking, the relatively high hurdles that non-privileged 
actors must overcome to establish individual concern when trying to 
challenge regulations and directives initially formulated in Plaumann is 
upheld to this day. This does not mean, however, that non-privileged 
actors have never tried to challenge regulations and directives. They 
have done so and continue to do so despite being aware of the relatively 
low chance of having cases admitted to the Court. While the Court in 
Codorniu v. Council (C-309/89) had been interpreted by some legal 
scholars as a breakthrough for private actors’ standing rights, subsequent 
case law quickly dissolved these kinds of hopes for easier access to the 
Court (Arnull 2001). Nevertheless, this case, in which a Spanish pro-
ducer of Crémant challenged a Commission regulation that would only 
allow producers from France and Luxembourg to label their high-qual-
ity sparkling wine Crémant, helped to establish that non-privileged actors 
could in fact challenge true regulation and true directives (Arnull 2001, 
80). However, later attempts to revise the so-called Plaumann test to 
assess the individual concern of directives and regulations have been 
rejected by the Court. In UPA (C-50/00), Advocate General Francis 
Jacobs had criticized the restrictive Plaumann test as inappropriate and 
proposed a less restrictive test for individual concern. The Court did not 
follow his opinion in this regard, however (Moser and Sawyer 2008, 85). 
Interestingly, when the French fishing company Jégo Quére attacked 
a Commission directive that specified new minimum mesh sizes, the 
General Court handling the case at first instance tried to introduce a less 
restrictive reformulation of the Plaumann formula (T-177/01). When 
the Commission appealed against the Court’s at the Court of Justice, 
however, the Court of Justice overruled this modification and recon-
firmed its determination to stick to the Plaumann formula (Moser and 
Sawyer 2008, 90).
One important change of primary law that came with the Lisbon 
Treaty was an addition to Article 263(4) TFEU. Here, the member 
states explicitly stated that regulatory acts that do not entail implementa-
tion measures would be reviewable with the annulment procedure. This 
would get rid of the individual concern criterion, which has continued 
to be a substantial hurdle for private litigants to effectively have EU legal 
acts reviewed before the Court, at least as long as regulatory acts did not 
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entail further implementing measures. Yet since the treaty abstained from 
defining what a regulatory act and implementing measures entailed spe-
cifically, it was—and still is—up to the Court to bring forward more spe-
cific definitions (Craig 2010). This is what the Court continues to do. In 
Inuit (C-583/11 P), for example, the Court established that it consid-
ered regulatory acts to be acts of general applicability (such as directives 
and regulations) that have not been adopted under the ordinary or spe-
cial legislative procedure (Peers and Costa 2012). For acts adopted under 
these legislative procedures, non-privileged actors would thus still have to 
establish direct concern and individual concern to have the Court assess 
whether an annulment action is indeed founded. Moreover, in subse-
quent judgements, the Court upheld rather restrictive interpretations of 
what implementing measures entailed, sometimes even rejecting opinions 
by the respective advocate general (e.g. T&L Sugars [C-456/13 P]).
conclusion
With this necessarily brief and selective overview over the legal back-
ground of actions for annulment, we have tried to highlight, among 
other things, that actions for annulment are not the only instrument 
through which the Court can be brought to review the legality of supra-
national actions. Yet quite importantly, they are the only instruments 
with which member states, other EU institutions, and even citizens, 
companies, or interest groups can directly invoke the Court. Moreover, 
the rules and interpretations guiding the conditions under which these 
different kinds of actors can successfully initiate actions for annulment 
have evolved considerably since the early days of the European project. 
Generally speaking, this road to Luxembourg has become broader and 
more accessible, allowing for the review of more legal acts by more types 
of actors. Typically, this evolution is seen to be driven by the judges at 
Luxembourg, who have helped to develop the annulment procedure 
through case law that has repeatedly led to the revision of primary law. 
Since the openness and shape of a legal system definitely influences the 
impact of this legal system on the resolution of political conflict, the 
political balance of power, and the general dynamic of policy processes 
(Hilson 2002; Andersen 2006; Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006; 
Vanhala 2012), actions for annulment are likely to become even more 
important as a tool with which one can still leave a mark in an increas-
ingly heterogeneous and fragmented European Union.
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The legal evolution of actions for annulment has been influenced par-
ticularly strongly by annulment actions launched in areas where their 
admissibility was seen as highly questionable. It was those cases that 
required the Court to set the future course of this legal instrument. In 
this regard, the Court’s interpretations have at times answered objective 
needs, for example, when the EP’s legal acts were included in the list 
of supranational acts eligible for annulments (e.g. C-294/83, T-16/04, 
T-308/07). Such formal review of parliamentary acts was not needed as 
long as the powers of the EP remained merely symbolic. In this sense, 
the extension of annulments to comprise the EPs’ acts was the log-
ical consequence of the shifting balance of power in the supranational 
institutional order. A similar logic applied in those cases where the EP 
brought annulments against other institutions’ actions to the Court (e.g. 
C-70/88, C-65/90, C-295/90). In the original treaty provision, the 
Parliament did not have the formal right to do so; the Court conferred 
this right, however, to the EP via its case law, and later, this change of 
legal doctrine found its way to into the treaty (McCown 2003).
While many legal scholars continue to question whether the rules that 
guide the admission of actions brought by non-privileged actors provide 
effective judicial protection (Eliantonio and Kas 2010; Kornezov 2014), 
the gradual extension of the scope of application of annulment actions, 
as well as the rising empirical importance of annulment actions over time, 
reflect the ever-greater powers delegated to the EU and its increasing 
internal sophistication. In itself, the evolution of annulments indicates the 
increasing maturity of the EU as a political system and supports our argu-
ment about the growing conflict potential in the EU multilevel system.
Nevertheless, the evolving rules on reviewable acts under, and eli-
gible applicants for, actions for annulment influence the empirical pat-
terns of annulment litigation. Semi-privileged actors, such as the ECB or 
the Court of Auditors, can only challenge those acts in order to defend 
their own prerogatives. Consequently, we see actions for annulments 
launched by these institutions where they do have prerogatives or where 
they claim to have prerogatives. Because of the relatively strict rules on 
admitting cases by companies, for example, many annulment actions ini-
tiated by these actors emerge in the context of competition and state aid 
law where these actors can often make a relatively strong case for being 
directly and individually concerned. And yet the sheer mass of actions for 
annulment in any one area does not necessarily determine the impact of 
actions for annulment in that area. On the contrary, areas with relatively 
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few actions for annulment are areas where EU institutions only start to 
claim the right to act in legally binding ways. In those cases, the Court’s 
assessment of that right is arguably quite influential for the future course 
of European integration.
Finally, in strictly legal terms, actions for annulment serve a rather 
clear legal purpose. They represent a legal attack on an EU institution 
that is claimed to have overstepped its mandate or at least has allegedly 
neglected procedural requirements. Consequently, the respective EU 
institution appears in Court as the defendant. From a legal standpoint, 
it is thus clear who the defendant is in this constellation. Interestingly, 
this is much less clear from a political perspective. After all, for member 
states, regional governments, and other subnational actors, the initiation 
of an annulment action can often be a measure of last resort to fend off 
legally binding interference by EU institutions that are perceived as ille-
gitimate, inappropriate, politically inopportune, very costly, or all of the 
above. Politically, they try to defend their political realm against supra-
national interferences. Making use of the EU’s legal system can be an 
important part of such a defence. Therefore, in the next chapter, we turn 
to these political motivations to initiate actions for annulment.
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against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individ-
ual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct con-
cern to them and does not entail implementing measures. Acts setting up 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions 
and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons 
against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal 
effects in relation to them. The proceedings provided for in this Article 
shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or 
of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on 
which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be’.
2.  We have already discussed the ERTA judgements implied powers doctrine 
in Chapter 1 and will also touch on it in Chapter 5.
3.  This terminology is not the terminology of the treaties. Yet the terms 
‘privileged applicant’, ‘semi-privileged applicant’, and ‘non-privileged 
applicant’ are widely used in legal scholarship.
4.  See above with the ERTA and Chernobyl cases, for example.
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In the remainder of this book, we study the sequence through which 
annulment litigation affects multilevel politics. This sequence is composed 
of distinct, yet interlinked, analytical steps that feed into each other. We 
start by (1) analysing actors’ motivations for turning a policy controversy 
into a judicial conflict. From there, we move on to investigate (2) litigant 
configurations that influence annulment proceedings, all the way to assess-
ing (3) the judicial outcome and the political and institutional impact of 
annulment actions. Our focus on this whole sequence reflects our presump-
tion that there are several different things to analyse in order to understand 
how the emergence of annulment litigation feeds back into the European 
Union (EU) multilevel system. We have to understand when and why dif-
ferent kinds of actors want to initiate annulment litigation; how this inten-
tion by different actors is reflected by the litigant configuration in court; 
and how this litigant configuration relates to judicial behaviour. Finally, we 
have to understand the institutional and political effects of judgements. 
Focusing on this whole sequence sets this book apart from much of the 
extant research on legal conflicts in the EU multilevel system, which has 
typically focused on these steps individually, without conceiving them as 
elements coming together in the form of a complex process. The research 
design applied in this study is thus innovative as it attempts to combine the 
analysis of single steps individually with a systematic argument about their 
interlinkages and their respective roles in the broader sequence through 
which litigation intervenes in multilevel governance.
CHAPTER 4
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In terms of data, this project brings together original quantitative data 
that aggregates information based on court documents on annulment 
actions as well as qualitative data collected through interviews with actors 
that took part in the studied processes and available documents. For 
each step of this study, we are thus able to combine quantitative analy-
sis with in-depth analysis of concrete EU annulment conflicts. We also 
bring together a broad range of mostly new data sources, notably forty 
expert interviews with actors involved in annulment conflicts at the dif-
ferent stages of the EU multilevel system and a large-N original data set 
on all annulment actions in the EU multilevel system. Most of the annul-
ment actions analysed in our case studies date from the last ten years. 
This relative recentness allows tracing processes that are still relatively 
fresh in the memories of interviewees. The data set, in contrast, allows 
us to assess long-term trends and to reach much further back in time. 
Specifically, it covers the whole period from the Treaties of Rome to the 
end of 2012. Specifically, we include annulment actions that obtained a 
judgement until the end of 2015. Note that once an annulment action is 
launched, it takes on average twenty-four months—at times substantially 
longer—until a judgement is taken. Thus, our quantitative analysis cap-
tures cases that have been launched until 2012 and concluded at the end 
of 2015. We can thus draw upon different quantitative and qualitative 
analysis techniques to shed light on the chain through which annulment 
conflicts intervene in the EU multilevel system. This chapter explains 
the logic behind the choice of our research strategy in more detail and 
justifies our case selection. Moreover, it provides all necessary informa-
tion about the empirical material we collected. We hope that this chap-
ter allows the reader to assess the empirical and systematic quality of our 
subsequent arguments and claims.
reseArch strAtegy
So far, political science has paid little attention to annulment con-
flicts in the EU as an analytical category of its own. In fact, doing so 
begs the question of how the study of annulment actions can improve 
our understanding of EU multilevel politics. What are these annulment 
actions? To which theoretical concepts do they relate? Are they a case 
of supranational noncompliance and implementation conflict in the EU 
that could bring a new dimension to research on compliance and imple-
mentation? Will they help us to study this phenomenon of supranational 
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noncompliance, or are actions for annulment only a tool of inter-institu-
tional conflict and procedural politics, which help EU institutions strug-
gle for legislative influence (Jupille 2004)? Do they speak to research on 
the strategic interaction between these institutions in the process of leg-
islative bargaining, or are actions for annulment merely another channel 
through which the Court can influence the trajectory of European inte-
gration by means of judicial law making? Are they thus mainly a category 
of cases able to speak to scholars of judicial behaviour and European 
integration who have so far focussed primarily on the role of preliminary 
references?
Our tentative answer to all of these questions is yes. Actions for annul-
ment are probably best viewed as a case of all of these things. Therefore, 
in order to understand their political role, all of these aspects have to 
be taken into account at the same time. Therefore, we take a more gen-
eral approach and treat annulment actions as manifestations of conflict 
within the EU’s multilevel system. These conflicts manifest themselves 
as accusations of noncompliance against EU institutions. Yet often, they 
result from conflicts over policy application between the respective supra-
national institution and national actors. As a result of these conflicts, the 
Court is activated and obtains a chance to develop the rules guiding pol-
icy making and decision competences within the multilevel system. All 
of these different aspects can be integrated by considering annulment 
actions as manifestations of conflicts within the multilevel system that are 
judicialised and thereby enabled to leave a permanent mark in that mul-
tilevel system. Therefore, it is essential to adopt a sequential analytical 
perspective that is able to integrate the individual steps within this rather 
complex chain of events that define the role and impact of annulment 
litigation. Because of the complexity of such an endeavour and the rather 
limited insights of prior research on the political role of annulments, 
such an effort is necessarily explorative to some extent.
With regard to the sequential causal chain linking litigation to multi-
level governance, our research design is informed by the limited availabil-
ity of data and theory that would allow tracing the conceptualized causal 
chain from the beginning to the end of an annulment cycle. Information 
on annulment conflicts seldom starts with the motivations underlying the 
conflict or ends with how rulings feed back into policy making. Given 
the absence of existing data covering all relevant steps of the chain, in 
combination with the lack of systematic theorizing about the operat-
ing causal mechanisms, our endeavour has an important exploratory 
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dimension, which speaks for a deductive-inductive strategy carried out 
by a mixed methods approach. The analysis of the relevant steps in the 
annulment sequence (motivations to litigate, litigants’ constellations, 
ruling outcomes, ruling impact) thus constitutes a heuristic attempt 
to order our research field and allow for applying theoretical insights 
from other discussions. Case study evidence exemplifies the working of 
hypothesized causality empirically while at the same time bringing to the 
fore additional explanatory factors and mechanisms. Furthermore, quan-
titative analysis allows probing the plausibility (or even testing their fit) 
of these factors and mechanisms on a larger number of cases.
In terms of analytical framework, we combine a focus on each of the 
steps in the sequential causal chain individually with a comprehensive and 
synthetic approach of their linkage throughout the multilevel system. 
This way, characteristics carved out in earlier steps become explanations 
for patterns in later steps of the annulment sequence. We thus emphasize 
the endogenous character of the way litigation emerges from and inter-
venes in multilevel policy conflicts. To be clear, the research design does 
not focus exclusively on these endogenous factors shaping annulment 
conflicts in the multilevel system. Rather, while our sequential argument 
works out this endogenous causality for each step, it comes as a comple-
ment to broader explanations that also include exogenous factors.
In sum, since the existing literature (on other forms of EU litigation 
than annulments) frequently addresses the use of litigation, litigants’ 
constellations, outcomes, and impact of litigation as analytically separated 
issues, they do so with an exogenous explanatory approach. By linking 
these steps together into a wider causal chain, we develop a new explan-
atory approach for annulment litigation that is based on endogenous 
mechanisms.
cAse selection
There have been several thousand annulment rulings since the founding 
of the EU in 1957. From this universe of cases, a number of annulment 
rulings were selected for in-depth analysis. We selected these annulments 
in order to cover both vertical and horizontal conflict categories.
With respect to vertical conflicts, the case selection proceeded in two 
steps, aiming to cover the widest possible variety of types of multilevel 
policy conflicts. In the first step, we selected two countries from which 
to choose annulment cases, namely Spain and Germany. We chose these 
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countries for three reasons. First, both Spain and Germany are among 
the member states that raise most annulment actions per year (Bauer and 
Hartlapp 2010). Second, both countries present different litigant pro-
files, as shown by the different extent to which they raise preliminary 
rulings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); 
Germany raises many, Spain relatively few. Third, most annulment 
actions raised by Spain relate to financial sanctions in EU redistributive 
policies, mainly in agriculture and cohesion policies; such cases related 
to fiscal issues are relatively rare in Germany. In other words, because of 
such structural differences between both member states, we have reason 
to suspect that the nature of the conflicts underlying litigation might dif-
fer in those countries, too.
In the second step, we chose a series of annulment cases in each coun-
try. To select those individual annulment cases, we started by listing for 
both countries all annulment actions raised by national or regional gov-
ernments between 2010 and 2015, coding them with regard to the type 
of policy field they belong to and the subject of the dispute. Many of the 
cases dealt with conflicts over EU redistributive policies, as mentioned 
above in agriculture and cohesion policies. This seems to be a relatively 
homogeneous category of cases that focuses almost exclusively on finan-
cial issues (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). To assure variance across cases, 
we decided to treat all cases related to the use of EU funds as one ana-
lytical category instead of picking individual cases within this policy field. 
We then randomly selected six cases in Spain and six cases in Germany 
among the remaining cases that did not fall into the EU redistributive 
category.
The selection of our horizontal annulment cases for in-depth study 
had to be done differently. First, because the conflict involved EU insti-
tutions on both sides of the conflict, no different polity contexts (i.e. 
member states) could be selected. All horizontal conflicts, by our defi-
nition, originate in the political system of the EU. To select a broad 
range of annulment cases involving European institutions, we thus 
looked at the cross-sectoral distribution of the full sample of horizon-
tal cases. Distribution across policy fields was assessed via the treaty arti-
cle(s) referred to in the ruling. Treaty articles were grouped into broader 
policy areas with the help of an established codebook (Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 1999).1 That meant, for example, that for external affairs, we 
selected all cases coded as dealing with external relations in the Stone 
Sweet and Brunell database (matter 412).2 Cases dealing with common 
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and foreign security policy (matter 384), development cooperation (mat-
ters 338 and 419), or integrated Mediterranean programmes (matter 
423) were added. Where multiple treaty bases applied without corre-
sponding to the same policy area systematic, the substance of the case 
was assessed in detail to identify the dominant policy field, and the case 
was then accordingly assigned to the correct category.
It turned out that the category of external affairs is the area with 
the highest number of horizontal annulment conflicts (forty-one cases 
representing 29% of all cases). The second most important area is staff 
regulation and institutional provisions (twenty-two cases, or 15%), fol-
lowed by environment and energy as well as justice and home affairs 
(fourteen cases each, with the latter seeing a substantial hike in the last 
three years), agriculture and fisheries (eleven cases), community budget, 
state aid (eight cases each), and taxes (six cases). The number of horizon-
tal annulment conflicts is negligible in all other policy fields (Hartlapp 
2018). Based on this cross-policy distribution, we decided to focus on 
external affairs as the area with the highest overall number of annulment 
cases. Here, all cases have been studied systematically and in depth. In 
addition, horizontal cases from other policy areas have been added to 
the sample of cases studied in more depth where primary or secondary 
sources had highlighted that they are of particular interest, for example 
where interviewees mentioned them as particularly interesting or where a 
precedent was set. This helped us to gain in-depth insight into the most 
dynamic policy field while at the same time covering the politically rele-
vant cases on other areas as well. In sum, our cases were selected to rep-
resent annulment conflicts that seem to be most typical from a bird’s eye 
perspective while using the advantage of our research design to be open 
to include additional information and thus cases promising to enrich our 
understanding (see also Bauer and Knill 2014).
dAtA
We built a data set covering all annulment actions that were launched 
since the founding of the European Community and received a judge-
ment until the end of 2015. To this aim, we extracted all cases from the 
Stone Sweet and Brunell (2007) Data Set on Actions under Article 230: 
1954–2006. We updated the selection done by our colleagues by retriev-
ing the relevant information from CURIA and EurLex. All entries were 
double-checked and completed. We inserted in the emerging data base 
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information on the date of litigation and ruling, claimant and defendant, 
the legal domain, or subject matter and decision type—thereby following 
and relying on Stone Sweet and Brunell’s method. In addition, however, 
we added information on the title and substance of the case, the official 
number, actors intervening in the case, and information on who won or 
lost the case (here, cost transfer was used as indicator). In other words, 
we substantially enriched the Stone Sweet and Brunell database in terms 
of content and time line.
The database on which this book relies is substantially improved 
also with respect to data analysis done over the past years by us for var-
ious publications. First, we had selected only cases launched against 
the Commission (up until 2012); we later include actions against all 
EU institutions and not just against the Commission (until 2015). 
This includes the horizontal cases in which EU institutions also act as 
litigants. Additionally, this includes vertical cases in which the defend-
ant is not the Commission (e.g. private/regional/member states v. 
Council/European Parliament [EP]/European Central Bank). This 
means that our analysis is no longer limited to accusations of noncom-
pliance voiced against the Commission, but involves such actions raised 
against all EU institutions. Most importantly, however, we are able to 
assess the participant structure within these conflicts. We capture all 
litigants as well as all intervening parties for all of those cases. In our 
final database, every case refers to a factual court ruling. A ruling may 
combine court cases, and there can be more than one claimant to a case 
(joint cases). We treat joint cases as individual annulment conflicts as they 
result from the same underlying conflict. We include all cases initiated. 
Where cases were at some point found to be inadmissible, we record this 
as the respective judicial outcome of the conflict.
For the case studies, we meticulously analysed the text of the respec-
tive rulings and put it into context with other primary and second-
ary sources. Where access to primary documentation was restricted, we 
relied on expert interviews as the adequate approach to maximize the 
amount of available information for studying underlying motivations 
and assessments (e.g. Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002). Our 
interviewees were usually high officials at the national level and EU level 
who themselves, in the capacity of their respective offices, took part 
in the decisions to litigate in the cases selected. Most of the time, our 
interviewees were state attorneys and officials from policy departments 
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and legal services from the national and subnational ministries and EU 
institutions.
A total of forty semi-structured interviews were carried out between 
April 2009 and June 2016 in Berlin, Bilbao, Bonn, Brussels, Dresden, 
Madrid, Munich, and Santiago de Compostella (see the Annex for 
details). Three interview partners were Commission officials (labelled 
as COM_1, COM_2, COM_3), one interview partner worked in the 
legal service of the EP (EP_1), one interviewee came from the Council 
(CONS_1), nine interviewees worked for various German federal min-
istries (MIN_DE_1, etc.), nine interviewees were Spanish civil servants 
affiliated with various national ministries (MIN_ES_1, etc.), one inter-
viewee worked for the regional ministry of Saxony (MIN_SA_1), one 
interviewee was from the regional ministry of Bavaria (MIN_BA_1), 
six interviewees were from various regional ministries of Galicia (MIN_
GA_1, etc.), five interviews were led with lawyers working in private law 
firms (LAW_1, etc.) and four interviews with employees from private or 
public companies involved in annulment litigation (COMP_1, etc.).3
Each of the interviews followed a semi-structured guideline with open 
questions and lasted between thirty minutes and two hours.4 The ques-
tions were constructed with a view to capturing process and preference 
information on the specific annulment cases as well as assessments of how 
specific the case at hand was—from the view of the interviewee—for EU 
annulment conflict more generally. In other words, we asked the inter-
viewees to reconstruct the decision-making process of litigation and asked 
a series of questions aimed at uncovering the criteria and considerations 
that had driven the decision to litigate. All interviews were transcribed 
and deductively coded, which allowed systematic searches for specific 
issues covered throughout the argumentative chain; for example, to facil-
itate the interpretation of how the cases relate to motivations, we were 
interested in quotes that mentioned the objectives of going to court.
Besides collecting the interview material, we also traced information on 
the litigation process on the basis of published primary documents, most 
importantly the rulings and opinions available on CURIA. Apart from 
containing the CJEU’s assessment of the situation, these documents typ-
ically describe the interaction between claimant and defendants in the con-
flict prior to litigation, as well as the core legal pleas brought forward. This 
information was complemented and validated by publicly available sources 
such as local, regional, and national press coverage and other media as well 
as position papers from the involved parties (when available).
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conclusion
To sum up, in this chapter, we presented the reasons behind our choices 
about how to study EU annulment conflicts empirically. The sequen-
tial approach, which we deem necessary to capture the political role of 
actions for annulment, requires us to look into a variety of issues span-
ning from multilevel policy conflicts to the feedback effect of litigation 
into policies and institutions of the EU multilevel system. Our attempt 
to do justice to the complexity of our research object finds expression 
in the research design that covers different steps in the process individu-
ally and their chain-like relationship. We believe a combination of quan-
titative data analysis and studying selected cases in depth to be the most 
appropriate strategy. The efforts to collect this quantitative and qualita-
tive data have been immense. As a result of these efforts, the subsequent 
chapters can rely on substantial and original empirical data.
notes
1.  We updated the codebook by Stone Sweet and Brunell in order to cover 
new treaty bases (1999).
2.  The mentioned matters 412, 338, 384, etc., are definitions taken from the 
codebook of Stone Sweet and Brunell (1999).
3.  Please note that many of our interview partners were procedural and legal 
experts who spent much of their professional lives with annulments liti-
gation. During the interviews, they added much to our understanding of 
various annulment cases.
4.  Further details are provided in the Annex of this book.
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What motivates political actors to engage in European Union annul-
ment litigation? This is the main question studied in this chapter. Our 
starting point is the observation that it is not possible to reduce public 
actors’ decisions to initiate annulment actions to the pure legal charac-
teristics of the cases. Annulment actions do not automatically arise from 
specific legal circumstances. This is what we learn from the examples of 
annulments reported in the previous chapters. There is more to filing an 
annulment lawsuit then just a legal-technical quarrel. This more is the 
political context that surrounds a concrete decision to engage in annul-
ment litigation.
While never contradicting the legal logic of annulment litiga-
tion, actors chose from the universe of potential annulment conflicts 
to engage in due to political reasons, which we conceive as material 
gains, institutional competences, ideology, or political trust. Consider 
in this context that annulment litigation is a defence against decisions 
made by an EU institution; such a supranational decision, if it remains 
unchallenged, constitutes a final point in a struggle about particular 
policy choices. In other words, if actors do not take up the fight—that 
is, if nobody litigates—the current interpretation of the supranational 
measure adopted prevails. It marks the institutional endpoint of a con-
flict, which can then have feedback effects. Actors obviously can choose 
not to engage in annulment conflict, but if their choice is to do so, it 
is the context of the struggle they go through in the multilevel policy 
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process—their priorities, perceived needs, and subsequently the utility 
they associate with potentially successful litigation—that tip them into 
active litigation.
It is thus important to uncover litigants’ motivations behind the 
empirical decision to turn to court. To this aim, we first review the liter-
ature on judicial politics as well as the classical literature on actors’ moti-
vations. On this basis, we distinguish between four types of motivations 
that drive actors to initiate annulment lawsuits in EU Court: to maxi-
mize financial resources, institutional power, ideological and policy pref-
erences, and political trust.
Second, based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Germany, Spain, 
and Brussels, this chapter assesses the relevance of these four motivations 
for launching annulment litigation empirically in selected cases (see also 
Chapter 4). Rather than classical ideal types in the Weberian sense, the 
four motivations are real types. Empirically, decisions to start an annul-
ment case can be based upon several motivations simultaneously.1 As we 
will show when analysing individual annulment cases, for almost all of 
them, a dominant motivation can be identified. We find, however, that 
not all motivations occur with equal frequency and that certain types of 
actors are associated more frequently with some motivations than with 
others.
First, financial gains are the most important motivation in quantitative 
terms, they underpin the bulk of annulment actions. Litigation is cho-
sen when legal success would significantly improve the litigant’s budget 
by either avoiding substantial expenses or maximizing revenue. Financial 
motives are important not only for private actors, such as companies hav-
ing benefitted from state aid. They are also a crucial motivation for pub-
lic actors, that is, member states and subnational authorities in the face 
of a Commission decision of financial correction in agriculture or cohe-
sion policies. This type of motivation is generally associated with supra-
national decisions bearing little saliency, and often do not have much 
impact beyond the financial redistribution across levels—although they 
can also occasionally come with important policy change in the related 
sectoral policies, such as the common agricultural policy or cohesion 
policies.
Second, litigation is pursued when the Court’s interpretation of 
unclear legal concepts may significantly improve the litigant’s insti-
tutional and decision-making competences. This motivation is found 
almost exclusively among public actors, both national and European, to 
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counter measures they perceive as a competence stretch threatening to 
reduce their own institutional power. This motivation is typically found 
with annulment actions that have important EU-wide repercussions, 
because they always bear a potential to alter the institutional status quo 
through a Court-led redefinition of competences within the EU.
With respect to the third motivation—ideology—litigation represents 
an opportunity to defend or promote an important ideological aspect or 
policy position by establishing or keeping a normative order. In terms of 
numbers, this motivation was not very significant. It was not found with 
that much frequency as the other three and we rather observed it occa-
sionally. Interestingly, we found that this motivation tends to underpin 
conflicts in highly salient policy issues.
Finally, litigation can also be used as a political symbol to signal 
responsiveness and trustworthiness to the litigant’s constituency and to 
important political partners. While overall less important empirically, a 
specificity of this motivation is the type of actor likely to initiate it. It 
matters for actors who are directly elected at the subnational, national, 
or supranational level, such as governments or, less frequently, the 
European Parliament (EP). Typically, the stakes underpinning this type 
of motivations are national or even local. So this type of action tends to 
have a significant distributive impact on national or local actors. While 
they can have EU-wide repercussions, this is not always the case.
The following analyses of empirical cases will demonstrate that annul-
ment actions are regularly used for political purposes. They are inher-
ently political tools employed as strategies in policy conflicts in the EU 
multilevel system. How the legal background mediates the political moti-
vations to initiate annulment actions is thus a central puzzle to which this 
chapter now turns. In sum, the following pages shed light on the con-
stellations, conditions, and mechanisms that bring actors to pursue their 
objectives with the help of annulment actions.
concePtuAlizing motivAtions for litigAtion
Since Martin Shapiro’s (1964) seminal introduction of a research agenda 
for political jurisprudence, the study of courts and litigation has escaped 
the narrow confines of legal scholarship. Since then, various social sci-
ence disciplines have applied their concepts, theories, and methods 
to the study of judicial processes. This allowed grasping the non-legal 
dimension of judicial proceedings, such as actors’ decisions to litigate 
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and judges decision-making roles. The literature on judicial politics 
thus offers plenty of material that is potentially relevant for studying 
annulment actions. We have complemented this body of literature with 
insights from research on actors’ motivations and preferences. This sec-
tion presents a theoretically derived categorization of four types of moti-
vations for litigation, extensive enough to do justice to extant research 
and yet parsimonious enough to be a useful tool in empirical research.
Material Gains
The first of these motivations is all about material—more precisely, 
financial—resources. Actors litigate because they hope to gain financial 
resources or avoid their loss. This motivation is particularly prominent 
for private litigators, as economic research on litigation has emphasized 
(Gould 1973; Posner 1973; Bebchuk 1984; Priest and Klein 1984). 
This literature typically investigates the conditions for the use of differ-
ent conflict-resolution mechanisms by opposing parties, litigation being 
one, arbitration another. These works assess how a variety of factors (e.g. 
information asymmetry, judicial procedures, probability to win) affect 
the risk-benefit analysis made by litigants when deciding whether it is 
financially worthwhile to go to court. This literature thus assumes that 
litigation is driven primarily by financial considerations and leaves little 
room for other possible rationales regarding the use of litigation.
Wealth maximization is obviously of particular relevance for under-
standing the behaviour of private actors attempting to further their eco-
nomic aims with the help of litigation. But public actors, too, care about 
their budgets. In contrast to the economic literature that focuses on 
individuals’ material interest, for public actors, material motivations are 
typically studied in combination or alongside other motivational factors. 
Depending on the conceptualization of the role models of bureaucrats, 
individual material gains can be crucial to explaining public decisions 
(Downs 1967). Moreover, at an aggregate level, bureaucracies are 
often conceived as self-aggrandizing actors, searching to maximize their 
budget and expand their services (Niskanen 1971). This assumption also 
applies to governments whose capacity to act depends—inter alia—on 
the national budget. Given the political relevance of budgets, politicians 
are thus searching to maximize revenues (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) 
and to limit unnecessary or non-priority expenses.
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Many decisions adopted in the EU multilevel system have a budgetary 
impact. Furthermore, as in any polity, EU budget decisions are subject 
to intense inter-institutional conflicts (Becker et al. 2017), which often 
lead to the use of judicial review, especially by the Council against deci-
sions of the EP (Skiadas 2002). The Commission, too, may adopt deci-
sions that affect member states’ budgets in a negative way (Bauer and 
Becker 2014; Ege et al. 2018). The treaties and secondary law have del-
egated a series of sector—and issue-specific enforcement mechanisms to 
the Commission—other than the infringement procedure (Gil Ibañez 
1998)—allowing the latter to impose financial sanctions on the member 
states. Judicial review may then be used by the member states to chal-
lenge these decisions (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). We expect such a 
material motivation to be particularly relevant in EU policy areas where 
distributive instruments prevail or where regulatory instruments directly 
affect the allocation of resources. The maximization of material resources 
can explain annulment actions initiated by EU institutions or by the 
member states, where the litigant is willing to annul a decision that has a 
negative impact on its budget or to seek higher budgets, without neces-
sarily being the only reason for engaging in annulments (as we shall see 
below). The motivational logic behind trying to protect or expand one’s 
material resources, however, is simple: annulment actions motivated by 
financial resources aim at revoking a decision of EU institutions that has 
a negative impact on the litigant’s budget. In short, the object to litigate 
is to receive a favourable decision about an actor’s own material gains.
Institutional Competences
In his seminal work on the functioning of democracies, Downs (1957) 
argues that political actors are not interested in particular policies. 
Instead, they care about the privileges they derive from holding power. 
Thus, what motivates them is institutional power and positions. This 
motivation is likely to matter for annulment conflicts in the EU multi-
level system, too. Litigation can be motivated by the intention to influ-
ence the distribution of institutional competences in a political system. 
We know that courts can have a profound impact on the structure of 
governance and politics, that is, on the distribution of power among 
political actors and their strategic behaviour and interactions. Stone 
Sweet’s (1999) theory about the judicialization and the construction of 
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governance and Jupille’s (2007) argument about contested legislative 
procedures highlight the endogenous process through which the charac-
teristics of a polity can be altered gradually and even profoundly through 
actors’ recourses to litigation. Actors may thus resort to litigation in the 
hope to use the court’s influence as a lever to alter the distribution of 
institutional competences to their advantage.
In federal states, courts have significant influence on the shape and 
evolution of the multilevel decision-making arrangement (Baier 2006). 
Hence, judicial review plays a particularly important role in federal coun-
tries. Comparative politics and legal scholarship understand it as a tool 
that allows protecting the constitutionally enshrined federal arrange-
ments against attempts by the federal or regional governments to over-
step each other’s competences (Lijphart 1999; Baker and Young 2001; 
Ryan 2011). Courts’ capacity to shape federal arrangements is particu-
larly prominent in countries with a high number of veto players in the 
executive and legislative branches (Swenden 2006, 79). Being a highly 
fragmented polity, the EU appears particularly prone to judicial influence 
on the distribution of power between the supranational and national 
level. After all, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
come to be seen as capable of transforming the relationship between 
the EU’s and national legal orders in fundamentals ways for a long time 
(Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998).
Moreover, legal provisions—and particularly constitutional provi-
sions—that define the distribution of competences are conventionally 
theorized as incomplete contracts (Farrell and Héritier 2007) that can 
be—or sometimes even need to be—clarified via litigation (Hadfield 
1994). By inviting the judiciary to (re-)interpret the legal provisions 
specifying the distribution of competences on which a contested act was 
based, litigants might manage not only to dissolve the contested legal 
act, they might also be able to create an effective (legal) barrier that will 
keep the defending institution from adopting similar legal acts in the 
future. In this sense, litigation today can be initiated with the goal in 
mind of avoiding similar competence creep in the (far) future.
This motivation is likely to matter for two reasons, both related to 
systemic features of the EU. First, part of the EU’s expansion of pow-
ers is the result of competence creep, in particular as provoked by the 
Commission (Pollack 1994; Weatherill 2004; Amaral and Neave 2009; 
Prechal 2010). Second, the high number of veto players involved in EU 
decision making makes it difficult for the member states to counteract, 
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through the adoption of legislation or treaty change, the Commission’s 
decisions once such a decision is taken (or those of other EU institu-
tions). This turns the CJEU into an attractive venue for member states 
willing to put a hold on the Commission’s extensive interpretation of the 
EU’s competences (see Schmidt 1998, 173; Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). 
In line with this argument, Adam (2016, 158) argues that governments 
may use annulment actions ‘for reasons that go beyond the desire to 
win a legal dispute […] and instead […] to bring more general ques-
tions concerning the design of institutions […] to the CJEU’s atten-
tion’, in the hope of exploiting the Court’s judicial authority to alter the 
EU’s institutionalized balance of power. In short, annulment actions are 
launched as an attempt to influence the distribution of institutional com-
petences in the long term via inviting the CJEU to formulate a judicial 
interpretation of key legal concepts. We thus expect to see conflicts moti-
vated by an interest in keeping or expanding competences, particularly in 
those policy areas and in those periods of time where competence alloca-
tion in the multilevel system changes or where competences are shared 
between institutions and levels. This motivation should be most relevant 
for public actors as their relationships and (future) checks and balances 
in a political system will be at stake. We refer to this kind of institutional 
motivation as the willingness to protect decision-making competences.
Ideology
Next to material gains and protecting institutional competences, a deci-
sion to litigate can also emerge from substantial policy interest. Going 
back to the early literature on political parties, Edmund Burke estab-
lished the notion that groups of political actors are motivated by some 
principle in which they all agreed. The ideological orientation of a group 
can explain the positions chosen in line with such principles. Moreover, 
comparative politics research (De Swaan 1973; Müller and Strøm 1999) 
argues that the party political orientation of actors helps to explain why 
actors are seeking specific policies. Where this ideology is at odds with a 
process or instrument chosen, or where it does not fit the substance of 
an EU policy, conflict can emerge. In such a case, the active engagement 
in this conflict is driven by neither a material motivation nor an institu-
tional motivation. Ideology can be a reason for actors to take decisions 
that are not in their material or institutional interest. Instead, values and 
norms about how things ought to be can be powerful drivers of agency.
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In European integration research, the role of national interests has 
been heatedly debated ever since the early days of theorizing suprana-
tional institution building. Prominently, national positions are explained 
by particular policy interests, such as preferences for creating an inter-
nal market expressed by national economic elites (Moravcsik 1991). 
However, ideology is also an important explanation for European inte-
gration and for policies adopted in the EU system. Normative beliefs and 
deeply rooted values not only shape individual behaviour but may prevail 
at the level of collective actors or even entire nations, for example regard-
ing nation-state identity, (Western liberal) values, and a shared under-
standing of human rights and the rule of law. Ideology motivates actors 
to propose and use EU instruments. Where this ideology is at odds with 
a process or instrument chosen or where it does not fit with the sub-
stance of an EU policy, conflict can emerge (Risse et al. 1999).
Policy actors may try to use litigation as a tool to advance their sub-
stantial policy goals. The extensive literature on the legal mobilization 
of social movements developed in the United States shows how litiga-
tion can serve ideologically driven actors (Scheingold 1974; McCann 
1994). Similar results are found in the EU, where both gender rights 
activists and environmental organizations have used litigation strategies 
before the European Court of Justice as a mean to advance their pol-
icy agenda (Cichowski 2007). Yet this motivation for litigation is not 
exclusively reserved for social movements and non-governmental organ-
izations. Ideology is also an important driver for national governments, 
the Council, the EP, and the European Commission. While it remains 
difficult to apply the notion of party families across all EU member states 
(Camia and Caramani 2012), the politicization of European integration 
has turned ideology into an important determinant of EU policy mak-
ing (Hutter and Grande 2014; Hartlapp 2015; Rauh 2019). The early 
years of integration were characterized by a permissive consensus, where 
integration advanced without (public) contestation as an elite project 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). This has started to change in the 1990s, 
and today, political contestation affects virtually all EU institutions. An 
increasingly critical public challenges specific EU policies as well as the 
overall direction of the integration process. There is more debate about 
desirable trajectories for European integration. Frequently, criticism and 
controversy follow party cleavages. The desire to defend policy design 
often motivates annulment actions against decisions of EU institutions 
that appear to come in the way of achieving ideological goals.
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When a decision adopted by an EU institution clashes with a pub-
lic actor’s ideological preferences, we can imagine ideology motivating 
actors to raise an annulment action with a view to having the EU meas-
ure annulled. Such action may have, as a priority objective, the annul-
ment of the contested EU measure.
Even more so, annulment actions may also serve long-term ideolog-
ical goals reaching well beyond the case at hand. Indeed, litigation can 
be ‘more than just litigation and courts’ (Boutcher 2013), as is shown 
by the constitutive approach to legal mobilization by social movements 
(McCann 1994). Similar to what we discussed regarding a long-term 
institutional motivation, annulment litigation may also serve long-term 
ideological goals simply by subjecting legal concepts with ideologically 
important implications to judicial review. These ideologically important 
concepts become part of legal discourse. The prevailing legal interpreta-
tion turns the litigation on which it is based into a ‘prophetic litigation’ 
that ‘often functions as an appeal to future generations’ (Lobel 1995, 
1347), ‘to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future 
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the 
dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed’ (Hughes 
1928, 68). In other words, the contested case creates opportunities in 
the sense of Galanter’s repeat players argument, according to which insti-
tutional actors often engage in litigation with the view of shaping courts’ 
case law in the long run rather than in the tangible outcomes of specific 
cases (Galanter 1974). In the same line of reasoning, Granger’s account 
of member states’ participation to preliminary references trials empha-
sizes their willingness to weigh on the evolution of the Court’s legal 
doctrine in the long run (Granger 2004). Ideology may thus motivate 
actions that can have, as a primary purpose, either the annulment of the 
contested EU measure or the promotion of a legal discourse supporting 
the litigants’ normative order. In sum, annulment actions can be moti-
vated by the goal to revoke EU measures that clash with the litigant’s 
ideological preferences.
Political Trust
Scholarship on the strategies of social movements to mobilize against 
regulations argues that litigation, independent from the outcome of 
the trial, can increase social movements’ credibility and public support 
(Lobel 1994; McCann 1998; NeJaime 2011). By initiating judicial 
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proceedings, a social movement may attempt to change the public’s per-
ception about its action and to gain the public’s trust, sympathy, and 
support. This mechanism can be an appealing way to signal trustwor-
thiness to important constituencies for politicians and governments and 
should help to improve their chances for reelection (Müller and Strøm 
1999). It is thus a form of legitimacy. Interestingly, in this case, the ini-
tiation of litigation is sufficient for gaining political trust and electoral 
support. The legal outcomes of judicial proceedings play only a second-
ary role, particularly when they materialize only after several years of 
proceedings.
Political trust, as we conceive it, is a highly valuable resource for 
office holders because it translates into citizens’ support for their poli-
cies (Chanley et al. 2000; Davis and Silver 2004; Hetherington 2005; 
Rudolph and Evans 2005). Political trust also increases political actors’ 
informal room for manoeuvre and thereby can smoother the function-
ing of the political system (Miller 1974; Coleman 1994; Gambetta 1998; 
Levi and Stoker 2000), as well as the chances for being reelected. It 
should thus not be surprising that political leaders eagerly invest continu-
ous effort in maximizing political trust (Bourdieu 1991, 18).
Obviously, political trust is affected by many parameters, includ-
ing the perceived quality of democratic institutions (Mishler and Rose 
2001; Segovia Arancibia 2008), demographic variables (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2005; Macoubrie 2006), societal characteristics (Newton and 
Norris 1999), and exogenous events and the saliency of international 
issues (Chanley 2002; Hetherington and Rudolph 2008). Moreover, 
governmental performance (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1998; Chanley 
et al. 2000; Van De Walle and Bouckaert 2003; Keele 2007), the align-
ment between the policies adopted and the public’s preferences (Miller 
1974), and leaders’ personality (Citrin 1974; Citrin and Green 1986) 
affect levels of political trust.
As a matter of fact, it is less the objective governmental performance, 
responsiveness, and leadership per se than it is the public’s perception 
of these aspects that affects political trust. Trust is a relational concept; 
to be trusted, trustees need to signal trustworthiness to their principals 
(Bacharach and Gambetta 2001). This is a sociological mechanism that 
applies in a wide variety of situations. Companies use third-party certi-
fication labels to signal trustworthiness (Aiken et al. 2004); bureau-
cracies design their public communication in order to improve their 
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reputation—that is, the public’s perception of their capacities and per-
formance (Maor et al. 2013). Just as companies and bureaucracies do, 
politicians also need to convince their own audience, their constituency, 
of their trustworthiness.
While political trust as a relationship is important for any actor in a 
political system, electoral gains are particularly relevant where we can 
identify a constituency. This is the case for national governments as well 
as for the EP. They all need to take care of the image they send to their 
voters. Litigating against (other) EU institutions can be a way to signal 
trustworthiness to constituencies. Political parties can thereby demon-
strate their willingness to “stand up and fight” for the rights and interests 
of their electorates. By litigating against legal acts that clash with public 
opinion, national governments, as well as members of the EP, can show 
their responsiveness to the public’s concerns. Consequently, we speak of 
responsiveness and trustworthiness whenever the motivation to litigate is 
driven by the attempt to retain a good relationship with the public.
Table 5.1 depicts the four motivational logics for initiating an annul-
ment action that we derive from our reading of the pertinent literature. 
The question, however, is whether these motivations drive empirical 
cases. It is thus to the analysis of annulment cases that we now turn.
Table 5.1 Overview of the four motivational logics for litigation
Source Own compilation
Motivations Objective How does litigation serve the 
actor’s objective?
Material gains Maximising returns or minimizing 
costs
Repealing a decision that has a 




Preserving political rights and 
ring-fencing the opponent’s deci-
sion-making competences
Interpretation of competences 
and decision-making powers
Ideology Promoting ideological or substantial 
policy preferences
Establishing or keeping norma-
tive orders
Political trust Maintaining good relationships with 
addressees of a policy
Signalling responsiveness and 
trustworthiness to constituencies 
and partners
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emPiricAl AnAlysis
We thus expect litigation to be driven by motivations to maximize 
material gains, to promote and protect one’s ideological goals, to 
defend one’s institutional competences, and to maximize political trust. 
Analytically, these motivations are clearly distinct. Empirically, however, 
it is challenging to objectively identify and distinguish these motivations. 
It is important to realize that these motivations are not mutually exclu-
sive. For each case, we seek to identify the predominant motivation while 
also reflecting aspects of the other motivations. In addition, motivations 
are notoriously difficult to capture, as they cannot be directly observed. 
Motivations, understood as objectives an actor is seeking in the first place 
(and rather independently from other factors that render litigation more 
or less likely), can, however, be deduced indirectly from primary (inter-
views, rulings) and secondary sources.
the legAl fActor
The literature on the economics of litigation sees the chances of suc-
cess in court as a crucial factor for deciding whether to litigate.2 After 
all, it is the chances of success that strongly influence litigants’ expected 
 payoffs, no matter whether these are material or immaterial. We have 
asked our interviewees about the role of the legal factor, understood as 
the chances of judicial success, in their decisions. While it plays a central 
role for private actors, it is apparently not so crucial for public actors. 
Although the member states lose most vertical conflicts (i.e. 75% of the 
cases in which they litigate by themselves against single EU institutions), 
the legal merits of the case supporting the position of the member states 
do play a role. State attorneys and legal services of the EU institutions 
need a legal doubt, however small, in order to engage in litigation. When 
legal defeat in court is nearly certain—that is, when the application of 
the Court’s case law will in all likelihood imply a rejection of the annul-
ment action—these actors rather abstain from litigating. The reason is 
simple. State attorneys and legal services in the EU institutions want to 
preserve their reputation and credibility in Luxemburg, which means 
they are careful not to raise actions without adequate legal justification—
and at least some chances of winning. By contrast, a legal doubt (even a 
small one) about how case law should apply to the case at hand suffices 
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to legitimize judicial action; state attorneys are in such cases very keen 
to litigate (MIN_ES_4, MIN_ES_5). In this sense, a legal doubt on the 
case is a necessary condition for litigation, but it is not a sufficient one. 
We now examine, based on a carefully selected series of case studies, the 
role of material gains, institutional competences, ideology, and political 
trust in motivating public actors to raise annulment actions.
mAteriAl gAins–driven motivAtion  
in Annulment litigAtion
We claim that financial resources can play an important role in public 
actors’ decisions to raise annulment actions. The underlying objective is 
to get the Court to declare void a decision that would have a negative 
impact on the litigant’s budget. We find that this motivation is particu-
larly important in vertical annulment conflicts, that is, in those cases initi-
ated by (private) national or subnational litigants against EU institutions. 
Hence, this section essentially focuses on such vertical cases, although 
we also give an example of horizontal case (i.e. initiated by an EU insti-
tution) motivated by the litigant’s willingness to maximize financial 
resources.
When member states litigate against EU institutions, many cases 
emerge in the context of agricultural policy and regional policy. Both 
the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the regional policy are redis-
tributive policies, which allocate funds to different types of beneficiaries 
across Europe. The application of these policies and their execution relies 
on the Commission’s strong enforcement powers, which may adopt 
decisions of financial correction, where they find that EU funds are not 
spent according to EU law. When the sums spent under the CAP or the 
regional policy are advanced by the member states and reimbursed by 
the Commission at a later stage, by adopting a decision of financial cor-
rection, the Commission denies the transfer to the member states of the 
sums already issued. Annulment actions raised by the member states in 
both sectors typically target such Commission decisions of financial cor-
rection. This gives a first indication of the likely importance of material 
interests in member states’ decisions to litigate against the Commission. 
To verify this, we asked national civil servants in Spain and Germany 
about the criteria they take into account when deciding to litigate for 
financial reasons.
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In both countries, the regions or federal states manage the funds. As 
subnational actors have the responsibility to issue the funds according to 
EU law, they are also responsible in cases of detected non-compliance. 
In practice, this means that the region where funds have been misspent 
is the one to pay the financial correction back to the Commission. On 
the other hand, in the ruling Regione Siciliana (C 15/06), the Court 
made clear that it would not admit annulment actions over financial 
corrections from subnational authorities. It is very difficult for these 
subnational authorities to demonstrate the direct effect of suprana-
tional decisions. The Court found, for example, that the Commission’s 
decision of financial corrections lacked a direct effect on the applicant 
region, which is an indispensable criterion for the region, treated as non- 
privileged applicant, to have their actions admitted by the Court (see 
Chapter 3). Hence, annulment actions against decisions of financial cor-
rections should be raised by the member states on behalf of the regions 
concerned. Therefore, for matters related to the funds, while the regions 
bear the costs of the Commission’s decisions, it is up to the member 
state to decide whether to litigate. Cooperation between regions and the 
central state is therefore necessary for litigation to take place.
The regions affected by financial corrections decisions usually want 
their member state to engage in litigation against the Commission. This 
material interest rationale for litigation is often paramount for the con-
cerned regions (MIN_DE_5, MIN_ES_4). State-level actors, the cen-
tral administration responsible for the funds, and the state attorneys are 
receptive to the region’s interests and usually willing to cooperate with 
the regions on that matter. However, they also consider other crite-
ria and balance them with the financial criteria when deciding whether 
to litigate or not, such as the legal merits of the case (MIN_DE_5, 
MIN_ES_4).
We found that financial considerations are driving many of the mem-
ber states’ decisions to litigate against the Commission. In the cases we 
studied, the higher the level of the financial correction, the more likely 
becomes a decision to litigate. State attorneys often have to arbitrate 
between several petitions for litigation. They must manage their work-
force wisely, concentrating on those cases of greater significance. Hence, 
cases involving a high financial correction are more likely to lead to liti-
gation than cases with low financial corrections (MIN_ES_4).
In Germany, the average amount of financial corrections imposed in 
the last few years in agriculture amounts to about ten million euros each 
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year. Compared to the 6.5 billion euros spent in one year, this barely 
reaches 0.15% of the funds received. This is a particularly low level of 
financial corrections compared to other countries. In 2015, France was 
requested to return 1 billion euros for the period 2008–2012, which 
corresponds to about 2% of the forty billion received from the EU in the 
same period.3 This explains why Germany has raised relatively few annul-
ment actions in agriculture compared to other countries (MIN_DE_5).
In Germany, where financial corrections tend to be low, decisions to 
litigate depend much on the strength of their legal arguments. Given 
that the financial incentive is not high, German governments are more 
selective on the cases they bring to court and decide to go only when 
they have very strong arguments, that is, when they are nearly convinced 
that they are right and that they will win (MIN_DE_5). By contrast, in 
Spain, where financial corrections tend to be higher than in Germany, 
the financial incentive is higher, which reduces the importance of other 
criteria in the decision to litigate. In the face of a particularly high finan-
cial correction (e.g. several hundred million euros), state attorneys go to 
court anyway, doing their best to carve out of the case at least some legal 
issues in order to carry out the judicial battle.
The Potato Starch Case (T-557/13)
The only annulment action raised by Germany in the agriculture sector 
in the last eight years is the potato starch case. It illustrates the impor-
tance of both the financial and legal factors. The potato starch case is 
based on a misunderstanding between the Commission and German 
administrative authorities that arose from the way in which the EU reg-
ulation had been translated into the German language. The EU allows 
interventions to stabilize prices of agricultural products. The root of 
this disagreement was the question over the precise moment at which 
the German authorities can pay the direct financial aid to the producers. 
There is a minimal price—regulated by the EU—that applies to the pota-
toes sold by the potato producer who benefits from EU aids. To make 
sure the producer does not sell the potatoes below the minimal price, 
EU regulation stipulates that national authorities can only pay the aid 
once the producer has received this minimal price for potatoes. German 
authorities have allowed the application of this requirement in several 
instalments. The payment for the potatoes is issued in three instalments. 
The producer first receives 41% of the minimal price for the potatoes 
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delivered; another two instalments complete the payment of the mini-
mal price. Accordingly, the authorities granting the aid have paid 41% 
of the aid once the producer has received 41% of the minimal price, and 
so on. Arguably, this procedure is in line with the German version of 
the regulation. Nevertheless, based on the English version of the regu-
lation, the auditors and the Commission claimed there was an irregular-
ity. They argue that the aid can only be paid to the producer once the 
producer has received the full 100% of the minimal price for the pota-
toes produced and delivered. German civil servants, who insisted that 
the German language version of the regulation was different, rejected 
this interpretation. Despite the confusion over linguistic differences, the 
Commission decided to impose the financial correction of 6.3 million 
euros. This meant a substantial flow of money away from the coffers of 
the culprit Länder—in that particular case, Brandenburg. German state 
attorneys and civil servants were convinced that their interpretation was 
right; hence, they decided to litigate. In fact, Germany won this annul-
ment against the Commission (MIN_DE_5).
Adjustment of Salaries and Pensions of Eurocrats  
(C-196/12, C-66/12, C-63/12)
Interests to maintain material benefits are at the heart of conflicts over 
salaries and work-related benefits running between the EU institu-
tions themselves. At the EU level, the Council decides about the stat-
ute of European civil servants. Where direct material interests of the 
staff working in other institutions such as the EP, the Commission, or 
the European Investment Bank are negatively affected, they might go to 
court. Such conflicts already resulted in litigation in the 1970s through 
mid-1980s, as well as in the early 2000s. More recently, horizontal 
annulment cases related to such financial interests increased, especially in 
the wake of the financial crisis. Generally, an adaptation clause for the 
salaries and pensions of Eurocrats exists. Accordingly, the development 
of EU salaries links to the development of national wage indices in the 
EUROSTAT data, with a time lag due to technical requirements for 
working out the indices. ‘And what happened—it was in the middle of 
the financial crisis—the calculations, which came from the years before, 
brought a result that was unacceptable for the member states. They said, 
you couldn’t do that. We are asking for budget cuts’ (EP_1). Neither 
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Commission nor Parliament staff wanted to accept this linkage, and their 
respective institutions decided to take the Council to court for refusal to 
adopt the Commission’s proposal for salary adjustment. In fact, a num-
ber of related cases were successively opened (C-453/12, C-68/13), 
until the first case was settled in court.
In sum, these cases illustrate the importance of financial motivations 
when actors decide to file an annulment case against EU institutions—
and even between EU institutions themselves. The evidence gleaned 
from the interviews also underlines that the legal merits of a case—how 
actors perceive their chances to succeed in court—are duly taken into 
consideration in the decision of public actors to engage in litigation or 
not.
institutionAl comPetences–driven  
motivAtion in Annulment litigAtion
Annulment actions are also motivated by actors’ willingness to max-
imize (or defend) their decision-making competences. They are driven 
by actors’ institutional interests. Inviting the CJEU to intervene in such 
cases is a way to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the scope of the 
defendant’s competences, with the hope to prevent competence creep 
into the litigant’s institutional prerogative in the future. Thus, this moti-
vation should be particularly relevant for public actors at the different 
levels of the EU multilevel governance system.
Our quantitative data highlights that institutional competences 
are an important motivation behind annulment actions. For example, 
we observe rises in the number of annulment cases shortly after treaty 
changes (see Fig. 5.1). After the adoption of new formal rules (marked 
by the vertical dotted lines), struggles over the interpretation of those 
rules follow (see also Farrell and Héritier 2007). To settle such conflicts, 
the actors involved call upon the judiciary to intervene. Such testing the 
ground and clawing back of competences explain the peaks of annul-
ment litigation in the years following changes of the European treaties. 
Annulment actions tend to emerge after treaty changes alter the status 
quo of competence allocation in the EU. We turn now to some case 
studies that help illustrate the context of actors’ strategies to preserve, 
defend, or obtain institutional competences with the help of annulment 
litigation.
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The Renewable Energies Law Case (T-134/14 and T-47/15)
In cases T-134/14 and T-47/15 that dealt with the promotion of 
renewable energies in Germany, the motivation of the German gov-
ernment for challenging the Commission’s decision derives from the 
willingness to protect its own institutional competences. The German 
renewable energy law subsidizes producers of alternative energies. The 
law guarantees that the electricity produced from renewable energies 
can be sold at a guaranteed price. The difference between the market 
price and the price effectively charged is sponsored by consumers. The 
law designed a financial circuit that transits between several actors (elec-
tricity companies, mainly network operators) and passes on the burden 
of the subsidy to all consumers of electricity. This implies that electric-
ity prices in Germany are relatively high, which is a problem for those 
industries that consume a lot of electricity, the so-called energy-intensive 
Fig. 5.1 Annulment actions and treaty changes (Source Figure based on own 
data. Dashed vertical lines indicate the year in which treaty changes came into 
effect [the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, the Nice 
Treaty in 2002, and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009])
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consumers. To reduce the burden of these energy-intensive consumers, 
the renewable energy law puts up a compensation, which significantly 
reduces the intensive consumers’ participation to the subsidy of renewa-
ble energies, compared to what they would pay if they were subjected to 
the normal regime. The Commission considered this advantage to ener-
gy-intensive users as constituting state aid, and Germany challenged this 
decision before the Court.
An important motivation for German state attorneys and the German 
administration was to place a limit on what they perceived as a compe-
tence creep on the side of the Commission (MIN_DE_6). The dispute 
was about the interpretation of the notion of state resources, which, 
according to EU competition law, must be involved in the aid scheme 
in order to qualify the scheme as illegal state aid. From the German per-
spective, no state resources were involved. This is because technically, the 
advantage enjoyed by the energy intensive users stemmed from a regula-
tory mechanism that passed the costs of the subsidies for renewable ener-
gies on to consumers. According to Germany, since the funds travelling 
in this circuit never transited through any kind of state fund, the criteria 
of state resources was not met. The Commission had a different perspec-
tive. Since the mechanism through which the subsidies are handed out 
to the final consumers is designed by the state, this is enough to con-
sider that the mechanism constitutes state aid. This reasoning, contained 
in the controverted decision of the Commission, was new. As such, it 
represented a new threat for the member states, as its application would 
greatly broaden the scope of national measures that could be subject to 
EU state aid law, thereby limiting national room of manoeuvre.
To some extent, Germany’s willingness to litigate was motivated by 
the intention to defend its legislative scheme and specific policy design 
(MIN_DE_6). Yet the concern with the growing scope of EU state aid 
law to the detriment of national autonomy has also played an impor-
tant role in Germany’s motivation to challenge the Commission (MIN_
DE_6). While the case was examined by the Court, Germany prepared 
an updated version of its renewable energy law, which was negotiated 
with the Commission in terms of the design of the compensation mech-
anism for energy-intensive users. The Commission and Germany reached 
an agreement on a new national law that would enter into force in 2014. 
Therefore, Germany’s necessity to defend the previous version of the 
renewable law before the Court faded away, so they could have sim-
ply withdrawn the case if their only goal was to protect their renewable 
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energy approach. Very importantly, however, the state attorneys deliber-
ately decided to continue to pursue the case. They wanted to have the 
Court decide on the interpretation of the notion of state resources, hop-
ing to preserve their autonomy (at best) or to clarify the legal situation 
(at worst) (MIN_DE_6). This decision to continue litigation in order to 
reach a general clarification in terms of the Commission’s powers to limit 
domestic policy, quite apart from the question of whether the concrete 
trigger of the case is still relevant or not, shows the general character of 
annulment litigation strategies. It is not only in defence of a particular 
policy for which annulment litigation is undertaken. Sometimes, liti-
gation aims at settling the underlying legal issue, which might lead to 
similar struggles about institutional competences between national gov-
ernments and the Commission in the future.
The Leipzig Halle Case (T-396/08)  
and the Dresden Airport Case (T-215/09)
Cases T-396/08 and T-215/09, which dealt with new runways at the 
Leipzig Halle and Dresden airports, provide other examples of litiga-
tion pursued in order to contain what is perceived as the Commission’s 
competence creep in state aid. In the mid-2000s, the logistics company 
DHL considered moving its hub from Brussels to Leipzig. To attract 
DHL, Saxony’s government committed itself to building a new run-
way at the Leipzig Halle airport with priority usage for the company; 
in case it would fail to do so, the regional government committed itself 
to compensating the company financially. Saxony notified this arrange-
ment to the Commission in line with EU state aid law. While the agree-
ment specified that DHL would only be compensated financially in case 
the runway would not be built, this arrangement with DHL could be 
state-aid relevant. The Commission, however, did not limit its examina-
tion of the dossier to the potential financial compensation for DHL. The 
Commission also assessed whether the building of a runway with priority 
usage was compatible with EU state aid law. The Commission argued 
that the building of this new runway by Saxony’s government would 
constitute a state aid in favour of the Leipzig Halle airport. This came 
as a surprise to Saxony, as only the financial support of economic activi-
ties was traditionally perceived as state aid. In this sense, the operation of 
infrastructure like an airport had always been seen as an economic activ-
ity. Consequently, its support with public funds constituted state aid that 
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would have to be declared to the Commission and checked for its com-
patibility with EU law. In contrast, the construction of infrastructure was 
traditionally not seen as an economic activity. Constructing infrastructure 
with public funds was thus not perceived as state aid and would thus not 
have to be examined by the Commission.
Although in this specific case, the Commission found that the build-
ing of the runway constituted state aid that was compatible with EU 
law and authorized the project, Saxony strongly opposed the decision. 
Most importantly, it did so because it would have significant implica-
tions for all future regional infrastructure projects. If one were to accept 
the Commission’s approach towards regional infrastructure projects, 
all future projects would have to be passed by the Commission. Saxony 
feared that in the future, the Commission might not be so generous and 
would decide to cap or deny such projects. At the very least, the need 
to involve the Commission would definitely lead to a loss of control and 
time within such projects (MIN_SA_1). Consequently, in 2008, Saxony 
filed an annulment action against the Commission’s decision. Germany’s 
federal government supported Saxony as an intervener in court. In coor-
dination with the Saxon government, the Leipzig Halle airport filed a 
separate action against the Commission.
A few months after initiating the annulment action over the runway 
at the Leipzig Halle airport, Saxony decided to also build a new runway 
at the Dresden airport. This was the perfect opportunity to further esca-
late this competence struggle with the Commission over the distribu-
tion of competences over state aid policy. Therefore, Saxony notified the 
Commission of the building of the new runway, yet it did so as a non-
state-aid measure. Saxony anticipated that the Commission would reject 
this notification and qualify the runway again as state aid. This gave 
Saxony another chance to challenge the Commission’s attempt to gain 
more control over regional infrastructure projects in court via annulment 
action in March 2009 (MIN_SA_1).
In March 2011, the General Court rejected Saxony’s action over the 
Leipzig Halle runway. Since the Commission had authorized 100% of 
the aid, the measure lacked a direct legal effect on Saxony. Moreover, 
the Court backed the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of 
economic activity in state aid law. Subsequently, the airport appealed 
the General Court’s decision on the Leipzig Halle case and Saxony sus-
pended the Dresden case (which was still pending) until the Court’s 
decision on the appeal in the Leipzig Halle case. In December 2012, the 
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Court’s final judgement confirmed the General Court’s ruling in favour 
of the Commission and Saxony also withdrew the Dresden case. In light 
of this case law, there was no longer a realistic chance of winning this 
case. Both of these airport cases demonstrate rather well that annulment 
litigation is not always just about the specific policy decisions that these 
cases deal with legally. Annulment actions are also initiated in order to 
influence the distribution of competences in the long run. In this sense, 
annulments are employed strategically in the struggle between actors 
eager to protect or expand their decision-making powers.
Procedural Competences in Trade Negotiations  
(C-22/70 and C-425/13)
External affairs is a policy area that has seen many competence changes 
and competence conflicts over the last decade of EU integration. New 
offices have been created, such as the High Representative, and new 
organizations, including the European External Action Service with its 
hybrid organizational structure and mix of officials from national foreign 
services, the Commission, and EU diplomatic corps. While EU external 
trade policy has been strongly supranationalized, other, closely related 
issues, such as development aid, have not. In this context of evolving 
supranational competences, the European Commission, the Council, 
and even the EP are seeking to keep or expand their specific preroga-
tives. Early annulment rulings had established the principle of implied 
powers, which endowed the Commission with negotiation competences 
in all areas in which the community held internal competences, such as 
transport (cf. ERTA case C-22/70, see Chapters 1 and 3). Ultimately, 
this principle got promoted to EU primary law with the Nice Treaty 
(Cremona 2011). Despite such far reaching and lasting feedback effects 
in primary law, conflicts about competences continue in an area charac-
terized by fuzzy and overlapping powers (MIN_DE_4). Issues of conten-
tion in more recent annulment actions have moved on to the questions 
of representation (role of the High Representative, C-387/00), as well 
as to procedural powers—that is, fine-tuning the broader competences 
set in the treaties, for example reporting rights during international 
negotiations or duration of negotiation mandates (C-425/13, COM_2). 
In this case, the Commission sought the annulment of a paragraph in 
a Council decision of 13 May 2013. The contended paragraph author-
ized the opening of negotiations that would link the EU emission 
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allowances trading scheme with an emission-trading scheme in Australia. 
The Council decision was modelled on an earlier scheme for emis-
sion-allowance trading with another third country, Switzerland. Council 
competences for opening the negotiations were uncontested. Linking 
the negotiation mandate to existing schemes would, however, limit 
the room to manoeuvre in negotiations and was thus contested by the 
Commission, which insisted in its treaty-based right to negotiate inter-
national agreements that do not fall in the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy without a more detailed Council mandate. From the 
Commission’s perspective, an existing degree of independence was— 
illegally—challenged with which it can act in negotiations, in particularly 
vis-à-vis the Council and the EP.
The Selective Tax Benefits Cases (T-219/10, T-399/11)
The European Commission recently began examining national tax leg-
islation to identify advantages that could result from specific tax provi-
sions, with a view to applying state aid law. Indeed, tax advantages are 
only granted to some beneficiaries who comply with specific criteria. The 
extent to which these criteria imply a selective effect can be subject to 
debate. Yet selectivity is a key criterion in state aid law. Only those provi-
sions that are selective can qualify as state aid.
After a first series of cases related to regional aid in the Basque coun-
try in the early 2000s, the Commission confirmed its interest in analysing 
national tax legislation from a state aid perspective. In the late 2000s, 
the Commission adopted decisions qualifying national tax provisions as 
illegal state aid, notably in Spain and Germany. This move surprised the 
member states, who saw tax legislation as measures of general applica-
bility, deprived of selective effect (MIN_DE_6). Quite importantly, tax 
policy remains an area of member state sovereignty. EU policy making 
was characterized by conflict and stalemate. Several annulment actions 
followed against these decisions, some of them initiated by the member 
states who were keen to put a halt on the Commission’s competence 
creep. The cases related to tax amortization in Spain are examples of 
such annulment actions.
There is a Spanish tax scheme that allows companies based in Spain 
that have acquired shares in a company established abroad to deduct 
from the basis of assessment for corporate tax in Spain part of the sum 
paid to acquire the share, corresponding to what is called the financial 
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goodwill. The Commission examined this measure and concluded that 
insofar as it provides a fiscal advantage to those companies that invest 
abroad, the measure was selective. Hence, the Spanish tax scheme con-
stituted state aid and the corresponding financial advantages granted 
should be recovered by the state.
Two companies affected, Autogrill and Banco Santander, brought 
annulment actions against the Commission’s decisions (T-219/10, 
T-399/11) and won in first instance (the judgement was delivered in 
2014). Unlike the Commission, the General Court considered that the 
derogation from the normal tax regime granted to companies investing 
abroad was not sufficient to find that the measure is selective. The selec-
tivity criterion requires that the beneficiaries of the aid correspond to a 
category of undertakings that can be distinguished on account of their 
specific characteristics (e.g. location, sector, etc.). This was not the case 
here, as any company has the option of realizing an investment abroad.
The Commission appealed the judgements in 2015 (C-20/15 P, 
C-21/15 P). In the appeal, three countries decided to intervene in the 
case in support of the companies opposed to the Commission: Spain, 
Ireland, and Germany. Spain’s motivation to intervene in the case was 
twofold. While Spain was interested in defending its legislation and tax 
scheme, its decision to intervene was also largely a result of its willing-
ness to oppose the Commission’s interpretation of the selectivity criteria 
and its extensive application to national tax regimes (MIN_ES_5). As for 
Germany, while the contested measure was a Spanish one, the German 
government felt concerned because the decision of the Commission 
threatened to broaden significantly the realm of application of EU state 
aid law, to the detriment of national autonomy in tax policy in general 
(MIN_DE_6). Germany’s intervention had a clear and explicit purpose: 
Germany wanted to ring-fence the Commission in the area of tax law. 
The Court delivered its judgement in 2016, overturning the ruling of 
the General Court, thus confirming the Commission’s broad under-
standing of the selectivity criteria. As for Ireland, enmeshed in a similar 
conflict with the Commissions about Irish tax law, as exemplified with 
the Apple case mentioned in Chapter 1, our document analysis indicates 
that their intervention in the case was also a result of their willingness to 
protect their institutional autonomy in the field of tax policy.
In sum, the four cases presented in this section illustrate, in various 
contexts and constellations, that protecting institutional competences is 
an important motivation for engaging in annulment actions.
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ideology-driven cAses in Annulment litigAtion
According to our conceptualization, actors’ decisions to raise an annul-
ment action can be motivated by ideology, that is, the willingness to 
promote ideological preferences. Ideological drivers are, for example, 
party political positions or liberal versus interventionist stances on policy 
designs. In our fieldwork, we regularly encountered ideological consider-
ations leading to or backing up litigation strategies as one factor among 
others. We present three examples where policy and an ideological moti-
vation were the main reason for launching annulment lawsuits.4
The EPSO and Patent Package Cases  
(T-148/13, T-149/13, T-191/13, C-274/11, C-147/13)
Spain challenged a decision of the European Personnel Selection Office 
(EPSO) to publish the call for recruiting staff in EU institutions because 
it did not include Spanish as a working language. They argued that this 
constituted discrimination because the language requirements for the 
competition were lower for those applicants whose mother tongue was 
either French, German, or English. This action reflects a constant policy 
line of Spain: fighting to have Spanish recognized as a working language 
in all EU organizations (MIN_ES_2, MIN_ES_5). Therefore, whenever 
there is an opportunity to manifest this position before the Court on the 
subject, the Spanish government goes for it (MIN_ES_2).
The same explanation applies to a series of annulment actions initi-
ated by Spain against the adoption of a European unitary patent package 
(adopted by the member states in 2012). The translation arrangements 
for the unitary patent would be discriminatory towards individuals whose 
mother tongue is neither French, German, nor English because the pat-
ents would be granted in French, German, or English only. The Court 
rejected Spain’s actions in 2015.
Italy has an interest similar to Spain’s on this topic. Just like Spain, 
Italian authorities regularly resist decisions of the EU that privilege the 
three working languages of the EU (French, English, and German) to 
the detriment of other languages. Just like Spain, the Italian government 
takes annulment actions against EU institutions in the attempt to pro-
mote Italian (C-295/11; T-443/16), as was the case in the negotiation 
of the European Patent package (Van Zimmeren et al. 2015).
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Passenger Rights (C-317/04 and C-318/04)
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States tight-
ened legal requirements for air carriers flying to or over the United 
States. Accordingly, now passenger name records would have to 
be communicated to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, the Bureau of Customs, and Border Protection US. Aware of 
the potential clash between this provision and European rules on data 
privacy, the Commission negotiated an international agreement that 
led to Commission Decision 2004/535/EC5 and Council Decision 
2004/496/EC.6
These internationally negotiated rules, however, collided with the 
EP’s views on data privacy. For nearly a decade, and particularly since 
the adoption of the first EU data privacy directive, civil liberty rights had 
been high on the Parliament’s agenda (Long and Quek 2002; Newman 
2008). From the viewpoint of the EP, the agreements signed with the 
United States were not merely a setback. The Parliament considered 
this agreement to be a blunt violation of fundamental individual rights 
(COM_2). Consequently, the Parliament launched two closely related 
annulment cases against the Commission (C-318/04) and against 
the Council (C-317/04). Leaving victorious in both legal actions, the 
EP was able to defend a policy position that it has since developed fur-
ther, a prominent example of which was its negotiation of a framework 
for the processing of personal data with the General Data Protection 
Regulation.7 Given the Parliament’s strong preferences for data privacy 
and its objective to present itself as a defender of civil liberty rights, 
securing values on civil liberty enshrined in existing policies and pre-
paring the ground for future instruments is a core motivation to go to 
court. Annulment actions are one important instrument to do so.
The Private Pension Market Case (C-57/95)8
This conflict between France and the Commission has roots that reach 
back to the year 1991, when the Commission submitted to the Council a 
proposal for a Council directive relating to the freedom of management 
and investment of funds held by institutions for retirement provision. 
This proposal represented the first attempt to effectively harmonize the 
European market for pension funds. While the basic freedoms ensured 
within the internal market that was to be completed by 1992 was also 
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seen—at least by the Commission—to extend to pension funds deliv-
ering financial services, these were at that point in time still subjected 
exclusively to highly diverse national regulation.
The Commission’s proposal for a Council directive did not try to 
abolish the national diversity of pension systems and abstained from 
forcing member states to allow for the national establishment of pen-
sion funds. Yet the proposal nevertheless contained several requirements. 
Specifically, member states would no longer be allowed to constrain 
national actors to use the services of pension funds established in other 
member states (European Commission 1991, Article 3). Furthermore, 
the proposal defined several principles guiding the investment practice s 
of pension funds (European Commission 1991, Article 4). In this con-
text, it emphasized, among other things, that member states should 
no longer prohibit pension funds from investing in foreign securities. 
Pension funds would thus have a right to choose their investments 
within the internal market freely.
While the matter was undisputed among actors at the suprana-
tional level, the proposal was highly controversial among the member 
states in the Council, with France being one of its main opponents. 
Consequently, the Commission decided to withdraw the proposal in 
1994. France opposed the proposal not only because it challenged the 
French approach towards private pension funds, but also—and mainly—
because it challenged the French approach towards regulating invest-
ments by institutions for retirement provision. While France was one 
of the few member states that traditionally defined detailed quantita-
tive investment restrictions, the Commission’s proposal rather included 
qualitative concepts. It specified that assets should be sufficiently diver-
sified, avoid major accumulations of risk, and restrict investment in the 
sponsoring undertaking (i.e. the company for which the pension fund 
works to ensure the pensions of its workers) to a prudent level. Instead 
of relying on strict quantified obligations, this regulatory approach 
reflects a precautionary principle (or prudent-person rule) that was typ-
ically applied in Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands but 
ran counter to the French approach. In 1998, the financial institution 
Deutsche Bank still diagnosed an ongoing clash of regulatory cultures 
with respect to investment rules for institutions of retirement provision. 
The debate between proponents of quantitative restrictions on invest-
ment and proponents of the prudent-person rule was at the heart of this 
conflict (Deutsch 1998; Haverland 2007).
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The Commission, however, did not give up on its intention of lay-
ing the foundation for pension fund reform. On the contrary, the 
Commission simply decided to pursue this objective by different means. 
Specifically, the Commission quickly moved to publish its interpreta-
tion of relevant Community law with respect to rights and obligations 
of pension funds in the Official Journal. In fact, the Communication on 
the Freedom of Management and Investment9 of funds held by institutions 
for retirement provision was purposefully published on 17 December 
1994, not even two weeks after the proposal for a directive had been 
withdrawn. Moreover, the connection between the proposed directive 
and the Communication was not only their temporal proximity. The two 
texts were also rather similar in content (Hartlapp 2008; Adam 2016).
Thus, unsurprisingly, France quickly decided to initiate an action for 
annulment against the Communication. The motives driving France to 
litigate were the same as their motives to prevent the adoption of the 
directive proposed by the Commission. In the backdrop of the clash of 
regulatory cultures, the French government wanted to preserve their 
regulatory approach. They were thus seeking to keep the policy in line 
with the precautionary principle.
This section presented annulment cases dealing with recruitment prac-
tices, the EU’s patent package, data privacy, passenger rights, and private 
pension market reform. These cases illustrate that seeking policies on ide-
ological grounds plays a crucial role in public actors’ decisions to engage 
in annulment litigation.
PoliticAl trust–driven Annulment cAses
Seeking to improve, restore, or protect political trust is a common 
driver of annulment conflicts, especially in multilevel conflicts that pit 
member states against EU institutions. Where supranational actions 
clash with public opinion in certain countries or regions, standing up 
to Brussels can be politically opportune no matter whether legal actions 
will be successful. Obviously, this motivation of building political trust 
is particularly important to actors that seek (re-)election. We distinguish 
three situations in which political trust motivates annulment actions by 
national governments. National governments may challenge EU institu-
tions to gain trust from citizens, from subnational territorial authorities, 
or from companies. We illustrate the empirical relevance of these constel-
lations below.
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Toy Safety Case (T-198-12)
The German case on toy safety illustrates how governments may liti-
gate against the Commission to gain the trust of an important constit-
uency. After a series of problems with toy safety in the mid-1990s, the 
Commission decided to revise the old EU toy safety regulatory regime 
established in 1988. The scientific report that the Commission used as 
a basis to work on the regulatory reform was controversial among the 
academic community. Based on studies other than those used by the 
Commission, Germany contested the limit values for lead and other tox-
ins recommended by the Commission, arguing they were too high to 
guarantee children’s health. In other words, Germany considered the 
Commission’s approach to be too lenient and unable to effectively pro-
tect child health. Nevertheless, Germany’s input was ignored, and a new 
directive on toy safety was adopted in 2009. This directive was based on 
the limits for toxic substances as proposed by the Commission.
Once the directive came in force, the obligation to transpose it 
clashed with the pressure felt by the German government to respond 
to public opinion concerns. After all, even before the adoption of the 
directive, the German government had publicly communicated its con-
cerns about the high limits proposed by the Commission. The German 
Parliament, along with consumer protection groups, scrutinized the 
topic rather closely. With the directive adopted, all eyes were on Ilse 
Aigner, Germany’s federal minister for consumer protection, to see what 
she was going to do in order to secure the highest possible protection for 
German children (MIN_DE_9).
Minister Aigner had two options at the time: Germany could either 
launch an annulment action against the directive, or it could delay the 
transposition to negotiate lower limits within comitology. Since Germany 
disagreed with only about 10% of the directive’s content, Aigner chose 
the second option. Over time, however, the German government real-
ized that it would not be able to meet its objectives via comitology 
and technical ex post negotiations, as the concessions made by the 
Commission to raise the regulatory requirements were still far below 
German’s safety standards. Having missed the chance to litigate against 
the directive and having failed to negotiate an appropriate compromise, 
Germany turned to its right—guaranteed by the treaties—to deviate 
from EU safety standards in case this was deemed necessary to ensure a 
higher level of health protection. Germany thus made a formal request to 
112  C. ADAM ET AL.
the Commission for the authorization to introduce stricter limits on tox-
ins in toys than those defined by EU law. Yet in response to the request, 
the Commission only accepted deviation from EU levels for some toxins 
but not for others. Here, Germany would still have to comply with EU 
standards.
Germany’s government was divided over this issue. There was dis-
agreement between the Ministry for Consumer Protection and the 
Ministry for Economic Affairs, and the issue escalated up to the highest 
political level, the German federal cabinet. The Ministry for Economic 
Affairs opposed litigation against the Commission’s decision for fear 
that diverging from EU-wide standards could have a negative impact 
on German toy industry. On the other hand, Minister Aigner was 
under great pressure to follow-up on her public commitment to do all 
she could to ‘protect German children’, even if that meant going to 
Luxembourg. Aigner won this dispute, and Germany decided to litigate 
against the Commission. Even though the German government lost 
this legal conflict in the first instance and its subsequent appeal, it did 
not lose this conflict politically. The public accepted the sentence and 
did not punish its leaders, as the blame was successfully shifted to the 
Commission and the Court. Aigner could be seen as having done her 
best in ‘standing up to Brussels’ for a good cause (MIN_DE_9).
The Molluscs Case (T-204/11)
In all cases related to funds in agriculture and cohesion policies, political 
trust between the state and its regions plays a central role in the decision 
to litigate. We explained above that many of these cases were essentially 
based on financial motivations. Yet when negative financial effects rest 
on the shoulders of an actor not able to litigate itself, this actor relies on 
a privileged litigant, such as a member state government, to litigate in 
its behalf. In Spain, for example, the regions are responsible for carrying 
financial sanctions imposed by the Commission for inappropriate spend-
ing of agriculture funds and cohesion funds. Yet the Court has estab-
lished a very restrictive approach towards the regions’ ability to challenge 
such financial corrections decisions by the Commission. Therefore, 
they depend on the national government to endorse their interests and 
litigate on their behalf. Only when the federal government’s budget is 
affected by such corrections does it have a clear financial motivation to 
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litigate. But what is its motivation to litigate if mostly regional budg-
ets are affected? Our interviews suggest that, particularly in Spain, the 
principle of constitutional loyalty plays an important role in this regard. 
Maintaining smooth and cooperative relationships with its respective 
regions or states is of paramount importance for a central government. 
It is a way to improve or protect the relationship with a specific region. 
Annulment litigation in this sense is a way to build political trust.
One case that illustrates the relevance of this motivation is the mol-
luscs case. In 2011, the Commission adopted a regulation to change the 
methodology used for the detection of toxins in bivalve molluscs such 
as clams and oysters. While the detection of toxins had relied on tri-
als on mice, analyses would now have to rely on chemical procedures. 
Galicia, a coastal region in northern Spain whose economy relies heavily 
on the fishing sector (especially on molluscs), opposed this regulation. 
In particular, this opposition resulted from the fact that this chemical 
method was much more expensive for the Galician administration and 
for Galician shell fishermen. Having to switch to this method was por-
trayed and perceived as a catastrophe for Galicia. Equipped with scientific 
evidence that questioned the new method, Galicia tried to litigate against 
the regulation before the CJEU. However, being aware that the restric-
tive standing rights of regions would likely prevent such an action from 
being admitted, Galicia decided to turn to the central state for support 
(MIN_GA_5).
In Spain, this petition is made informally via the day-to-day communi-
cation between the relevant ministries of both governmental levels. If the 
relevant central ministry then endorses the region’s interests, it makes a 
formal petition to the central monitoring commission, which is led by 
state attorneys. This monitoring commission effectively decides whether 
Spain will take the matter to court. While this is usually a rather smooth 
process, the strong clash of interests between Galicia and the national 
agriculture and health ministries resulted in a rockier process in this par-
ticular case. First of all, a Spanish laboratory affiliated with the Spanish 
national agency for food safety had played a central role in the devel-
opment of the new chemical methodology adopted at the EU level. 
Naturally, they defended the advantages of this method (MIN_GA_5). 
Second, in an informal deal with the European Commission in com-
itology, Spanish representatives had committed not to challenge the 
regulation before the Court. In exchange, the European Commission 
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agreed to prolong the transition period until the new method became 
obligatory. The competent ministries at the central level were therefore 
strongly opposed to litigate, and for this reason, they refused to endorse 
Galicia’s petition before the monitoring commission (MIN_ES_1).
Galicia thus followed the formal procedure to make their petition to 
the monitoring commission, which is carried out through the interme-
diation of the Conference for Issues Related to the European Union 
(CARUE), the commission for the coordination between the central 
state and the regions about EU issues. Galician representatives were 
duly invited to present their views before the monitoring commission, 
which led to a lively technical debate between experts from Galicia and 
the Spanish food safety agency (MIN_GA_5). Within the monitoring 
commission, composed of the state attorneys and all central ministries, 
decisions to litigate are adopted under unanimity. This obviously implies 
that when one or several ministries oppose the judicial action, there is no 
litigation. Surprisingly, despite the clear opposition of the central minis-
tries for health and agriculture, the monitoring commission decided to 
support Galicia.
While the central state acknowledged the deep impact of the regula-
tion on Galician producers and the good legal and technical arguments 
in favour of an annulment action, these conditions cannot normally jus-
tify overcoming the opposition of a central ministry. The decisive factor 
for this surprising decision was the willingness of the central state to sig-
nal a cooperative attitude and good will towards Spanish regions in mat-
ters related to interventions before the CJEU. Previously, the CARUE 
process yielded little support for Spanish regions, as many petitions 
raised by the regions were rejected. This fuelled substantial resentment, 
as the regions felt their interests were not duly taken into account, even 
in such matters for which they held the formal competence according to 
the Spanish constitution. With its decision to litigate over the method 
used to test Galician shellfish for toxins, the Spanish central government 
decided to send a positive signal to the regions to show that their con-
cerns were heard and supported (MIN_ES_1). Once the decision to 
litigate was taken, Spanish state attorneys and Galician officials worked 
in close collaboration to defend the case, which they eventually lost, 
however.
5 MOTIVATIONS: WHEN CONFLICT LEADS TO LITIGATION  115
BMW Case (T-671/14)
Finally, the BMW case exemplifies the situation where governments use 
judicial actions to maintain good relationships with certain companies. 
The German region Saxony wanted to have BMW, the German car-
maker, establish its new plant for electric cars in Leipzig and promised 
the company an aid of forty-nine million euros if they did so. They jus-
tified this measure by the EU regime for regional aids, exclusively appli-
cable to Europe’s poorer regions. Under the regional aid regime, poor 
regions only have to notify the Commission of aid that exceeds 22.5 mil-
lion euros (below this threshold, a block exemption applies; such smaller 
aids are automatically legal and exempted from notification obligation). 
Since Saxony wanted to give 49 million to BMW, they however had to 
notify the Commission of the aid. Before being able to authorize the aid, 
the Commission assessed whether the aid was in fact necessary to attract 
the new plant. To do so, it asked BMW to demonstrate that it would 
have been cheaper for them to set up shop elsewhere. BMW was able to 
show a document that evaluated that building the new plant in Bavaria 
was seventeen million euros cheaper than in Saxony without the aid. 
While this justified Saxony’s need to grant aid to attract a new employer 
to this poorer region, the Commission used this evidence to evaluate the 
forty-nine million as excessive aid. It concluded that the aid granted by 
Saxony could not exceed seventeen million euros. Alternatively, it could 
take advantage of the block exemption regime and give up to 22.5 mil-
lion euros in aid if they withdrew their notification completely.
Saxony left it up to BMW to decide what to do. The company, which 
had seventeen million euros in aid guaranteed, preferred to not with-
draw the notification and to sue the Commission’s decision (the alterna-
tive would have been withdrawing the notification and taking advantage 
of the block exemption to give 22.5 million euros to BMW). Saxony 
wanted to show support for BMW as they had promised the aid before 
the intervention of the Commission. It was important for Saxony to sig-
nal that the regional government was a reliable partner standing by its 
financial promises (MIN_SA_1). However, given that Saxony had lost 
several previous state aid cases—as in the Leipzig Halle case presented 
above—the regional authorities shied away from a direct annulment 
appeal. Instead, Saxony decided to join BMW’s action as intervener 
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before the Court and contracted first-rank law firms in order to bring 
additional legal expertise to the case in close coordination with the 
actions of BMW (MIN_SA_1).10
The cases presented in this section illustrate the importance of what 
we conceive of as political trust for public actors when deciding to 
raise an annulment case. Especially in cases where the national litigant 
is unlikely to win (given the objective assessment of the legal situation), 
raising an annulment action can be a strategy for securing political trust 
from the electorate, from institutional partners (like regions or subna-
tional authorities), and from big companies—no matter what the final 
outcome of the legal case is going to be.
conclusion
Annulment litigation is about politics. Annulment actions are likely to be 
used when political considerations blend in. Understanding the use of 
judicial review thus requires going beyond a purely legalistic view of judi-
cial conflicts, particularly since litigation is costly. Actors thus litigate only 
after some calculation about the potential costs and benefits; this calcu-
lation is done on various levels and with complex aims of the litigating 
actors. Formally winning a case is sometimes only one objective among 
others, and occasionally, it is not at all the major driver for litigation.
This is not to say that legal factors are irrelevant. They do play a role 
in actors’ decision to engage in litigation rather than trying to exert 
influence in the political arena. In addition, they structure choices 
between different legal channels. Legal options provide the opportu-
nity structure in which actors’ concrete political calculations take place. 
However, in contrast to the literature on the economics of litigation 
(Gould 1973; Posner 1973), which emphasizes the probability of win-
ning as the essential element in litigants’ risk-benefit analysis about their 
decision to litigate, the expectation to win is often only secondary in 
annulment cases—at least for public actors. The more annulment litiga-
tion is pursued for symbolic reasons—that is, as a signal to domestic con-
stituents—the less important success in court becomes to litigants (Adam 
et al. 2015). Not to be misunderstood; annulment litigants do genuinely 
seek judicial success. But in terms of the legal merits of the case, the min-
imum requirements for justifying litigation are rather low. The important 
analytical consequence of this being so is that the explanatory power of 
legal factors on public actors’ decision to litigate is limited.
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Based on a new conceptualization of actor motivations, this chapter 
has identified four possible types of motivations that lay behind engaging 
in annulment litigation. Litigation can be chosen (1) in order to maxi-
mize material gains (or minimize financial costs), (2) to preserve political 
decision rights and to ring-fence the opponent’s decision-making compe-
tences, (3) to promote ideological and policy preferences, and (4) to sig-
nal trustworthiness to addressees of a policy. Not all of these motivations 
appeared equally frequent. Ideology, for example, found fewer echoes in 
our cases. Yet all motivations clearly constitute particular types that pro-
vide distinct analytical levers to understand annulment actions in the EU 
multilevel system. What is more, we saw that specific groups of actors 
are more likely to litigate based on one particular motivation: financial 
gains are frequently important for private and subnational governments. 
Signalling trustworthiness and responsiveness, in turn, are objectives of 
actors that face electoral competition at the subnational, national, or 
supranational level. Moreover, the motivation to keep or expand insti-
tutional competences matters most for public actors that want to protect 
their role in public decision taking. Finally, ideology matters most for 
strongly politicized actors, such as social movements (private litigants) or 
public actors for which demonstrating that they hold a certain position 
according to party politics is important in preventing loss of legitimacy 
for their representational role.
We illustrated the four types of motivations in a number of empiri-
cal cases. These cases generally represent one dominant motivation type; 
only a couple of cases show evidence of motivations coexisting with 
the predominant one. The applicability of our typology appears thus to 
be on solid empirical grounds. It backs the conclusion that annulment 
actions are examples of how multilevel policy conflicts in the EU trans-
late into judicial conflicts when the financial, institutional, ideological, or 
legitimacy stakes are sufficiently high in the eyes of the actors to justify 
the dedication of administrative resources to litigation. Before this result, 
the next chapter analyses the factors that make different litigant configu-
rations more or less likely to occur.
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See Table 5.2.
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notes
 1.  In other words, while we expect to find cases explained by, for exam-
ple, both motivation 1 and motivation 2, we do not expect to find cases 
explained by one motivation that would be a hybrid between motivation 
1 and 2. In our conception, whereas our motivations can coexist in a sin-
gle annulment case, they could not be mixed into hybrid types.
 2.  For example, Eisenberg (1990).
 3.  Le Figaro, La France va devoir rendre un milliard d’euros d’aides agricoles 
(27 January 2015), accessed 22 January 2017.
 4.  In addition, the annulment action initiated over pension market reform 
in France described by Adam (2016) can also be read as evidence for the 
relevance of ideological motivations.
 5.  2004/535/EC:Commission Decision of 14 May 2004 on the adequate 
protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of 
air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (notified under document number C[2004] 1914), 
Official Journal L 235, 6.7.2004, pp. 11–22.
 6.  2004/496/EC:Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of 
an Agreement between the European Community and the United States 
of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to 
the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection, Official Journal L 183, 20.5.2004, p. 83.
 7.  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), Official Journal L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88.
 8.  A more detailed description of this case can be found in Adam (2016).
 9.  COMMISSION, E. C. 1994. Commission Communication on the 
Freedom of Management and Investment of Funds held by Institutions 
for Retirement Provision (94/C 360/08). Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 1994, pp. 7–11.
 10.  At the time of writing, the case was still pending.
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Scholars describe policy processes in the European Union (EU) as 
 multileveled, networked, and fluid. As such, they typically involve a 
wide range of different actors, located at different governmental levels, 
whose interactions can feature cooperation but also conflict. Generally, 
political disputes over policy issues mobilize a fair number of actors from 
within the multilevel system whose relative positions, rivalries, and alli-
ances come to form what we conceive as a policy conflict configuration. 
The emerging policy positions tend to be supported by several actors 
that may even unite into a coalition. Hence, far from being limited to 
a face-off between two actors, policy conflicts typically involve numer-
ous stakeholders. While policy conflicts involve a large number of actors, 
the great majority of judicial conflicts do not. Most often, legal con-
flicts include only two parties: the applicant and the defendant. This is 
also true for EU annulment actions. Most of the conflicts discussed in 
Chapter 5 represent such a simple applicant-defendant configuration, as, 
for example, when Germany brought the Commission to court because 
of the Commission’s interference with the German renewable energy law 
(T-134/14).
Even when more actors effectively have a stake in particular cases, the 
resulting litigant configuration in court does not always reflect that. This 
indicates that a filtering process from societal conflict to legal dispute 
must be at work (Glenn 1999). Two important structural aspects—in the 
sense of legal opportunity structures, as discussed in Chapter 3—work as 
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enabling or constraining factors in this filtering process: actors’ standing 
rights and their legal and financial resources. Simply put, not all inter-
ested actors are allowed to take on an active role before court even when 
they want to. Furthermore, not all actors are able or willing to invest 
the financial or legal resources necessary to take part in court proceed-
ings, particularly when there are options for a free ride on the decision 
of other actors to go to court. Yet despite these factors discouraging 
interested actors from joining annulment cases, we do observe a sub-
stantial number of complex litigant configurations. In fact, while simple 
litigant configurations represent the majority of annulment cases, com-
plex litigant configurations, in which additional litigants or defendants 
join cases, are far too frequent to be regarded as mere exceptions. Before 
this background, we set out to study simple and complex litigant con-
figurations in this chapter. We will show that emerging conflict config-
urations can be linked to the motivations outlined in Chapter 5. The 
financial litigation motivation coins conflicts between member state gov-
ernments and EU institutions and between national companies and the 
Commission. The institutional power motivation generally drives con-
flicts between member state governments and the EU, as well as between 
EU institutions among themselves. The ideological motivation is found 
in vertical conflicts between member states or non-governmental organi-
zations and EU institutions, as well as among EU institutions. The polit-
ical trust motivations generally underpin annulment actions, intervening 
as a two-level game where a national or regional government judicialises 
a conflict with an EU institution to send a positive signal to their constit-
uency at home.
The specific link we explore in this chapter is the nexus between insti-
tutional turbulence and the emergence of complex litigant configura-
tions. We propose in this regard that the emergence of complex litigant 
configurations is causally linked to institutional turbulence. Institutions 
are in turbulence when existing institutional arrangements are in flux, 
are new, or become unsettled. Annulment litigation that emerges in 
this context often involves more than just two actors. This is because 
the status quo ante of the turbulence represents a negotiated temporary 
equilibrium situation that tends to involve a substantial number of stake-
holders. This temporary equilibrium comprises a financial dimension, an 
ideological dimension, an institutional or competence-related dimension, 
and a political or electoral dimension. Therefore, threats to disrupt the 
status quo hold the potential to trigger litigation decisions driven by 
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all four motivations we described in Chapter 5. Moreover, institutional 
turbulence reduces legal certainty—an observation that can hardly be 
overestimated. In consequence, such turbulence makes the prospects of 
judicial success higher for potential litigants. Legal conflicts that involve 
fundamental struggles over the status quo that take place at such critical 
institutional and policy junctures are thus most likely cases that attract 
not only one but several actors and therefore reflect a more complex liti-
gant configuration.
engAging with comPlexity
In the previous chapter, we addressed the decisions of individual public 
actors to litigate. Now, we take a more macro-level perspective and focus 
on what we conceive of as litigation configurations. In annulment liti-
gation, a diverse set of actors from various territorial levels can take part 
in lawsuits. We think of the possible combinations as configurations or 
constellations.
While litigant configurations differ enormously across annulment 
cases, we generally distinguish between simple and complex configu-
rations based on the number of participants that take part in the case. 
Simply put, cases that involve only one applicant and one defendant are 
considered simple configurations. All other cases are complex configura-
tions. Obviously, this is a simple distinction that lumps together various 
different alliances and cleavages. The following paragraphs intend to do 
justice to the various different constellations that make up the group of 
complex litigant configurations. With this, we hope to demonstrate that 
the distinction is conceptually and theoretically fruitful and empirically 
relevant.
In line with the distinction drawn between simple and complex con-
flicts (cf. Chapter 2), we speak about complex litigant configurations 
when at least three actors take an active role in the annulment litiga-
tion. One of these actors, the defendant, does not consciously choose 
to be involved; it has to defend itself as soon as a litigant decides to chal-
lenge one of its decisions. The crucial actor actually deciding to start a 
litigation is the applicant for an action for annulment. Additional par-
ties can intervene either in favour of the applicant or in favour of the 
defendant. Actors on the applicant’s side can also decide to raise an addi-
tional annulment action against that same EU measure that is already in 
force. Typically, the Court joins these cases under the umbrella of one 
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proceeding and one judgement that binds together such cases against 
the same EU measure. Such joint cases thus reflect a complex litigant 
configuration.
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the absolute number of annul-
ment cases with a complex litigant configuration and of the share of 
complex cases (based on the total number of annulment cases). In total, 
we find 936 complex litigant configurations. Complex configurations 
reached a temporary peak relative to the absolute number of annul-
ments in the mid-1990s. In absolute terms, the highest number of cases 
with complex litigant configurations emerged around a decade later, in 
the mid-2000s.
We discuss litigant configurations for vertical and horizontal conflicts 
separately. In the context of vertical annulment conflicts, we observe 828 
complex litigant configurations. This amounts to about 26% of all ver-
tical cases (see Table 6.1). Simple vertical constellations mostly include 
conflicts between individual private actors on the claimant side and the 
Commission or the Council on the defendant side. Yet they also often 
include individual member states litigating against the Commission.
Fig. 6.1 Complex litigant configurations over time (Source Own data)
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The specific litigant arrangement in such vertical complex litigant con-
figurations is quite diverse. Table 6.2 explicitly describes the five most 
frequent actor configurations that lead us to classify cases as complex 
vertical configurations. It is important to highlight that these configu-
rations are not mutually exclusive as they refer to either the claimant or 
the defendant side. In 452 cases, we observe that several private actors 
joined forces on the claimant side of a conflict against the defending EU 
institution. In 158 cases, private actors and the Commission fought on 
the same side—the defendant side—of the conflict. Yet the Commission 
is supported as a defendant not only by private actors but also sometimes 
by one or several member state governments. We count 145 such con-
stellations. As claimants, member states and private actors align in 155 
cases and several member states align in 81 cases. While these configu-
rations represent configurations that are rather numerous, another 155 
cases remain; these belong to other complex litigant configurations, not 
explicitly referenced here. In any case, the purpose of this section is to 
provide a condensed insight into the complexity and diversity of actor 
configurations in annulment conflict rather than to provide a detailed 
data report.
Turning to horizontal annulment conflicts, it is important to note 
that in relative terms, complex litigant configurations are more frequent 
here. While we classify only twenty-six horizontal conflicts as cases with 
simple litigant configurations, 108 of these cases feature a complex 
Table 6.1 Simple 
and complex cases 
in vertical conflicts 
(1957–2012)
Source Own data
Type of legal conflict Frequency
Simple vertical conflicts 2254
Complex vertical conflicts 828
Table 6.2 Most 
frequent complex actors’ 
configurations in vertical 
conflicts (1957–2012)
Source Own data. MS = member state
Complex configurations Frequency
Private + Private 452
Commission + Private (defendants) 158
Commission + MS (defendants) 145
MS + Private 155
MS + MS 81
Other configurations 155
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configuration. This amounts to about 81% of all horizontal cases. 
Complex configurations are thus the norm rather than the exception for 
horizontal conflicts (see Table 6.3).
Most often, these complex horizontal configurations consist of the 
cases in which the Council and one or several member states join forces 
(on either side of the conflict). We find this configuration forty-nine 
times. In thirty-one cases, the Commission and member states fought 
on the same side, while the Commission and the European Parliament 
(EP) did so seventeen times. Again, we include a catch-the-rest category 
for other configurations that turn fifteen cases into complex cases. It is 
important to highlight that, as for vertical constellations, these horizon-
tal configurations are not mutually exclusive. So one annulment conflict 
can feature, for example, the Commission and the EP on one side and 
the Council and member states on the other side. Similarly, the same 
annulment conflict can feature the Council and some member states on 
one side versus the Commission and other member states on the other 
side (Table 6.4).
Overall, we see that in relative terms, complex litigant configurations 
are more frequent in the context of horizontal conflicts than in vertical 
conflicts. However, even among vertical conflicts, complex configura-
tions can hardly be treated as a phenomenon of marginal empirical rele-
vance. Complex litigant configurations come in many forms and emerge 
in different contexts. While it is difficult to determine precisely whether 
a specific case will give rise to a complex litigant configuration, we argue 
that the emergence of complex configurations is far from random.
Table 6.3 Simple and 
complex cases in horizontal 
conflicts (1957–2012)
Source Own data
Type of legal conflict Frequency
Simple horizontal conflicts 26
Complex horizontal conflicts 108
Table 6.4 The Council and the 
Commission in complex  
configurations (1957–2012)
Source Own data. MS = member state
Complex configuration Frequency
Council + MS 49
Commission + MS 31
Commission + EP 17
Other configurations 15
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theorizing comPlex litigAnt configurAtions
Unfortunately, extant research has so far not provided much insight 
regarding the factors that shape litigant configurations. Typically, lit-
igant configurations are treated as exogenous factors that potentially 
influence judicial decisions. Legal scholars do so when studying ami-
cus curiae1 briefs before national courts to learn about supporters and 
their arguments in court. The question in this context is whether liti-
gants supported by (legally) powerful amici have a greater chance of 
success; although the empirical validity of this assumption is debated 
(Sheehan et al. 1992).
Political scientists take a similar approach when they analyse how lit-
igant configurations correlate with Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) decisions to assess the Court’s independence (e.g. 
Carrubba et al. 2008, 2012; Larsson and Naurin 2016). Again, this 
approach starts with different litigant configurations as exogenous fac-
tors. On this basis, scholars assess how the Court responds to them. 
Does the Court tailor its rulings to the political power that backs up 
either side of the dispute or is it immune to such political pressures? This 
way of using litigant configurations does not explicitly theorize the emer-
gence of different litigant configurations. And yet it rests on the assump-
tion that actors participate because they have a stake in the legal conflict 
they join. This is why they reveal their preferences to the Court. While 
we are far from challenging this assumption, we try in this chapter—and 
throughout this book more generally—to complement and qualify the 
underlying assumption in several regards.
First, Chapter 5 has laid out that there are different motivations 
for taking an active role in court proceedings. Winning the imminent 
legal case is not always important for this decision. While some actors 
might have a financial stake in a case, the same case might be of elec-
toral relevance to other actors. Ideological or policy goals, institutional 
competence-related stakes, material or financial stakes, political trust, 
and electoral stakes can all cause actors to take an active role in court 
proceedings. In fact, we assume that motivations are particularly heter-
ogeneous in conflicts characterized by complex constellations. It seems 
overly rigid to assume that all parties involved share the same motiva-
tion. This flows from our argumentation above. Developing the differ-
ent motivations, we highlighted that frequently, a specific motivation is 
typical for one category of actors but not for another. For example, we 
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expect private actors to be motivated by material gains in most cases. 
Political trust, in the form of electoral gains, in turn, is likely to motivate 
actors that compete for votes at the ballot box. As the tables above show, 
complex conflicts regularly involve different types of actors and constella-
tions. Thus, they are likely to comprise different motivations for conflicts 
and objectives when going to court, too.
Second, it would be a mistake, however, to exclusively focus on 
these motivations and overlook the legal merits of the case. This might 
be obvious to legal scholars. Rather strikingly, however, this constraint 
seems too often to escape the eye of political scientists. Social movement 
research has highlighted that legal claims cannot be based on just any 
argument when going to court. After all, bad and clearly invalid legal 
arguments will maximize the chances of legal defeat that can seriously 
hurt actors’ long-term interests. Rather, available precedent or statutory 
basis on which the case can be argued is crucial (Andersen 2005). Here, 
analytically, the legal stock is a structural factor that influences litigation 
decisions (Vanhala 2011). However, the impact of this is typically dis-
cussed within extant research at the level of single cases rather than as a 
systematic factor. In the aforementioned studies that focus on the corre-
lation between actor configurations and CJEU decisions (e.g. Carrubba 
et al. 2008, 2012), analyses do not control for the legal merits of a case 
or plea. Obviously, this would be rather difficult to do. But without 
doing so, we cannot account for the empirical fact that certain cases are 
more likely to be won in court than others merely because of the differ-
ent legal merits of the cases. Yet what if the legal merits of a case should 
tend to spur different kinds of litigant configurations? Would we not 
always run the risk of mistaking correlations between litigant configura-
tions and legal outcomes for causal impacts of litigant configurations on 
judicial behaviour?
As Chapter 5 on motivations has laid out extensively, very different 
motivations can bring actors to litigate. At the same time, our interviews 
highlighted that actors systematically consider the legal merits of a case. 
Before a decision to go to court is taken, they make an analysis of the 
situation by considering whether ‘we have a chance to succeed “yes/
no”, or to what extend do we technically speaking recommend to [go 
to court] “yes/no”’ (EP_1, cf. also COM_1, CONS_1, MIN_DE_1, 
MIN_ES_4, MIN_ES_5). Thus, while actors might be motivated differ-
ently, they are always constrained or enabled by the legal merits of a case. 
In a logical extension from the arguments presented in Chapter 5 on the 
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motivations of individual actors, complex litigant configurations are thus 
the result of several actors having a stake in the case and perceiving the 
legal situation—at the very least—to be sufficiently unclear as to be will-
ing to go to court.
Obviously, this general condition can and does arise in various con-
texts. It is, however, most likely to emerge in situations that we choose 
to describe as situations of institutional turbulence. With this emphasis of 
turbulence, we make use of a concept from the context of organizational 
research. Here, turbulence is used to describe situations when organiza-
tions are facing changes that ‘are nontrivial, rapid, and discontinuous’ 
(Cameron et al. 1987, 225). Often, the term turbulence is also used to 
describe situations of uncertainty (Burns and Stalker 1961) or as a direct 
consequence of organizational change (Cameron et al. 1987; Ansell et al. 
2017; Trondal and Bauer 2017).
Turbulence thus refers to a situational context that lacks clarity, rou-
tine, and certainty. These situations are likely to threaten established 
policy paradigms, legal interpretations, implementation practices, compe-
tence distributions, political alliances, or resource allocations. Situations 
of institutional turbulence are situations that apply beyond individual 
interests. They alter the setting for many actors at a given point in time; 
in other words, the situation provides supranational, national, or sub-
national actors with ideas about why annulments might further their— 
possibly differing—stakes. When this is the case, many different actors 
are likely to have a particular stake in overturning or consolidating the 
legality of a specific legal act. Institutional turbulence can thus be the 
result of treaty or policy changes. Historical institutionalists describe sit-
uations that can fundamentally alter the path of law and public policy 
as critical junctures (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutional turbulence is 
a typical result when such path changes are adopted. They represent a 
divergence from the status quo by changing interpretations, introducing 
new legal concepts for the first time, abolishing old rules, or changing 
the competence structure.
Supranational acts can be the source of institutional turbulence. We 
find several different empirical manifestations of which we highlight the 
three most obvious in the following. First, a treaty change clearly rep-
resents a time of substantial institutional turbulence. Assuming that 
with the entering into force of a treaty change, all uncertainties would 
vanish neglects that treaties consist of rather abstract terms and rules 
that require further interpretation to come to life. Treaties are always 
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incomplete contracts. Second, treaty change is not the only trigger of 
institutional turbulence; sector specific policy reforms, typically shifting 
the underlying logic of a number of different policy instruments and 
practices, can also be at the origin of turbulences. Such reforms some-
times even come in the form of soft law (Terpan 2015). The adoption 
of a new state aid action plan, new guidelines on merger control, or new 
rules on funding the common agricultural policy can represent similar 
threats or disruptions of the status quo, which in turn will generate crit-
ics and proponents and will come with a non-negligible amount of legal 
vulnerability that can be exploited in court. Third, even individual deci-
sions create institutional turbulences. Consider a Commission decision 
that changes the standards for assessing particular issues, as was the case 
when the Commission declared illegal state aid to ProSiebenSat1 and the 
RTL Group, two private broadcasting companies.2 That decision, meant 
as a particular intervention, turned out to be a critical juncture in the 
Commission’s way of assessing the legality of state aid.3
We argue that supranational acts causing situations of institutional 
turbulence are particularly likely to lead to complex litigation patterns. 
These situations are likely to both yield high stakes for several actors and 
to create sufficient legal uncertainty to encourage these different actors 
to try their luck in court. First, whenever the status quo is disrupted, 
protest and support by several actors, which act upon different motiva-
tions, are likely to emerge. The status quo represents equilibrium on sev-
eral dimensions simultaneously; it consists of a situation of stability on 
the financial, institutional, ideological, and political fronts. Consequently, 
disrupting the status quo implies bringing about important changes on 
most (if not all) of these dimensions simultaneously. While some actors 
may be reactive to a disruption in a financial situation, others might 
rather be sensitive to the institutional or political dimension of the dis-
ruption. Hence, institutional disruption is likely to affect different types 
of actors, each of whose reasons for considering raising annulment 
actions may be different. Likewise, institutional disruption opens an 
opportunity for other actors (the losers of the status quo that is being 
disrupted) that may want to intervene in support of the defendant to 
prevent a return to the status quo ante. Here again, several dimensions 
(financial, institutional, ideological, political) are at stake simultaneously. 
Hence, such situations are particularly likely to see the engagement of 
different types of actors, creating a multi-actor defending front before 
the Court.
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Furthermore, institutional turbulence creates legal uncertainty. When 
a supranational act is aligned with the corresponding policy or institu-
tional path, its legality has typically already stood the test of time and 
the review by courts. Schmidt (2012) refers to this as the path depend-
ency of case law. Following a functionalist argument, she shows that lit-
igants transfer legal arguments from one case to the next or even from 
one policy area to the next. This creates a positive feedback loop that 
paves the trajectory of case law. Legal certainty in such contexts of conti-
nuity is relatively high. Put differently, in stable situations, a case is more 
likely to be clear-cut, and an actor can more easily assess its chance of 
succeeding by simply applying path dependent reasoning. By contrast, 
institutional turbulence on these various levels creates legal uncertainty. 
When a supranational act represents a critical juncture in policy or insti-
tutional terms, the result of its adjudication by the Court is an open 
question. If the supranational act is exploring new territory, the exist-
ing legal stock does not allow predicting with relative certainty how the 
Court will assess it. Chances of success are thus significantly higher for 
litigants against supranational acts disrupting the status quo than against 
supranational acts reinforcing an existing policy or institutional path that 
has been previously adjudicated by the Court. Higher chances of success 
should therefore, logically, attract a higher number of litigants, which, in 
turn, makes complex litigant configurations a more likely outcome.
comPlex litigAnt PAtterns in the fAce  
of institutionAl turbulence
To assess the plausibility of this link between institutional turbulence and 
the emergence of complex litigant patterns, we proceed in several steps. 
In the context of an initial correlational analysis, we start from the emer-
gence of institutional turbulence in the form of treaty reforms and assess 
the relative frequency of complex litigant configurations. In a second 
step, we turn to qualitative case analyses. Here, we start from the obser-
vation of complex litigant configurations and try to trace them back to 
instances of institutional turbulence.
In our conceptualization, treaty changes represent instances of sub-
stantial institutional turbulence. By adjusting the distribution of com-
petences within the EU system, or better within the EU’s different 
policy systems, they essentially change the rules according to which 
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actors interact: treaty changes thus alter the games that actors play. As 
such, treaty changes create the opportunity to alter established routines 
of interactions and change the substance of public policy. Elsewhere, 
we have described this mechanism in more detail (Bauer and Hartlapp 
2010). The argument is that the modification of treaty provisions invites 
supranational actors to engage in attempts to actively stretch their com-
petences, since the amendment of existing treaty provisions or the adop-
tion of new rules often results in formal compromises and ambiguous 
wording, giving rise to legal uncertainty. Presuming the interest of the 
Commission and other EU institutions for that matter, ‘to extend its 
powers, it might be inclined to use these situations of legal flux for test-
ing out supranational room for manoeuvre (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). 
These are moments of institutional turbulence, where old equilibria 
arrangements—in terms of resource allocation, competence allocation, 
ideology, etc.—are substantially threatened without having settled on 
any new specific equilibrium. ‘The concrete balancing of interests and 
legal interpretations invites a tug-of-war’ (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010, 
209). Rather than strictly setting a new path for policy development, 
treaty modifications thus represent critical institutional and policy junc-
tures. The trajectory that policies will take from there will be subject to 
conflict.
As we have laid out in detail in Chapter 5, there are different motiva-
tions for initiating annulment litigation against such attempts to shape 
new institutional or policy trajectories. The motivation to protect deci-
sion-making competences is just one of them. Trying to avoid a certain 
policy trajectory implied by supranational legal acts taken at such critical 
junctures can also be ideologically, financially, or electorally motivated, 
where political trust depends on entering into conflict. This is why situ-
ations of institutional turbulence that represent critical policy junctures 
are most likely situations for complex litigant configurations to occur. In 
combination with the legal flux (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010), which is a 
typical feature at critical junctures after larger institutional or policy mod-
ifications, many actors might be motivated not only to litigate. They are 
also likely to perceive the legal situation as sufficiently unclear to allow 
for litigation. Legal defeat against the EU institution in these situations 
does not seem to be inevitable. Consequently, the probability that sev-
eral actors will engage in annulment litigation and will not shy away 
from the Court, because the matter is too important—again, financially, 
ideologically, electorally, or in terms of competences—and is not legally 
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discouraging per se, creates a most likely situation for complex litigant 
configurations to emerge.
One of the consequences of this effect of institutional modification is 
that we see a significantly elevated share of complex litigant configura-
tions in the year in which treaty changes enter into force as compared to 
all other years. Table 6.5 presents the results of an independent-samples 
t-test to compare the share of complex litigant configurations of all annul-
ment conflicts per year in which the case was launched, between years in 
which treaty changes went into effect and years without such an event. 
For years with treaty modifications entering into force, we observe an 
average of 15% of annulment conflicts featuring a complex litigant config-
uration where we observe only an average of around 7% for years without 
such events. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. All 
treaty modifications from the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty, to the Lisbon Treaty are included 
as treaty modifications. Instead of using the year of ratification, we use the 
year of entering into force to capture their effects.
While these results help to support our argument, we do not want 
to rely solely on this group comparison. On the one hand, the rather 
large difference in means is partly the result of the fact that complex lit-
igant configurations were absent or very rare before the 1980s, a time 
for which we included no (major) treaty modifications. While this does 
correspond to our general argument, the average shares between both 
groups move much closer together if we exclude the years before the 
1980s for the purposes of a robustness check. With 15% versus 10%, the 
treaty modification years still display a higher share of complex litigant 
configurations. However, the standard deviation is somewhat higher and 
Table 6.5 T-test on the relative frequency of complex litigant configurations in 
years with and without treaty changes
Note *p < 0.05; N = 51; the share of complex cases is measures as a fraction between a minimum of 0 and 
a maximum of 1
Source Own data




Mean SD Mean SD T-test
Share of complex 
annulment cases
0.07 0.01 0.15 0.03 –2.27*
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thus the difference does not quite make it over the typically accepted 
threshold for statistical significance. Therefore, we seek to substantiate 
our argument through case study evidence that allows tracing the cau-
sality underlying this correlation of treaty change and complex constella-
tions in a more nuanced way.
The annulment case Commission v. Council (C-114/12) serves as a 
first illustration. Here we see how treaty changes create institutional tur-
bulence that leads to attempts to stretch and specify new competences 
and ultimately promote complex litigant configurations. One of the 
many modifications that came with the Treaty of Lisbon was a clarifica-
tion of the EU’s competences in external affairs. The treaty added Article 
3(2) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
This article stipulates that the EU has exclusive competence to conclude 
an international agreement where ‘its conclusion is provided for in a leg-
islative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise 
its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common 
rules or alter their scope’ (Woods and Peers 2014).
While Article 3(2) TFEU seemed to strengthen the EU’s compe-
tences to conclude international agreements, it remained to be seen how 
this provision would affect the actual conclusion of such agreements in 
practice. This became clear in 2011 when the Council of Europe set out 
to update regulations on neighbouring rights for broadcasting organi-
zations and was looking for negotiation partners in the EU. While the 
Commission submitted a decision proposal to the Council that would 
delegate the negotiation of this agreement to the Commission, mem-
ber states in the Council were rather reluctant to delegate this task fully. 
Instead, they adopted a decision that would authorize the Commission 
‘to participate, on behalf of the Union, in the negotiations for a 
Convention of the Council of Europe’. At the same time, however, they 
declared that ‘the member states should participate on their own behalf’ 
(CJEU 2014, para. 32). While this latter provision was clearly confined 
to ‘matters that arise in the course of the negotiations that fall within 
their competence’ (CJEU 2014, para. 32), the overall approach of trying 
to establish a shared role in the negotiations can be interpreted as a quite 
restrictive application of Article 3(2) TFEU. Even more so, in an attempt 
to limit the Commission’s freedom in these negotiations, the decision 
foresaw that ‘to ensuring the unity of the external representation of the 
Union, the Member States and the Commission should cooperate closely 
during the negotiation process’ (CJEU 2014, para. 32).
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After all, neighbouring rights had become a sensitive political issue in 
several member states. Generally, neighbouring rights are similar to copy-
right laws in that they regulate how much broadcasting organizations have 
to pay for playing music. Yet instead of regulating how much money copy-
right holders obtain, they regulate how much money music labels, produc-
ers, and performers get. Such neighbouring rights have gained a special 
place in the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy. News publishers 
have found it increasingly difficult to collect revenue for the content they 
create. Print subscriptions have been going down and advertising income 
has followed suit. While many news publishers put a lot of hope in online 
advertising revenue from their websites, so called news aggregators such 
as Google News have become a serious threat since they collect and gather 
snippets of content from publisher’s websites and draw a lot of consumer 
traffic without paying for displaying the content provided.
Different member states eventually took different steps to approach 
this issue. In 2012, Belgium, for example, settled with Google in a 
bilateral agreement. According to this agreement, Belgium abstained 
from passing legislation that would force Google to pay for services to 
publishers in exchange for a commitment by Google to partner with 
publishers and help them to increase their revenues via ‘implement-
ing Google + social tools, including video Hangouts, on news sites, and 
launching official YouTube channels’ (Geerts 2012; Rosati 2016). France 
quickly followed to strike a very similar deal in 2013, in which Google 
agreed to create a sixty million euros Digital Publishing Innovation Fund 
and reinforce its previous commitments in France, such as the Google 
Cultural Institute in Paris (Rosati 2016). Germany, in contrast, took a 
more adversarial approach by adopting a law that would allow publishers 
to charge Google for using their content (Rosati 2016).
The Council’s (partial) delegation to negotiate an agreement on these 
and other related issues of cross-border publishing and broadcasting 
preceded these national responses. Member states had not yet adopted 
these approaches but were still in the process of formulating national 
responses. Therefore, they were reluctant to have the Commission 
tie their hands regarding national broadcasting policies by setting an 
unwanted legal frame in the negotiations with the Council of Europe. 
The Commission, however, strongly opposed this reluctance on the 
side of the member states and demanded full responsibility and com-
petence. The resulting annulment conflict initiated by the Commission 
against the Council’s decisions to secure a strong place for member 
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state governments in these negotiations represented the ‘first case in 
which the Court interpreted Article 3(2) TFEU added by the Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (Woods and Peers 2014). While the Lisbon Treaty modified the 
rules, there remained substantial conflict between member states in the 
Council and the Commission over how this would affect the game— 
particularly in this specific situation. This first Court ruling on this newly 
added article thus represented a critical juncture in terms of clarifying 
(1) future competences in the negotiation of international agreements 
and (2) in terms of the specific negotiation of neighbouring rights for 
broadcasters.
In line with the arguments presented above, and in awareness of the 
relevance of such critical junctures, several member states joined the 
case—all in support of the defending Council—as did the EP in support 
of the applying Commission. Specifically, the eventual litigant configura-
tion included the EP and the Commission on one side, and the Council 
and the German, Dutch, Polish, Czech, and United Kingdom govern-
ments on the other side. Since this was the first time the Court had to 
interpret the specific meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU, it seems fair to say 
that the Court’s eventual decision was far from obvious. Particularly con-
tested was the question of whether this specific international agreement 
fell under Article 3(2) TFEU at all. The defendants contested the claim 
that existing EU legislation even covered the substance of the agree-
ment. While several EU directives—such as the Council’s Satellite and 
Cable Directive No. 93/83/EEC4—dealt with cross-border publishing, 
they were formulated with respect to specific technologies and created 
uncertainties with respect to the applicability for internet-based services 
(Woods and Peers 2014). Overall, the case thus nicely illustrates the link 
between treaty changes, institutional turbulence in specific policy sec-
tors, and the resulting incentives for many actors to take an active role 
in annulment litigation at such critical policy junctures. In this case, the 
EP as well as several member state governments were motivated by the 
struggle over the future competence distribution and encouraged to liti-
gate by the uncertainty characterizing the legal situation.
Obviously, however, treaty modifications are only one potential 
source of institutional turbulence in different policy fields. This plausi-
bility probe thus only relates to one aspect of our argument. While treaty 
changes do represent large disruptions of the status quo and do imply 
subsequent struggles over the materialization of these treaty changes in 
specific alterations of existing policies, institutional turbulence manifests 
itself in smaller scale and more regular actions, too.
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The Expanded Tobacco Case (T-170/03)
Manifestations of the mechanism at a smaller scale can be illustrated 
with the help of case T-170/03 dealing with expanded tobacco prod-
ucts. In this particular case, the established policy equilibrium was not 
dissolved through a treaty modification. Instead, the Commission cre-
ated institutional turbulence by considering modifying the application 
of Council Directive 95/59/EC on Manufactured Tobacco.5 Whereas 
the Commission had traditionally classified expanded tobacco as ‘man-
ufactured tobacco other than smoking tobacco’,6 it decided within its 
comitology system to reclassify expanded tobacco and henceforth treat 
it as smoking tobacco, in line with Article 5(1) of the Council Directive 
95/59/EC on Manufactured Tobacco.
Tobacco refers to a processed form of tobacco. The producer British 
American Tobacco compared this process with the process for making 
puffed rice snack food; specifically, the process to make dry ice expanded 
tobacco ‘involves permeating the tobacco leaf structure with liquid car-
bon dioxide before warming. The resulting carbon dioxide gas forces 
the tobacco to expand’ (British American Tobacco 2014). Expanded 
tobacco has become a popular product among producers and custom-
ers because it helps both groups save costs. Essentially, it allows produc-
ers to buy fewer tobacco leaves for the same number of rolled cigarettes. 
Furthermore, when sold as roll-your-own tobacco, its greater volume at 
lighter weight produces a tax advantage for customers, who are able to 
roll just as many cigarettes (due to greater volume) with a lighter pack 
of tobacco, which is taxed (typically to a substantial part) based on its 
weight (Canadian Coalition for Action on Tobacco 2004). Because of 
these characteristics, expanded tobacco has carried the hopes of the 
tobacco industry, which hoped that ‘by offering customers expanded 
tobacco in our cut filler products, we will continue to grow our business 
in the face of continuing governmental regulations and higher excise 
taxes’ (Miller 2013).
This reclassification essentially meant two things. First, it meant 
that expanded tobacco was now subject to excise duties (CJEU 2001, 
para. 8). According to Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3311/86, 
expanded tobacco was considered unsuitable for smoking without fur-
ther industrial processing. In Article 11(d) of Directive 95/59/EC, the 
Commission explicitly excluded tobacco products from excise duties 
‘if it was reworked by the producer’. Now expanded tobacco would be 
treated under the category of smoking tobacco subject to excise taxes. 
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Second, as a result of this classification, the transporting and trading of 
expanded tobacco was now subject to stricter administrative require-
ments. These requirements were specified in Article 18(1) of Council 
Directive 92/12/EEC.7 Most importantly, any shipment of expanded 
tobacco would now always include an enclosed document. The direc-
tive did not specify this document any further and merely stated that 
this could be an administrative or commercial document and that the 
Excise Duties Committee would specify its form and content. Generally 
speaking, the system was, however, the paper-based precursor to today’s 
Electronic Excise Movement and Control System, which is now able in 
real-time to monitor the movement of products for which excise taxes 
still have to be paid.
As one of the main exporters of expanded tobacco from the United 
Kingdom to other EU member states, the private company British 
American Tobacco requested to see the minutes of the respective 
comitology deliberations underlying this reclassification. When the 
Commission denied this access to the respective internal document, 
British American Tobacco initiated an action for annulment against the 
Commission (T-170/03 but also T-111/00). Essentially, the company 
claimed that denying this request violated the common code of con-
duct concerning public access to internal documents adopted in 1993.8 
For the company, it would be essential to know exactly which member 
state delegates argued for and against the reclassification and why. This 
knowledge would facilitate its interactions with national customs author-
ities, which were necessary to minimize the administrative burden and 
legal uncertainty associated with expanded tobacco exports. While excise 
duties were harmonized to some degree among member states, ‘there 
remain significant differences in the treatment of expanded tobacco by 
the various customs authorities of the member states, and this causes 
the applicant difficulty’ (CJEU 2001, para. 27). Therefore, it would be 
essential to know exactly the positions of the respective member states on 
how they would handle expanded tobacco under the national excise duty 
regime.
In fact, the differential and complex handling of expanded tobacco as 
a specific tobacco product continues to be an issue to this day. In 2012, 
a study conducted by Ramboll Management and Europe Economics 
still discussed the administrative burden involved in the movement 
of expanded tobacco as an intermediary product that is hard to verify 
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between member states (Pedersen et al. 2012, 171). In terms of the 
motivations for engaging in the respective conflict, it seems clear that 
British American Tobacco as exporter of the respective good was driven 
by financial concerns resulting from the subjection to excise duties and 
from the administrative burden that came with it in different national 
contexts.
Importantly, however, this conflict also triggered litigation by 
other actors for different motivations. Specifically, the governments 
of Denmark and Sweden, as well as the European Data Protection 
Supervisor, joined British American Tobacco. The case thus clearly com-
prises a more complex litigant structure than a bilateral face-off between 
British American Tobacco and the Commission. Our argument about 
the tendency of institutional turbulence to engage actors with very dif-
ferent motivations is clearly supported by the participation of govern-
ments and EU institutions that are motivated differently to engage in 
litigation.
In the case of Denmark and Sweden, litigation was most likely by the 
implied clash between the Commission’s practice to deny access to doc-
uments and the Scandinavian culture of transparency. In Scandinavia’s 
culture of open government, transparency through public access to 
documents is a fundamental right of citizens that improves the politi-
cal system’s accountability and is part of these countries’ constitutional, 
political, and cultural heritage (Grønbech-Jensen 1998). There have 
regularly been judicial conflicts between private actors and EU institu-
tions about transparency and public access to EU documents where 
Scandinavian countries joined the dispute in favour of the litigant (e.g. 
T-84/03, T-174/95, T-14/98, T-111/07, T-250/08, T-362/08, 
T-436/09, or T-306/12). Against the background of strong national 
policies and a culture that favours transparency, the involvement of 
Denmark and Sweden in the annulment case is clearly the result of an 
ideological motivation for litigation.
Similarly, the active role of these governments is also due to these 
countries’ history as outspoken critics of the EU’s tobacco policy 
approach, which differentiates strongly between tobacco products. 
Sweden in particular has been willing to lobby at the EU level for the 
abolishment of the ban on snus, a moist powder tobacco that is placed 
under the upper lip and enjoys a high popularity in Sweden. Sweden 
even negotiated an opt-out from the snus ban when joining the EU. 
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Without the opt-out, the referendum on EU integration would probably 
not have passed (Haydon 2012). To avoid distortions, all tobacco prod-
ucts—smoking and non-smoking tobacco—should be treated equally 
in the internal market, the Swedish government argued, according to 
Tobacco Tactics, a platform provided by the Tobacco Control Research 
Group at the University of Bath, which monitors the tobacco industry 
and charts its influence on public health, scientific research, and policy 
regulation (Tobacco Tactics 2017). Treating non-smoking tobacco more 
strictly than smoking tobacco was not seen to be fair or proportion-
ate. Whether in this case, Scandinavian litigation was motivated by the 
willingness to send a signal of political trust worthiness to (snus-affine) 
electorates and Swedish Match (one of the world’s largest producers of 
smokeless tobacco products), or by a willingness to voice Scandinavia’s 
ideological preferences for transparent bureaucracy, their involvement in 
the conflict supports our point. Status quo disruption, even at the scale 
of comitology regulation, can trigger reactions from different kinds of 
actors based on different kinds of motivations, ultimately leading to 
complex judicial configurations.
While it seems fair to argue that Denmark and Sweden had motives 
that went beyond a mere financial interest in the case, this claim becomes 
even clearer for the participation of the European data protection super-
visor. While the role of this actor is generally to ensure EU’s institutions 
compliance with the processing of individual information and data pro-
tection rights of EU citizens, it also joined the case on the side of British 
American Tobacco. Essentially, the Commission justified the denial of 
the document request with a reference to the need to protect the iden-
tity of member state delegations in order to ensure frank and open 
discussions in committee. In the attempt to still flesh out his role, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor joined this case to have the Court 
confirm its general stake not only when personal data are processed but 
in all cases that involve data processing (Hofmann et al. 2011, 744). Its 
motivation was thus related to an attempt to establish the scope of his 
competences.
Overall, the case illustrates (1) how institutional turbulence can be 
created by challenges to the policy status quo of a minor magnitude than 
treaty modifications, and (2) that at such critical policy junctures, con-
flicts often attract multiple actors for different motivations because the 
multidimensional character of the challenged equilibrium creates multi-
ple incentives to litigate.
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Spanish Coal Case (T-57/11)
That multidimensional motivations trigger complex litigant configura-
tions becomes even clearer in case T-57/11 that dealt with Spanish coal 
subsidies. The conflict in the Spanish coal and energy sector emerged 
when the Spanish government decided in 2010 to protect domestic coal 
producers with subsidies for power plants using domestic as opposed to 
imported coal. The measure was adopted by the Socialist government 
in response to enduring protests by mine workers in Castile and León 
over unpaid wages (Abend 2010). While this measure strongly bene-
fited power plants based on coal in the region of Castile and León, the 
regional government of Galicia opposed the subsidy since power plants 
in this area mainly ran on imported coal, gas, and oil. Consequently, the 
Galician government saw its power plants as falling victim to discrimina-
tion by this subsidy.
While the Spanish subsidy had challenged the status quo arrange-
ments in local energy industries, the Commission consolidated this 
threat with its decision to authorize the subsidy as compatible with 
the internal market. The measure represented a clear change in Spain’s 
energy policy. While Spain had been called a poster child for clean energy 
by Greenpeace, the environmental interest group decried that ‘this suc-
cess story is now under threat’ as the ‘Spanish government is retroac-
tively changing the rules and cutting back on support for renewables’ 
while at the same time increasing subsidies for its domestic coal industry 
(Simons 2014).
It is thus relatively easy to see that the resulting institutional tur-
bulence comprised multiple dimensions. First, the Spanish measure, 
together with the Commission’s decision to authorize it, comprised a 
clear financial dimension, since power plants feared for their revenue, and 
an environmental (ideological) dimension, since environmental interest 
groups decried the renewed subsidies for the coal sector. Furthermore, 
the measure was a threat to the Galician energy sector for benefitting the 
region of Castile and León as its competitor. There, the population and 
the mayors of the cities related to the Galician energy sector were very 
concerned and expected the Galician government to react in order to 
protect the local economy and Galician workers (MIN_GA_3).
These additional motivations were clearly reflected by the complexity 
of the litigant structure, which included, in this case, the Commission and 
the government of Spain, two private operators of coal-operated power 
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plants, the regional government of Castile and León, and the Spanish 
National Association of Mining Companies on the defendant side. On 
the applicant side, the private power plant operator Castelnou Energia 
SL, which felt that the subsidy distorted competition in the energy sec-
tor, was supported by the environmental interest groupGreenpeace in its 
attack on the Commission’s authorization (Abend 2010). The Galician 
government attempted to join the conflict in support of Castelnou 
Energia SL, but the General Court rejected its demand because Galicia, 
as a non-privileged applicant, was lacking legitimacy to litigate against the 
Commission’s authorization (MIN_GA_3, LAW_1).
This conflict emerged in response to a change in EU policy that 
altered the path of national energy policy and put the Spanish energy 
policy at a critical juncture. This triggered responses by actors acting 
upon multiple motivations. Specifically, the case entailed a fair amount 
of legal uncertainty that encouraged different actors to join the case. 
This legal uncertainty resulted not only from the unusual form in which 
the subsidy was granted. While a simple subsidy payment would have 
had little prospect of sustaining a legal challenge, the Spanish govern-
ment introduced an obligation to produce energy for power plants using 
Spanish coal to ensure a stable electricity supply and reduce Spain’s 
dependence on energy imports. Consequently, the Spanish govern-
ment justified the subsidy by referring to exemptions allowed by EU 
competition policy for services of general economic interest, which the 
power plants would provide. In exchange for this service of general 
economic interest, power plants would receive a financial compensa-
tion. More importantly, since no legislation or case law existed on this 
specific question, the Court’s position was rather unclear as to how far 
the Commission would have to go in examining state aid. Would it be 
enough to examine its compatibility with state aid rules? Or would its 
coherence with other EU policies, such as climate change legislation 
and electricity market legislation, have to be taken into consideration as 
well (Cisnal de Ugarte and Di Masi 2016, 21)? One clear indicator for 
the high level of uncertainty connected to the legal case was the great 
interest with which the legal community observed the proceedings. The 
Court’s position on the inherent connection between state aid law and 
EU environmental law was seen to be unclear and was awaited with some 
excitement. Would state aid measures that did not pursue environmental 
objectives have to take EU rules on the protection of the environment 
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into account anyways? No matter what the Court’s answer would be, 
this answer would represent a critical juncture in the EU’s state aid law 
(Cisnal de Ugarte and Di Masi 2016, 21).
conclusion
While litigant configurations are typically treated as exogenous factors 
that are merely analysed for their impacts on judicial decisions, in this 
chapter we explored the conditions under which different litigant con-
figurations emerge. While we highlighted the variety of litigant con-
figurations in the context of annulment litigation, we proposed that a 
distinction between simple (1 v. 1) configurations and complex configu-
rations (all other constellations) represents an analytically rather powerful 
difference. This chapter constitutes a first step towards supporting this 
claim by highlighting that such complex litigant configurations (of what-
ever form) emerge more often in situations of institutional turbulence.
Obviously, legal standing rights of non-privileged actor types can 
be effective obstacles for the emergence of complex litigant configura-
tions. Nevertheless, we observe an empirically non-trivial number of 
such complex litigant configurations; particularly in times of institutional 
turbulence. Institutional turbulence shakes up established equilibria 
and thereby increases the stakes for policy conflicts for a wide variety of 
actors. Simply put, the question of how conflicts in such a situation of 
turbulence are resolved is very important for financial, ideological, pow-
er-related, and political trust reasons. Thereby, turbulence increases the 
chances of complex litigant configurations because court rulings have 
greater implications on more diverse respects on a greater number of 
actors. Moreover, turbulence comes with legal uncertainty. After all, the 
Court has not had the chance to interpret the new rules that created the 
turbulence in the first place. This acts as a further incentive to not shy 
away from annulment litigation. These empirical conditions that pro-
mote the emergence of annulment conflicts with complex litigant config-
urations also affects patterns of legal outcomes of court proceedings. We 
assess these in the Chapter 7.
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This chapter analyses how complex litigant configurations relate to legal 
success and policy and institutional outcomes. In the first section, the 
chapter revisits the literature on litigant constellations by carving out the 
relevant approaches and interpretations. This will provide orientation for 
analysing empirical patterns of complex constellations as identified by our 
statistical exploration. In the second section, we spell out our argument 
based on an endogenous conception of litigant configuration and legal 
uncertainty, which provides an innovative explanation to the relationship 
between complex litigants’ configuration and judicial success. In a third 
section, we identify an additional causal mechanism driving the relation 
between complex litigants’ configurations, legal uncertainty, and judicial 
success based on the heterogeneity of legal arguments presented to the 
Court. We then analyse empirical patterns of litigant’s configuration and 
judicial success, which give support to our argument about the endoge-
nous relationship between legal uncertainty, litigants’ configuration, and 
judicial success. Finally, we close the sequence linking policy conflict to 
litigation, to litigants’ configurations, and to ruling outcome by turning 
to the distributive effects of annulments rulings on policy stakeholders. 
Taking into account the objective that motivated the litigant to turn to 
court in the first place, we find that, although winning—the achievement 
of the litigant’s primary objective—is generally associated with judicial 
success, in many cases, winning and judicial success are disconnected.
CHAPTER 7
Litigant Success:  
How Litigant Configurations Relate 
to Legal Outcomes
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litigAnt configurAtions And JudiciAl success:  
whAt we know
With the increasing empirical relevance of courts and litigation described 
under the well-known labels of judicialisation and legalisation, judi-
cial behaviour has increasingly come under the focus of social science 
research (see Chapter 2). In this regard, the relationship between litigant 
configurations and the content of court rulings has become an area of 
particular scholarly interest.
From a strict legalistic perspective, litigant configurations should not 
be an important influence on judicial decisions. Instead, decisions should 
be based on the legal merits of the case, not on the question of who pre-
sents the case. Consequently, any observed covariance between litigant 
configurations and legal outcomes should be purely coincidental. From 
this perspective, any aggregate-level variation of legal success might sim-
ply be the product of chance, untouched by the structural characteristics 
of member state litigants and their strategic interactions with the Court. 
Instead, what matters is the plain meaning of the legal texts, the inten-
tion with which the legal texts were written, existing case law, and prec-
edents that determine judicial decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 48). 
While court decisions can have political consequences and litigation, as 
we have also argued throughout this book, can be politically motivated, 
rulings as such are apolitical decisions; for the legitimacy of court deci-
sions, a lot depends on whether the decisions are perceived as politically 
neutral. Regarding the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
it thus comes as no surprise that legalist approaches deny ‘the existence 
of ideological and socio-political influences on the Court’s jurisdiction’ 
(Burley and Mattli 1993, 45). From this perspective, any pro-integration 
bias of the Court results directly from treaty asymmetries (Scharpf 2002, 
2007), and CJEU case law might reflect the ‘inevitable working out of 
the correct implications of the constitutional text’ (Shapiro 1980, 538).
Such legalistic conceptions have been heavily criticized by propo-
nents of an attitudinal model of judicial decision making. This atti-
tudinal model proposes that legalistic considerations ‘serve only to 
rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s 
decision-making process’ (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 53). Rulings do not 
emerge automatically from existing law. No matter which legal method 
of interpretation one uses, rulings are always based on interpretations 
of the law. This process of the interpretation of more-or-less (un-)clear 
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words, phrases, situations, and potential precedents adds the attitudes 
and ideological predispositions of judges to the equation (Segal and 
Spaeth 2002, 86–97; for the CJEU, see Höpner 2011; Vauchez 2012). 
Based on this understanding of judicial decision making, potential liti-
gants—and researchers, for that matter—try to predict court decisions 
based on the ideological predispositions of judges. For the CJEU, this 
has proved particularly difficult because of the non-transparent deci-
sion-making process of the Court, where positions of individual judges 
cannot be identified. Abstracting from the attitudes of individual judges, 
researchers have assumed the Court to be generally very favourable of 
European integration. Otherwise, the argument goes, the Court’s drive 
towards legal integration could not be explained. While this reasoning is 
hard to reject, recent attempts to open the black box of CJEU decision 
making have revealed that CJEU judges do not necessarily have uniform 
preferences regarding the development of the European Union (EU)’s 
body of law (Malecki 2012).
A third prominent theoretical perspective on judicial decision mak-
ing is commonly summarized under the label of strategic approaches 
to judicial decision making. While this perspective does not deny that 
judges might hold relevant policy-related and institutional preferences, it 
emphasizes that judges are hardly able to act freely on those preferences. 
Instead, judges are constrained by the anticipated reactions to their rul-
ings. As a result, decisions reflect strategic interactions between judges, 
within courts, between the court and the litigant, and between courts 
and public opinion (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 100).
In the EU context, this perspective supports intergovernmentalist 
accounts of European integration. As such, intergovernmentalist scholars 
have emphasized the strategic relationship between the CJEU and mem-
ber state governments. Garrett et al. (1998) provide a formalized and 
strategic model of the relationship between member state governments 
and the CJEU in which the authors claim that the Court is a strategic 
actor that works to protect its institutional authority (Garrett et al. 1998, 
174). This authority rests on both the perception of the Court’s impar-
tiality and integrity and on its ability to adopt rulings that are not over-
ruled by subsequent legislation and are obeyed. More recently, Larsson 
and Naurin (2016) have demonstrated a strong correlation between the 
CJEU’s rulings and the political signals it receives from member states. 
Ultimately, in both studies, the authors argue that CJEU decisions reflect 
strategic assessment (Garrett et al. 1998; Larsson and Naurin 2016).
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In contrast to this strategic approach to judicial behaviour, the general 
litigation literature coined by US scholars has highlighted other reasons 
for which certain actors will be more successful in court than others. In 
this literature, the question about who has success in court has been on 
the research agenda since the 1980s. Concerning litigant groups, the evi-
dence is quite clear-cut. Governments and public actors come out first, 
followed by businesses and other organized interests, while individuals 
only reach the lowest success rates in comparison with the other groups 
(Farole 1999). Usually, litigant success is associated with arguments 
about judicial constraint or litigants’ capacity. In a comparative study of 
social activists’ ability to succeed in court, Epp (1998) emphasizes eco-
nomic resources available to the claimant as the most important sup-
port factor (for similar results on EU preliminary rulings, see Tridimas 
and Tridimas 2004). This purely economic factor partly overlaps with 
Galanter’s (1974, 97; similar McGuire 1995; Haire et al. 1999) prom-
inent repeat-player argument. Accordingly, resource rich claimants 
can afford to appear in court regularly and thereby gain the experience 
necessary to increase their chance of success in court. The relevance of 
capacity is also emphasized by studies analysing governmental litigation 
in the context of the World Trade Organization’s system of dispute res-
olution. Only governments with a high degree of executive effectiveness 
are found to be able to navigate the complex procedures, learn effectively 
from experience, and keep up with the constantly changing body of case 
law (Kim 2008; Davis and Bermeo 2009).
Authors that consider ideological closeness to the Court as the more 
relevant strategic factor oppose such arguments, which stress (economic) 
characteristics of claimants. In a much cited study on federal or state 
courts in the United States, Sheehan et al. (1992) find that across dif-
ferent litigant groups, the ideological complexion of courts was more 
important to explain success than other factors. More recently, Skiple 
et al. (2016) also found substantial explanatory power of Supreme Court 
judges’ ideological orientation—via appointment mechanisms—to matter 
for outcomes on economic conflicts.
At a more general level, judicial constraints can systematically affect 
litigant success. Studies along this line adopt a principal-agent perspective 
and assess whether national governments are able to effectively constrain 
the CJEU, which tries to avoid non-compliance and legislative overrid-
ing of its rulings. From this perspective, active participation in judicial 
proceedings by more powerful member states is likely to constrain the 
7 LITIGANT SUCCESS: HOW LITIGANT CONFIGURATIONS …  159
Court in its rulings because threats of legislative override and non-com-
pliance with rulings from that side are more credible (Garrett and 
Weingast 1993; Carrubba et al. 2008). Given that more powerful states 
are seen to be less susceptible to the reputational costs resulting from 
non-compliant behaviour, the probability of winning, that is the prob-
ability with which the European Court of Justice should be found to 
agree with the litigant government, increases with this government’s 
degree of political power.
With regard to multiple litigants, it has been argued that a threat of 
legislative override is reduced where member states appear to be divided 
over the legal question. In the EU context, which regularly demands 
high degrees of consensus or even unanimity in the Council, voting 
jointly becomes less likely in such cases. Whether or not there is empir-
ical support for these theoretical propositions remains heatedly debated, 
however (Carrubba et al. 2008, 2012; Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012).
But the ratchet effect created by the arithmetics of decision mak-
ing in the Council is not the only aspect heatedly discussed within this 
controversy. Some authors claim that the model is based on a miscon-
ception of the CJEU as an agent of the member states when it should 
really be considered to be a trustee (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2013). 
The trustee role, the argument goes, is distinctly different from the 
role of an agent and is characterized by three different aspects, ‘(1) the 
court is recognized as the authoritative interpreter of the regime’s law, 
which it applies to resolve disputes concerning state compliance; (2) 
the court’s jurisdiction, with regard to state compliance, is compul-
sory; and (3) it is virtually impossible, in practice, for contracting states 
to reverse the court’s important rulings on treaty law’ (Stone Sweet 
and Brunell 2013, 62). As trustee, the Court’s decisions would rather 
reflect a logic of majoritarian activism. This means that it tries to pro-
duce rulings that reflect standard practices in many member states and 
are characterized by a high level of state consensus (Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 2013). This brief literature review can hardly do justice to the 
vast existing and emerging literature on the CJEU, let alone on judi-
cial behaviour. Nevertheless, it hopefully serves to highlight that there 
is a controversial debate over the ability of powerful political actors to 
influence judicial decision making. While legalistic, attitudinal, and 
neo-functional approaches to CJEU decision making refute this claim, 
adherents of the strategic model argue that litigant configurations are an 
important influence on judicial behaviour. Accordingly, strategic models  
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of court behaviour argue that when many powerful member states sup-
port a specific legal argument, the Court becomes more inclined to 
follow this argument than when many powerful member state govern-
ments oppose this particular argument. Therefore, the threat of mem-
ber state non-compliance or legislative override is conceptualized with 
the help of member state’s political power and the number of member 
states supporting or opposing particular arguments. This approach yields 
so called net-weighted observations (Carrubba et al. 2008, 2012), which 
basically counts the number of legal observations of member state gov-
ernments on either side of the legal argument and weights this number 
by the political power of the respective member state. Neo-functionalist 
accounts have heavily criticized this approach (e.g. Burley and Mattli 
1993). Neo-functionalist accounts of European integration through law 
argue that the CJEU has—with the help of private litigants—promoted 
European integration well beyond the preferences of member state gov-
ernments. Most importantly, the critique against strategic models of the 
CJEU emphasizes that because of the high number of member states 
and the heterogeneity of their preferences, any sort of threat of legisla-
tive override is hardly ever credible. Therefore, this threat should not be 
measured on a continuous scale. Only when the vast majority of member 
states were clearly opposed to a particular legal interpretation would this 
threat be credible. In all other cases, the threat would be absent (Stone 
Sweet and Brunell 2012).
litigAnt configurAtions And endogeneity:  
A new APProAch
We use this chapter to highlight one further problem inherent in the 
empirical evaluation of strategic models of court behaviour that strongly 
rely on observed litigant configurations. Essentially, authors such as 
Carrubba et al. (2008) treat litigant configurations as factors that are 
exogenous influences on judicial decision making. The emergence of dif-
ferent litigant configurations is not explicitly theorized within such mod-
els. Empirical evaluations of these models thus rely on the assumption 
that cases that include many powerful actors are not systematically differ-
ent in any relevant way from cases that do not include powerful actors, 
except for the different participant configurations. Therefore, a correla-
tional relationship between litigant configurations and patterns of legal 
success can be interpreted as supporting the theoretically assumed causal 
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relationship between these variables. We believe, however, that patterns 
of correlation between litigant configurations and legal success are bet-
ter understood when litigant configurations are endogenized within the 
analysis and conceived in relation to the nature of the conflict. We argue 
that it is not necessarily the litigant configuration that produces certain 
rulings. The causal chain is much longer. As we have argued in the pre-
vious chapter, different litigant configurations emerge—to a substantial 
extent—as a result of different characteristics of the underlying situation. 
More specifically, we have argued that complex litigant structures tend to 
emerge in situations of institutional turbulence. Such institutional turbu-
lences often trigger active litigation by several actors who not only have a 
stake in the outcome of conflicts but, importantly, also perceive the legal 
situation to be sufficiently unclear—the legal merits of the case being 
open to different interpretations—as to consider it worthwhile joining 
the case.
As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, actors are typically more likely to engage 
in costly litigation where the chances of legal success are substantial, 
which is the case in situations of greater legal uncertainty. Success rates 
in annulment actions are rather low (around 25% across all cases and liti-
gant configurations). Situations of greater legal uncertainty, that is, when 
issues disputed before the Court are not clearly predetermined by pre-
vious case law, should translate into a higher success rate, close to 50%. 
Greater legal uncertainty thus typically means higher chances of success 
for potential applicants and thus a higher likelihood to see complex lit-
igant configurations as a result of additional actors joining the case in 
favour of the applicant.
This is particularly obvious for private actors who generally litigate 
out of financial motivations and where the chance of success is a critical 
element of the risk-benefit analysis underpinning the decision to litigate. 
Yet legal uncertainty is also an important factor to public actors, such 
as national governments. As repeat players before the Court (Galanter 
1974; McGuire 1995), they are unwilling to risk their reputation as 
serious partners in the legal discourse regarding EU law and European 
integration by pushing conflicts without legal merits. Besides, litigation 
before the CJEU consumes key human resources that need to be man-
aged wisely (state attorney units are typically relatively small), which 
requires prioritization among possible cases where the legal uncertainty 
criterion does play a role. Member states or other public authorities are 
thus rather likely to launch annulment cases or join them in support of 
162  C. ADAM ET AL.
an applicant where chances of success are higher, that is, in situations of 
greater legal uncertainty.
Interestingly, the same should be true for actors potentially interested 
in joining the case in support of the defending EU institution. In situa-
tions of great legal certainty (i.e. great predictability of the court ruling), 
the necessity to intervene in support of the defending institution does 
not appear as important. As the defending EU institution is more likely 
to win anyway, the actors interested in the success of the defendant adopt 
a free-rider approach and refrain from investing resources into the con-
flict. By contrast, if the chances of the defending institution are lower, an 
actor interested in the defeat of the action might perceive its intervention 
in the case as being potentially able to tip the scales and help to obtain 
a favourable ruling. The incentive to join the case is thus higher. Hence, 
situations of legal uncertainty are also more likely to see at least one actor 
intervening in support of the defending EU institution than situations of 
high legal predictability.
All this is not to say that complex litigant configurations will never 
emerge in cases with a marginal degree of legal uncertainty and conse-
quently an expected ruling. Yet the emergence of complex litigant con-
figurations in this context is less likely as compared to the emergence of 
simple litigant configurations. Put differently, if conflicts with little legal 
uncertainty—that is, when the outcome of court rulings is rather predict-
able—do lead to annulment litigation at all, they tend to lead to simple 
rather than complex litigant configurations.
In sum, we argue that treating litigant configurations as exogenous 
factors is problematic when trying to analyse their impact on judicial 
behaviour. It is not necessarily the litigant configuration that produces 
certain rulings. Instead, it is specific characteristics of the underlying con-
flict situation that promotes specific litigant configurations and triggers 
respective rulings. Accordingly, any correlation between litigant config-
urations and legal outcomes is not necessarily the result of the litigant 
configurations’ causal effect. Instead, the correlation is a reflection of the 
different character of underlying cases.
In an earlier study, we have made a similar point (Adam et al. 2015). 
While we found correlational evidence supporting arguments of judicial 
constraint, we emphasized that the characteristics of the litigant inform 
us not only about the abilities of this litigant to constrain or influence the 
Court in its decision making. Instead, the characteristics and motivations 
of the litigant tell us something about the kind of cases the litigant will 
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bring to the Court’s attention. In this particular context, we argued with 
the help of case studies and regression analysis that member state govern-
ments, which face strong subnational governments with a high degree 
of authority, are more likely to initiate annulment litigation against the 
European Commission for other reasons than trying to win the legal 
case. Instead, annulment litigation for those governments is often part 
of a two-level game. Adverse rulings might not harm them politically and 
in fact might even have positive electoral effects. This is particularly the 
case where such adverse rulings can be used as normative levers legiti-
mizing domestic reform processes. These characteristics and motivations 
help us understand why national governments facing strong regional 
governments are substantially less successful in winning annulment cases 
than national governments operating within centralized political envi-
ronments. They do not possess a lower level of legal expertise and they 
are not necessarily less likely to constrain the Court politically. Instead, 
they are somewhat more often inclined to initiate litigation in cases with 
only meagre chances of success in a legal sense, because they more often 
choose cases for their political rather than legal merits.
In this chapter, we make a similar argument. Yet it is not only the 
characteristics of litigants that contain information about the kind of 
cases litigants bring to the Court’s attention. More generally, litigant 
configurations in specific cases contain information of the underlying 
conflict situations that the Court has to settle. Building directly on the 
arguments presented in the previous chapter (see Chapter 6), complex 
configurations tend to arise more often in contexts in which court behav-
iour is difficult to predict and less certain, that is, in situations of greater 
legal uncertainty. This is subsequently reflected by the Court’s rulings 
fluctuating around a 50:50 chance of winning or losing in complex con-
figurations, whereas annulment actions with a simple litigant configu-
ration (simple applicant constellation v. simple defendant constellation) 
succeed in only about one in four cases.
litigAnt configurAtions And legAl reAsoning
In line with Chapter 6, we argue that success rates for cases with com-
plex litigant configurations should be around 50% because these con-
figurations tend to emerge in situations of lower legal certainty. In this 
section, we put forward an additional mechanism through which com-
plex litigant configurations not only emerge in situations of higher legal 
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uncertainty, but even contribute to increasing the legal uncertainty of the 
case under consideration. It is in this sense that we argue that litigant 
configurations can have a causal impact on court rulings. This is a second 
reason that we expect chances of legal success in cases with complex liti-
gant configurations to be closer to 50% than in cases with simple litigant 
configurations.
Since the Court has to engage with the arguments brought forward 
by the litigants, the merits of the different legal arguments advanced 
by the parties are important. In this regard, complex litigant config-
urations seem not only to be reflective of the legal stock of a case but 
also to potentially affect the diversity of arguments presented in court. 
Therefore, since complex litigant configurations tend to increase rather 
than decrease the heterogeneity of legal perspectives presented to the 
Court, court decisions in these situations are again more difficult to 
predict.
While the legal merits of a case are obviously important, so are the 
arguments that build on this legal stock and their presentation in court. 
It requires adequate pleas and reasoning to present these arguments in 
a way that will convince the Court. Thus, participation by different lit-
igants is anything but merely symbolic. On the contrary, our interviews 
indicate that the belief of being able to influence the Court’s decision 
making with the help of convincing legal arguments is an important fac-
tor that brings public actors to participate in annulment litigation. The 
logic of an intervener’s plea is to support arguments by adding new 
ways of reasoning and ‘to place emphasis on a point that is particularly 
important’ (COM_1, own translation; similarly COM_2; MIN_D_4; 
COMP_2; MIN_GA_2). In contrast, interviewees attributed little rele-
vance to legal constraints on the Court. They argued that the Court is 
rarely impressed by the political weight that member states put behind 
certain demands or arguments. An interviewee’s explanation that in 
horizontal annulments, high numbers of interveners are indicators of an 
uncertain defendant, supports this view. ‘All the time the Council has a 
problem, there are large numbers of member state interveners—but this 
does not impress the Court’ (COM_1, own translation). Instead, inter-
veners matter because even when formally limited in the length of their 
pleas, they are able to add legal arguments, information, and nuances to 
the debate and thereby provide the Court with a wider array of pieces 
to choose from. What is more, they avail themselves of more time to do 
so, since their pleas can be submitted after the case is launched before 
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the Court. This is important because—as we outlined in Chapter 3—
actions for annulment are subject to a tight time line and can be filed 
only within two months after a legal act is published. In this sense, more 
actors means more legal perspectives. To be clear, it is not the number of 
issues discussed in court that increases, but rather the number of differ-
ent perspectives on a somewhat fixed number of legal questions (formally 
no additional aspect can be raised by interveners).
Of course, we cannot predict the diversity of legal arguments pre-
sented to the Court simply based on the complexity of litigant configura-
tions. In our interviews, we have questioned litigants about their judicial 
strategies in cases involving other litigants on their side of the conflict. 
The answers indicate that the diversity of arguments is often reflected in 
complex configurations—but not always. This has a lot to do with the 
efforts of coordination between different litigants.
Across the multiple possible complex constellations of litigants, we 
found quite different efforts to coordinate. Public claimants often organ-
ized along existing networks of national legal experts, where mem-
ber state officials are sometimes approached directly by mail to draw 
attention to an upcoming or submitted case and a related request for 
a friendly intervention (MIN_D_4). Coordination by phone or email 
assures that substantial support is forthcoming. Moreover, such coop-
eration avoids ‘being in front of the Court and saying different things’ 
(EP_1).1
Finally, we came across cases where a given EU measure was being 
challenged in parallel by several applicants who never entered in con-
tact with each other. This seems to be more likely for private actors who 
frequently do not avail themselves of the same inter- and transnational 
networks. In the renewable energy case (cases T-134/14 and T-47/15 
presented in Chapter 5), the EU measure was attacked by fifty-one com-
panies. One team of lawyers defended the interests of about ten of these 
companies. The legal arguments for these ten companies were de facto 
very similar to the legal arguments of law firms defending the remaining 
companies. However, the respective lawyers had no contact whatsoever 
with the lawyers defending the remaining forty-one companies involved 
in the conflict (LAW_5).
It is important to note that such strategic interaction before or dur-
ing the process does not necessarily create convergence of positions 
and arguments. We found cases where litigants exchanged informa-
tion on their respective cases and legal strategy that did not lead to an 
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alignment of substantial arguments. In the milk quality case (T-683/15), 
the Commission attacked a Bavarian practice whereby investigations 
of the quality checks in the milk industry were paid by a fund of the 
Bavarian state. While the dairy industry pays into the fund, the fund 
itself is a public instrument. The Commission thought that companies 
themselves must pay the investigations and that the involvement of the 
Bavarian fund constituted illegal state aid. Both the Bavarian govern-
ment and the association of Bavarian milk producers raised an annulment 
action against the Commission’s decision. They exchanged information, 
but they put different arguments at the core of their reasoning. On the 
one hand, the association claimed, in line with existing CJEU case law, 
that the measure could not be classified as state aid, because no state 
resources were involved. The Bavarian government, on the other hand, 
was not convinced that they could win based on this argument. Instead, 
they argued that the scheme had already been in place before EU state 
aid law became applicable, thus falling into the category of the so-called 
existing aid, which is subject to a specific and less restrictive procedure. 
When the Commission finds an existing state aid to be in breach of EU 
state aid rules, it cannot ask the member state to recover the aid granted 
but rather asks it to put an end to the measure. In this case, while the 
dairy industry association claimed that the contested measure was not 
state aid, the Bavarian government acknowledged that it was state aid, 
arguing instead that it was a particular kind of state aid (MIN_BA_1). 
Here, we have two legal arguments that are contradictory. This is not 
necessarily a bad thing for the litigant, however, since it offers two alter-
native legal perspectives to the Court. If one does not convince the 
judges, the other may.
By contrast, the BMW case (T-671/14) is an example of a high level 
of substantial argumentative alignment among litigants. In that case, 
BMW raised an annulment action against a decision of the Commission 
that declared illegal aid by the German state of Saxony for BMW, which 
was meant to encourage the creation of a new factory in their region as 
contrary to EU state aid law (see discussion in Chapter 5). The Saxon 
government intervened in support of an action raised by BMW. Saxony 
hired expensive lawyers in order to bring additional argumentation to 
the Court. While BMW and Saxony had different lawyers, there was a 
lot of coordination among them. Both teams of lawyers shared all the 
information on the cases, met in Berlin, and developed strong ties. Every 
argumentation was exchanged and checked by the other claimant. While 
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they had slightly different views—some points were more important for 
Saxony, some more for BMW—they did not disagree on the points put 
forward by the other party. The common argumentative strategy was to 
present to the Court a convincing story, with complementary legal narra-
tives contributing to the same common interest (MIN_SA_1).
Complex litigant configurations enhance rather than reduce the diver-
sity of legal arguments provided. If the arguments presented to the 
Court are to have any effect on the rulings, then a greater variety of legal 
arguments should, in principle, make rulings less predictable. In any con-
flict, a greater variety of legal interpretations provides the Court with 
more possibilities to diverge from its preestablished legal interpretations. 
In other words, independent of the legal stock preceding a given case, 
where a complex litigant configuration brings about a higher diversity of 
legal arguments, this increases the Court’s capacity to diverge from the 
preexisting case law. Thereby, complex litigant configurations can add to 
the level of legal uncertainty: where more complex litigant configurations 
bring more heterogeneous legal arguments as well as varying perspectives 
to legal cases, CJEU rulings are again more difficult to predict than for 
simple litigant configurations with just one applicant and one defendant.
emPiricAl PAtterns of litigAnt  
configurAtions And legAl success
We now turn to empirical evidence on success in annulment cases. When 
going to Court, litigants seek a decision on a particular conflict. The 
Court can decide that the applicant is inadmissible and consequently 
reject making any decision. Typically, this is the case where the grounds 
raised are invalid. In all other cases that are not dropped or withdrawn, 
a judgement will eventually be made on the conflict. The plaintiff can be 
successful or lose the claim. We coded legal success based on the eventual 
decision of the Court taken at the end of the respective proceedings and 
clearly stated at the very end of the text of its judgements. Specifically, 
we consider applicants to have been successful whenever the Court com-
pletely or partially annuls the contested legal act. All other outcomes are 
treated as unsuccessful cases. Figure 7.1 depicts the share of successful 
annulment litigation over time.
Figure 7.1 shows that on average, the success rate lies somewhere 
between 18 and 35%. The volatility of success rates was higher in the 
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early years of integration. Note, however, that in these early years, overall 
numbers of annulments were substantially lower and therefore one single 
ruling influences the overall success rate substantially. Nevertheless, suc-
cess in court seems to have been somewhat more likely for plaintiffs in 
the early decades than it is today. Despite highs and lows between single 
years, the overall trend has been rather stable since the number of annul-
ments has started to increase in the 1980s.
With this picture in mind, we now return to the constrained court 
argument put forward in the debate. In essence, this argument considers 
success to be a function of the threat for legislative override. In contrast, 
we posit that success is a function of the characteristics of the conflict 
situation from which legal cases emerge. If we look at the patterns of 
litigant success for different litigant configurations, we find further sup-
port for our argument. To see how, consider Fig. 7.2 in light of strategic 
approaches to judicial decision making; in situations in which the Court 
settles conflicts with private applicants on the one side and an EU institu-
tion on the other side, political constraint should play hardly any role in 
Fig. 7.1 Success rate over time (Note Successful annulments are counted 
by the year of their referral to the Court. Absolute numbers include cases that 
were found inadmissible by the Court, cases that were dropped later on, or cases 
where a ruling became obsolete during the time of proceedings)
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the Court’s decision-making process. In these situations with simple liti-
gant configurations (n = 939), we observe that EU institutions lose only 
22% of cases. Alternatively, to put it the other way around, private liti-
gants win 22% of cases against EU institutions. If we compare this suc-
cess rate to the success rate in which an EU institution faces challenges 
from private actors and from at least one member state government at 
the same time, the Court should—if anything—be more constrained and 
thus more sensitive towards the applicant’s concerns. In fact, the higher 
success rate for the applicants in this complex litigant configuration of 
32% appears at the first glance to support this proposition. Yet consid-
ering our argument about endogeneity of litigant constellations, we 
should not jump to quick conclusions. First of all, an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA)2 that tests for significant differences in the mean success rate 
between the four different litigant groups, displayed in Fig. 7.2, indicates 
that the success rates of the first two groups (private v. EU and private/
MS v. EU) are not significantly different from each other.
Fig. 7.2 Litigant success by litigant configuration (Source Own compilation)
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Second, and maybe more importantly, the other success patterns do 
not really fit the constrained court narrative. This may result from the 
fact that the constrained court narrative remains theoretically underspec-
ified by failing to explicitly theorize the emergence of different litigant 
constellations. To begin with, it is difficult to see why such a constrained 
court would be less responsive to applicants when these applicants are 
just member state governments (25%) as opposed to member state 
governments combined with private actors (32%)—as the latter cannot 
threaten legislative override (see Fig. 7.2).
Similarly, and perhaps even more interestingly, we find that when lit-
igating against an EU institution, a member state has more chances to 
succeed when the defending EU institution is supported by another 
member state. This finding is completely at odds with the expectations 
of the strategic approach, which would predict a lower success rate when 
a defending EU institution is supported by a member state. Instead, we 
observe that member state applicants are much more likely to succeed 
in court when they face a defence alliance consisting of the contested 
EU institution and at least one other member state, compared to an EU 
institution acting on its own; this cannot be brought in line with the 
argument about court constraint, either.
We conduct a one-way ANOVA to determine whether these nominal 
differences in success rates are statistically significant (see Table 7.1). The 
differences between the first three groups are not statistically significant. 
We do find, however, that the success rate of group four (MS v. EU/
Table 7.1 Pairwise comparison of configuration-specific differences in success 
rates
*Indicates levels of statistical significance of the difference between groups at the 1% level; these results 
are robust for different post hoc tests (i.e. the Sidak method, Scheffé’s method, and the Bonferroni 
procedure)






A Private v. EU 0.22 0.41 0.62
B Private/MS v. EU 0.32 0.47 0.82
C MS v. EU 0.25 0.43 0.000*
D MS v. EU/MS 0.51 0.50
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MS) is significantly different from all other groups. This empirical pat-
tern does not support the constrained court narrative. It does, however, 
support our argument, which is that these different litigant configura-
tions tend to arise in different situations.
Take group four in Fig. 7.2 (MS v. EU/MS), where member state 
governments appear on both sides of the conflict. In line with the argu-
ments presented in the previous chapter, these configurations tend to 
arise more often in cases that are not only perceived as important by 
member state governments (for whatever reasons). They also include a 
sufficiently unclear legal situation as to make the Court’s ruling quite 
difficult to predict. This is reflected in a success rate of 51% for the appli-
cant member state government(s). In situations of institutional turbu-
lence, it is more likely that complex constellations comprise actors that 
are drawn to the conflict by different motivations. Put differently, cases 
that fall in the MS v. EU/MS category are not simply characterized by 
a different litigant configuration than cases that fall in the category MS 
v. EU. Rather, they represent a different underlying situation. The for-
mer constellation is more likely to emerge in situations of turbulence and 
greater legal uncertainty. Accordingly, member state governments do not 
have a better chance of winning when facing an alliance between an EU 
institution and (an)other member state government(s). Instead, in these 
cases, court behaviour is simply harder to predict. Consequently, the suc-
cess rate for these cases is closer to 50:50.
We believe that this argument also helps to explain the patterns dis-
played in Fig. 7.3. When court rulings are easier to foresee, cases are 
unlikely to attract a high number of litigants. Actors in anticipation of 
losing are reluctant to invest the necessary resources just as actors antic-
ipating sure success will rather free ride on the outcome of the case. 
Therefore, simple litigant configurations are more likely to emerge when 
the outcomes of court rulings are easy to foresee. In contrast, conflicts 
and related legal questions that invite complex applicant and defendant 
configurations are typically characterized by a high level of political rele-
vance and a high level of legal uncertainty; legal uncertainty and emerg-
ing policy junctures ensure that plausible legal arguments can be brought 
forward on both sides of the conflict, possibly making a difference in the 
ruling.
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distributive effects And feedbAck of winning  
or losing A cAse
Now that we have explored the sequence that links policy conflict with 
litigation, litigation with litigant configurations, and litigant configu-
rations to judicial outcomes, we come back to the origin. What is the 
feedback effect of the Court’s rulings on the political context out of 
which the legal action emerged in the first place? Our multilevel policy 
approach to litigation compels us to reflect on the policy impacts of rul-
ings. How do the Court’s rulings feed back into policy arrangements and 
institutional settings that had led to conflict? What kind of redistributive 
effects among policy actors can rulings have? We saw that actors gener-
ally initiate annulment actions for material gain, to protect or improve 
decision making competences, to maximize ideological preferences, or to 
improve political trust. To what extent do court rulings contribute to the 
Fig. 7.3 Success rates for simple and complex configurations (Note A one-
way ANOVA indicates that this difference is statistically significant [F = 48.1, 
p = 0.000])
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achievement of these objectives that motivated policy actors to engage in 
litigation in the first place?
Typically, when referring to winners and losers, the literature fre-
quently sets success in court equal to winning. Far less attention has 
been devoted to distributive effects of CJEU rulings (but see Cappelletti 
et al. 1986). We contend that courts also have distributive impacts that 
may or may not correspond to success or failure in the judicial conflict. 
As we have argued in an earlier publication, ‘it’s not always about win-
ning’ (Adam et al. 2015). Losing the legal argument can, at times, be 
irrelevant for the political utility associated with litigation. Even more, 
losing can even be positively related to the political utility of rulings. 
Acknowledging this compels us to explore how court rulings contribute 
to the objective pursued by policy actors when engaging in litigation.
winning cAn be Aligned with legAl success
Success in court and winning of the underlying conflict can be, and most 
of the time is, inherently connected. This is particularly the case when 
ideological opposition to specific supranational legal acts drives litiga-
tion, when litigation is motivated by direct material concerns, and when 
litigation is motivated by the wish to obtain or protect decision-making 
competences.
Material Gains
The connection between judicial success and the maximization of 
the utility of litigation is particularly evident where litigation is moti-
vated by a concern for material resources. Most of the private claim-
ants seek direct material benefits when going to court. Clearly, where 
they have success in court, they win. We saw in Chapter 5 that public 
actors also hold direct economic interests that can be pursued via annul-
ment actions. Virtually all annulment actions in the area of agriculture 
and regional funds involve financial issues. Here, member states litigate 
against the Commission’s decisions to impose financial correction, con-
sisting in refusing to reimburse to the member states a sum they spent 
under the Common Agriculture Policy or EU cohesion policies when 
the Commission’s auditors find that national authorities have committed 
irregularities. EU rules on how EU funds must be spent are complex. 
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This increases the likelihood of irregularities. When a member state chal-
lenges a Commission decision denying the transfer of funds correspond-
ing to the irregularity found, the member state expects that the Court 
will force the Commission to proceed to the transfer. When the Court 
rules that the member state is right, the Commission’s decision denying 
the transfer is annulled and the Commission has to reimburse the money 
spent. Here, the correspondence between judicial success and policy 
objective is very clear.
Institutional Competences
We have seen that a public actor may litigate in order to protect its deci-
sion-making competences from an over-reaching EU institution. There 
are many cases in state aid, for example, where the member states or 
regional governments raised an annulment action against a Commission 
decision that was perceived as a clear instance of competence creep. 
Often, the member state loses. In Chapter 5, we mentioned the Leipzig-
Halle and Dresden Airport cases (T-396/08, T-215/9), where the Saxon 
government litigated in order to put a halt on what was perceived as a 
competence creep of the Commission. In this case, for the first time, 
the Commission considered the construction of airport infrastruc-
ture as an economic activity in the sense of EU state aid law and pos-
ited that the Commission thus needed to be notified. This was new; up 
to this moment, the Commission had never put out this interpretation. 
Saxony’s decision to litigate was mainly driven by the attempt to fend off 
the Commission’s attempt to become more strongly involved in regional 
infrastructure projects. Yet it remained unsuccessful.
The ruling had a highly significant effect on the redistribution of com-
petences between the member states and the Commission in the field of 
infrastructure construction. After the ruling, Joaquim Almunia, then the 
Commissioner for Competition, declared that the Court’s judgement 
was applicable to all kinds of infrastructure, independent of the sector 
concerned. Such an extrapolation from airports to any kind of infrastruc-
ture was unexpected because state aid law is sector specific. This led to a 
huge increase in the number of state aid case notifications submitted to 
the Commission, which became overwhelmed by the increase in work-
load (MIN_SA_1). Nevertheless, the Commission further consolidated 
its new and enhanced ability to influence regional infrastructure projects 
by adopting several on sector-specific guidelines for regional infrastruc-
ture projects.3
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Particularly in the area of state aid, annulment litigation was not able 
to sustainably limit the Commission’s competence creep. A series of 
cases dealing with a Spanish tax scheme that would grant tax deductions 
to Spanish companies that acquire shares of companies located outside 
the EU (T-219/10, T-399/11). In these cases, Autogrill SA, Banco 
Santander, and other companies attacked the Commission for declar-
ing this provision in the Spanish tax code to be incompatible with EU 
law. According to the EU’s state aid law, aid granted selectively to some 
companies but not to others is generally illegal unless the aid meets a 
number of exceptional criteria. In a very broad interpretation of this 
provision, the Commission saw this criterion to be fulfilled since only 
companies that acquire foreign companies benefit from the tax benefit 
but not companies that acquire Spanish firms. The applicants perceived 
this to be an erroneous application of the selectivity concept and went 
to court. Specifically, the applicants went to the General Court in first 
instance. The General Court shared the view of the applicants and devel-
oped stricter conditions that would have to be met by the Commission 
when trying to assess the selectivity of tax measures. For the private com-
panies, legal success in court meant a clear victory since it helped them 
to realize their tax benefits. Also, the Spanish government welcomed this 
ruling as it effectively constrained the Commission’s ability to intrude on 
its national tax policy.
Yet the Commission appealed the decision of the General Court 
before the Court of Justice. Given the high redistributive effects at stake 
for the member states, three of them—Spain, Germany, and Ireland—
joined the case in support of the private companies in appeal. The Court 
overturned the ruling of the General Court based on the argument that 
the General Court had misapplied the selectivity criterion. ‘For state 
aid specialists and tax lawyers, this decision was bound to be a land-
mark case, whatever it would turn out to hold’.4 Legal defeat for the 
Commission would seriously compromise its impact on state aid pro-
vided through national tax measures, while legal success would pave the 
way for stronger influence in this area. The case was effectively seen as 
widely stretching the concept of selectivity,5 which, mechanically, leads 
to a wide stretch of the Commission’s capacity to use EU state aid law 
to veto national fiscal mechanisms. This redistribution of competences 
between the Commission and the member states in the field of tax pol-
icy was directly connected to legal success and legal defeat in this par-
ticular case.
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Another policy area where annulment litigation has resulted in clear-
cut competence gains for the Commission, here acting as a plaintiff, is 
external policy. Importantly, the first annulment case ever launched 
between EU institutions falls into this category. Traditionally, mem-
ber states would negotiate international agreements in all areas that do 
not fall within the EU’s competence, such as in external trade deals. 
The ERTA case (C-22/70), launched by the Commission against the 
Council, deals with this right of the Commission to negotiate interna-
tional agreements (see our discussion of this case in Chapter 5). The 
Council had authorized member states to negotiate and conclude an 
international transport agreement that included social rules for the pro-
tection of drivers (today, Article 95 TFEU). It did so by claiming that 
transport was an area of member state competence. The Commission 
felt that the Council had overstepped its competences and launched 
an annulment to shift the legal base so negotiation powers would fall 
on the Commission (Article 207, ex. Article 133 Treaty on European 
Union). The Court agreed that the existence of acquis communitaire 
harmonizing social provisions in transport (Council Regulation [EEC] 
No. 543/696) necessarily vested any international agreement that 
concerned transport in community powers, consequently excluding 
concurring powers of member states. Winning this case enabled the 
Commission to expand external policy competences to areas where the 
Community holds internal competences. This became known as the prin-
ciple of implied powers and was further developed and fixed in the Nice 
Treaty (Cremona 2011). Success in court thus meant winning compe-
tences beyond the more narrow right to negotiate trade agreements and 
altered the relationship of the EU institutions.
Ideological and Policy Preferences
Furthermore, winning tends to be closely connected to legal success in 
court if the motivation to litigate is dominated by the wish to challenge 
a supranational legal act due to ideological opposition. Where a supra-
national legal act directly interferes with core beliefs of what is right and 
wrong as well as with policies that are built on these normative beliefs, 
then winning a conflict is inherently tied to the ability to win the legal 
case and thereby abolish the ideological threat.
A good example is the passenger rights case (cf. cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04, discussed in Chapter 5). The European Parliament 
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(EP) challenged agreements that the Council and the Commission had 
negotiated internationally. The Parliament considered these agreements 
to violate fundamental individual rights related to data privacy. In an 
attempt to avoid litigation, the Commission actively approached mem-
bers of Parliament by trying to convince them that litigation ‘was not a 
good idea’ (COM_2). Yet the Commission failed to dissolve ideological 
concerns over data privacy simply based on strategic concerns. The EP 
won this case in court. This legal success was also a political success as 
it helped the Parliament to push forward the legislative agenda on the 
General Data Protection Regulation.7
An example of an unsuccessful attempt to promote ideological prefer-
ences is the Spanish coal case (T-57/11), discussed in Chapter 6. This 
case was triggered by a decree adopted by the Spanish government that 
altered the rules of the Spanish electricity market in favour of Spanish coal 
mines. This was seen as one important step in trying to save the Spanish 
coal sector from further decay. The Commission considered that the 
Spanish measure was not contrary to EU state aid law and authorized 
the measure. This decision sparked controversy within Spain. Castelnou, 
a small company that felt discriminated against by the Spanish decree, 
raised an annulment action against the Commission’s authorization, and 
several national actors, both private and public, joined the conflict to 
intervene in favour of either the applicant or the defendant. Greenpeace 
intervened in support of Castelnou in the hope of further containing 
attempts to subsidize the exploitation of fossil fuels in the EU. ‘Non-
governmental organizations like Greenpeace are only very rarely given 
an opportunity to argue before the EU Courts. This case is therefore a 
special opportunity to challenge some three-quarters of energy subsidies 
in the EU that still go towards fossil fuels’ (Simons 2014). Greenpeace’s 
legal objective was thus to promote a rebalancing of the interaction 
between environmental rules and state aid law in favour of the former. Yet 
the Court’s conclusion was unfavourable to this ideologically motivated 
view promoted by Greenpeace. In the ruling, the Court specified that 
where the Commission ‘assesses an aid measure which does not pursue an 
environmental objective, the Commission is not required to take account 
of EU rules on protection of the environment’, and ‘limits the verification 
of compliance with the rules, other than those relating to State aid, solely 
to those rules capable of having a negative impact on the internal mar-
ket’ (General Court 2014, 2). This ruling clearly circumscribed the extent 
to which environmental objectives can trump other policy objectives in 
178  C. ADAM ET AL.
the context of state aid law. While the Commission had not pushed to 
extend its decision criteria to evaluate state aid in this specific context, the 
Court’s judgement creates a barrier to do so in the future.
winning cAn be disconnected from legAl success
Policy actors may benefit from a ruling of the Court in which they lose. 
Cases abound where the redistributive effect of the rulings on policy 
actors do not coincide strictly with the Court’s decision about who the 
winner of the judicial conflict is. This disconnection between redistrib-
utive effect and ruling is particularly clear when the annulment action is 
raised with a view to maximize political trust domestically or to clarify (in 
addition to maximize) the distribution of institutional competences. This 
has specific implications for complex litigant constellations. As argued 
above, complex constellations are more likely to comprise compound 
motivations, particularly in cases with different types of actors involved. 
But where actors seek different objectives, the very same ruling can pro-
duce more than one winner or more than one loser on these different 
grounds. Consequently, annulment conflicts characterized by complex 
actor constellations are likely to be more nuanced in terms of winners 
and loser. In a way, rather than producing only winners or only losers, 
success and defeat are likely to be multidimensional.
Material Gains
When a member state loses a case over state aid against the Commission, 
legal defeat typically implies that the money flows back into the pockets 
of the state. In such cases where the state’s aid measures are declared 
illegal retrospectively, the ministry responsible for budget easily feels 
like a winner (MIN_D_3). While we tend to treat member states as 
unitary actors before the Court because of their status as litigant, they 
host important internal tensions and policy conflicts. Here, we see that 
a court ruling rejecting the action of the state can have a redistributive 
effect between ministerial departments. A concrete example is the Apple 
case (T-892/16) we discussed in the introduction to this book. While 
we can assume the Irish Ministry of Finance to be delighted to see huge 
amounts of tax money being flushed into its coffers, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs should certainly be less happy about gloomy investor 
prospects.
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Institutional Competences
Also, cases in which decision-making competences are disputed, suc-
cess in court might not always generate clear-cut winners. In Council v. 
Commission (C-409/13), the Council and Commission were at logger-
heads over the right to withdraw proposals from the legislative process. 
Along with its quasi monopoly to propose legislation, the Commission 
has the right to withdraw legal acts from the inter-institutional deci-
sion-making process. Installed to allow checks and balances in the EU 
political system, this right has seldom been used. Therefore, the Council 
was astonished when the Commission withdrew its proposal for a reg-
ulation on general provisions for macro-financial assistance to third 
countries that face short-term balance-of-payment difficulties after it 
had altered its content. The Council criticized the Commission by not-
ing that the Commission’s right to initiate legislative initiatives did 
not imply a symmetrical right to withdraw proposals, particularly not 
for mere political reasons. Consequently, the Council challenged the 
Commission’s decision to withdraw the proposal in court. The Court’s 
judgement had ambivalent effects. One the one hand, the Commission 
won the legal case and successfully defended its right to withdraw this 
specific legislative proposal (COM_1). On the other hand, the Court also 
narrowed the Commission’s ability to withdraw proposals in the future 
by ‘clarifying that while this right exists, the Commission cannot invoke 
this right under any condition and in any kind of way it wants’ (EP_1). 
The Commission’s short-term success has thus also had a restricting 
effect in the long-term as the Court used the ruling to clarify the condi-
tions under which the Commission would effectively be able to withdraw 
legislative proposals. There was thus a disconnection between imminent 
success in court and the winning of the general competence conflict.
Furthermore, disconnections between legal outcome and political suc-
cess emerge in situations in which legal clarification is seen as a second 
best in cases motivated by the willingness to maximize decision-making 
competences. In those cases, litigants typically have a clear preference 
for winning the case. However, they also considered that losing this par-
ticular case would not be so bad either, as long as the judgement would 
clarify unclear rules and ambiguous distributions of competences (MIN_
ES_7). This way, even legal defeat is not conceived as a complete loss 
since the legal certainty produced by the judgements will help to avoid 
unnecessary conflict and work in the future.
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Actually, this situation often emerges after treaty changes (Bauer and 
Hartlapp 2010). Here, the simple manifestation of a ruling can, in fact, 
produce winners across the board of litigants. For example, the new 
comitology system coming into force with the Lisbon Treaty troubled 
the Commission (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen 2017). Here, the EP 
claimed that any comitology act had to be considered an implementing 
act and thus had to be agreed upon according to a procedure endow-
ing it with relatively more influence. The Council, in contrast, had an 
institutional interest in declaring all comitology acts to be delegated 
acts. Sitting uneasily between these two options, the Commission feared 
that it would be exploited by the two as ‘a kind of a bargaining chip’ 
(COM_1). A number of annulment actions were launched by the EP 
and the Commission on the usage of delegated or implementing pow-
ers (see, for example, cases C-427/12; C-65/13; and C-88/14). The 
situation was characterized by general disagreement over the concept of 
implementation versus delegation as well as uncertainty about what rules 
would apply. The Commission claimed, for example, that the concept of 
implementing powers would apply to the online platform EURES that 
allowed for EU-wide job advertisements and job searches to promote job 
mobility. It claimed that this was the case despite the narrowing of its 
usage under the Lisbon Treaty. While the Commission was not successful 
in court, it gained legal certainty for further practices. ‘The judgement 
was useful to that extent, because the Court—actually it was dismissed 
so we lost the case—but we obtained clarification and the Court said 
very clearly what an implementing act can do and what it cannot do’ 
(EP_1). The ruling also had consequences at the level of administrative 
practices. In an attempt to be better able to secure its substantial inter-
ests in the altered setting, the Commission secretariat general with the 
legal service and the secretary general issued an internal guideline advis-
ing Commission staff on how to deal with the situation from now on 
(COM_1). Thus, this case shows how CJEU rulings (indirectly) affect 
the daily practice of the EU institutions in their interaction.
Political Trust
Finally, where litigation is motivated by gains in political trust, the rul-
ing itself might be of little relevance to determine winners and losers. 
In these cases, the value of the legal conflict for a plaintiff can be inde-
pendent of legal success in court. Analytically, these conflicts are best 
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conceptualized as being part of a two-level game (Putnam 1988), where 
actors can be indifferent towards legal defeat at the supranational level 
because the mere act of going to court helps them carry home political 
benefit at the domestic level. The decoupling of the decision to take an 
active part in judicial proceedings from expectations about the outcome 
of such proceedings is thus a result of the long duration of the proceed-
ings and the short time horizons of elected officials who are able to reap 
immediate benefits from the initiation of litigation. When politicians opt 
for legal conflict based on its value for populist signalling and not on the 
probability of winning, legal defeat is likely to be more frequent.
A case that illustrates this is the Austrian transit (C-356/01) con-
flict. In this case, the Austrian government found it worthwhile to 
initiate annulment litigation against the Commission for refusing to 
reduce the quota of freight trucks that could legally transit through 
Austria. This quota had been introduced before Austria joined the EU 
in order to reduce the country’s environmental burden from haul-
age companies travelling back and forth between Germany and Italy. 
Generally, this provision held that if the number of trucks in tran-
sit through Austria exceeded a certain threshold in any one year, the 
quota would be lowered for the following year to compensate for the 
excess. To implement this provision, the Austrian authorities installed a 
system whereby trucks in transit were counted electronically. In 2001, 
Austria demanded that the Commission lower the quota based on this 
data. However, the Commission refused to accommodate Austria’s 
application because it had doubts about the correctness of the data 
the country had presented. The CJEU subsequently supported the 
Commission’s decision. Following public protest, including several 
blockades of the Brenner motorway (the most important transit route 
through the Austrian Alps that connects Germany and Italy) in 1998 
and 2000, the formation of social movements such as Transitforum 
Tirol and the involvement of environmental interest organizations (e.g. 
Alpenforum), transit traffic became a highly politicized issue in Austria. 
With the electorate organizing around this issue, Austria’s government 
likely feared that accepting the Commission’s position would endanger 
its perceived integrity, particularly in the affected regions. The annul-
ment actions thus enabled the government to communicate its loyalty 
and commitment to national constituents and made the legal conflict 
public via the media. Signalling commitment to affected constituents 
was a more dominant rationale for the initiation of litigation than the 
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prospect of legal success. Austria’s transport minister, Hubert Gorbach, 
calmly explained in 2003 that the Court’s dismissal of Austria’s action 
for annulment had no implications for the country anyway, and thereby 
openly voiced the government’s indifference towards the legal outcome 
of the dispute.8,9
conclusion
This chapter addressed the last step in our sequential chain argumenta-
tion. Having explored different motivations underlying judicial conflict 
and how they translate into litigant constellations, we turned to the 
question of how such complex configurations relate to legal success and 
broader policy and institutional outcomes.
In line with strategic models of judicial behaviour, we also argued that 
success rates in court vary systematically across different kinds of litigant 
configurations. Importantly, however, we developed a radically differ-
ent interpretation of the relationship between litigants’ configurations 
and ruling outcomes. While litigant configurations are typically treated 
as exogenous factors, we highlighted the need for models of judicial 
behaviour to endogenize these configurations. Only when we take into 
account that different litigant configurations tend to emerge in different 
legal conflict situations, will we be able to understand the empirical asso-
ciation between litigant configuration and court rulings.
More specifically, we argued that complex constellations are more 
likely to be characterized by higher legal uncertainty and greater vari-
ety of legal perspectives presented to and evaluated by the Court when 
adopting its ruling. This is what explains the substantially greater share of 
claimant success in complex as opposed to simple conflict configurations. 
Our statistical analyses, as well as the case study evidence, support this 
argument.
This argument reflects a similar idea to the one promoted by Davies 
(2018). Davies claims that the CJEU’s recent tendency to side with 
member states rather than private litigants over questions of rights asso-
ciated with EU citizenship cannot easily be attributed to a changing judi-
cial perspective or to increasing member state influence. Rather, one has 
to consider that it is not the Court that has changed, but the cases. With 
less meritorious cases brought by private litigants, lower success rates are 
inevitable.
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This chapter also brought new insights to the relationship between lit-
igation and broader policy and institutional impacts. It is important to 
assess the different kinds of impacts that rulings may have, beyond the 
immediate success or defeat before the courts (Scheingold 1974; Lobel 
1994; McCann 1994; NeJaime 2011). We followed up on this approach, 
extending it to all types of actors raising annulment actions in the EU, 
while linking it more explicitly with the multilevel policy conflict from 
which litigation emerges. Starting from the premise that there are a vari-
ety of political goods sought by litigants when raising an annulment 
action (material gains, institutional power, ideology, and political trust), 
we assessed the relationship between a favourable ruling and the liti-
gant’s achievement of the primary goal underpinning its decision to liti-
gate. We found that legal success is often directly related to the litigant’s 
broader objectives; especially when seeking the maximization of material 
gain, institutional power, and ideological preferences. Legal success can, 
however, also be entirely disconnected from the litigant’s genuine victory 
in terms of it achieving the objectives underlying its motivation to go to 
court. Since ‘it is not always about winning’ (Adam et al. 2015), a liti-
gant may be perfectly satisfied, even in case of legal defeat, as long as the 
action has allowed it to reach its objectives. We posit that this disconnec-
tion between legal success and genuine achievement is particularly likely 
when, first, litigants use litigation as a way to maximize political trust. 
Here, litigation is conceived as a symbolic act, more than as a way to 
change the legal order. Second, this is the case when litigants are seeking, 
as a secondary objective, legal clarification in situations of unclear distri-
bution of competences. By emphasizing this relationship between legal 
success and a rulings’ broader redistribution impacts, we link back rul-
ing outcomes to the policy conflict from which litigation emerges in the 
first place, thereby closing the cycle through which litigation and courts 
intervene in multilevel policy conflicts in the EU. In the following final 
chapter, we summarize the individual sequences of our argument and 
our main findings. Moreover, we discuss the implications our study may 
have for further research in this area.
cAses cited
See Table 7.2.
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1.  Exchange of information and of legal arguments need not always be strate-
gic. In a case related to a decision of the Commission declaring a clause in 
German tax law as incompatible with EU state aid law (T-205/11), about 
twenty German companies raised an annulment action, and the German 
government intervened as a supporter in these actions. Within the German 
tax law scene, which organizes meetings gathering German tax law spe-
cialists and involving lawyers of the German ministry of economy, the 
restructuring clause case has been discussed, and legal arguments were 
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There is more to annulment actions than political science or legal 
 scholarship have so far brought to our attention. As we showed in this 
book, annulment actions are part of the struggle about money, policies, 
competences, and votes in the emerging multilevel political order of the 
European Union (EU). Annulment actions embody vertical and horizon-
tal tensions among public and private actors that purposefully take their 
conflicts to the European judicial arena. Annulment litigation works as 
a defence attempt of last resort; annulments are regularly the last chance 
to undo actions by supranational institutions. Against this backdrop, we 
have investigated the genuine political nature of annulment litigation 
with three analytical focal points: actors’ motivations to litigate, actor 
configurations in court, and the outcome and impacts of annulment 
judgements. We now turn to the insights gleaned from our empirical 
analysis regarding these three aspects of annulment litigation dealing with 
the emergence, structure, and outcome of annulment actions.
While we separated these aspects of annulment litigation analytically 
by discussing them within individual chapters, our argument and anal-
ysis overall is driven by the assumption that it is crucial to understand 
the interrelatedness of emergence, structure, and outcomes of annulment 
litigation. Together, these aspects constitute a causal chain. To separate 
them is, of course, vital for analytical reasons. However, emergence, 
structure, and outcome of annulment actions are not independent from 
one another. Rather, they co-determine each other. A major insight of 
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our analysis is that the three-fold elements of the annulment struggle 
feed into each other, thereby amalgamating the legal with the political 
struggle of EU multilevel policy making. This is why throughout this 
study we have developed a sequential approach to analyse annulment 
litigation.
the motivAtions behind Annulment Actions
The first set of questions we raised dealt with the motivations of policy 
actors to take legal steps and turn to the Court. The EU policy process 
involves many distinct actors located at different governmental levels and 
active in different arenas. As a result, a wide array of interests, political 
preferences, values, cultures, and understandings interact and often clash. 
Annulment actions constitute one possible legal channel for transferring 
policy conflicts into the judicial arena, and annulments are raised regu-
larly by a large variety of private and public actors that can be located 
on the subnational, national, European, or—in the case of multinational 
companies—even the global level.
While the litigation literature generally investigates the conditions 
under which specific actors decide to litigate, we focus on their motiva-
tions for litigating. In other words, since we already know from existing 
literature when actors are likely to go to court, we decided to focus on 
the ‘why’ question. Why do actors raise annulment cases in front of the 
Court and what are their objectives? What kind of utility do they associ-
ate with annulment litigation? What are they really after?
These questions are usually hidden as implicit assumptions in the 
litigation literature, which has essentially focussed on companies and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Gould 1973; Bouwen and 
McCown 2007; Vanhala 2011). While companies are generally assumed 
to litigate to maximize material gains, NGOs are seen to litigate to 
push for their ideological and policy preferences. These assumptions are 
plausible; however, they do still need to be substantiated empirically— 
especially when other actor categories come into play. Indeed, we also 
have some indications in the litigation literature that financial and ideo-
logical payoffs may not always be what litigants seek when turning to the 
courts. Influencing a court’s legal doctrine or gaining bargaining power 
(Galanter 1974; Schmidt 2000; Granger 2004) can also be important 
objectives for litigants when turning to courts. Assuming a dominance 
of financial concerns and ideology in litigation decisions seems, especially 
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for public actors, overly simplistic. Public actors are, after all, committed 
to a variety of objectives, not least keeping or expanding political power 
and institutional competences in addition to securing financial resources.
This study showed that in annulment actions, it is the multilevel polit-
ical context that prompts litigants’ decisions to turn to court. Locating 
actors’ action in the context of the struggles they go through in the mul-
tilevel policy process allows identifying their needs and subsequently the 
utility they associate with litigation. We found four types of motivations 
driving the use of annulment actions; litigants turn to the EU Court to 
maximize material gains, institutional competences, ideological and pol-
icy preferences, and political trust. While these four motivations consti-
tute real types, they are not mutually exclusive at the level of empirical 
cases; in other words, one annulment action can be driven by more than 
one motivation. Yet our case studies allowed for the identification of the 
single most dominant motivation underlying a particular case.
First, material gains constitute the quantitatively most important 
motivation. In these cases, litigation is pursued when success in court 
would significantly improve the litigant’s budget situation, by either 
avoiding substantial expenses or maximising revenue. This motivation 
is crucial for governments and for regional, subnational authorities con-
fronted with Commission decisions imposing financial corrections in 
agriculture or cohesion policies. This motivation is also important for 
companies having benefitted from domestic state aid that is later declared 
illegal by the Commission. In these cases, litigating is often the only 
option that can help to avoid having to pay back subsidies.
Second, litigation is pursued when the Court’s interpretation of 
unclear legal concepts may significantly improve the litigant’s institu-
tional and decision-making competences. This motivation is often found 
among public actors, both national and European, in the face of a meas-
ure adopted that appears to the litigant as a competence-stretch threat-
ening to reduce its own institutional powers.
Third, ideology drives litigation when this provides an opportunity to 
defend or promote an important ideological or policy position by estab-
lishing or keeping a normative order. In the cases we have explored here, 
ideology is most likely to show when strongly politicized actors such as 
NGOs (private litigants) become involved or public actors engage in 
party politics.
Fourth and finally, annulment litigation can also be used as a politi-
cal symbol to signal responsiveness and trustworthiness to the litigant’s 
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electorate or to important political partners. This motivation is current 
among actors that are directly elected at the subnational, national, or 
supranational level, such as governments or the European Parliament. 
Analysing annulment actions with the frame developed in this book thus 
allows capturing the conflictive dimension of EU multilevel governance. 
Annulment politics highlights that multilevel interaction in the EU has 
more to it than the processes of cooperation and coordination often 
dominating scholarly focus.
We have emphasized the political character of annulment actions. 
This is not to say that legal factors are irrelevant. On the contrary, legal 
aspects do play a crucial role in actor’s decisions to engage in litiga-
tion. Legal factors, however, usually relate to the ‘when’ question; they 
are located on a different analytical plane as the identification of actors’ 
motivations to engage in litigation. Even when actors are motivated to 
litigate, very bleak chances of legal success can nevertheless lead them 
to dismiss this option. As we showed, once we understand what actors 
are seeking, we can clarify the conditions for their decision to opt for 
 litigation in order to achieve their objective. This is where legal factors 
come in.
The literature on litigation economics emphasizes the probabil-
ity of winning as an essential element in litigants’ risk-benefit analysis 
 underpinning their decision to litigate (Gould 1973). While this is hard 
to refute, our findings give more nuanced insights into its role in the lit-
igation decision. More often than not, the benefit considered is political 
rather than financial. This considerably limits litigants’ capacity to quan-
tify the benefits they expect to gain. Consequently, risk-benefit assess-
ments of the utility of litigation often need to be far less scientific and 
objective as assumed within economic models of litigation.
Second, we found that chances of legal success in front of the Court—
though important—are not systematically considered as such by potential 
litigants. Often—and this is particularly true for public actors—litigants 
are satisfied with the presence of a certain legal uncertainty, while the 
exact scope of legal uncertainty hardly plays a role in their decision to 
litigate. Since the economics of litigation literature refers implicitly to 
chances of success, it considers that legal uncertainty is measurable in 
one way or another and that the scope of legal uncertainty—the litigant’s 
chances of success—is a determinant factor in the decision to litigate 
(Gould 1973; Landes 1974). By contrast, as soon as the financial, insti-
tutional, ideological, or political stakes of the case become important, 
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most of the public actors we talked to were satisfied with a small degree 
of legal uncertainty that would allow them to present decent legal argu-
ments in court without risking their reputation in Luxembourg. When 
limited resources force them to select cases for litigation among several 
conflicts, it is more the political, institutional, or material relevance of the 
case than its legal merits that dominates the filtering process.
The importance of the legal factor, in the form of chances of success, 
also varies depending on the litigant. The risk-benefit analysis found 
in the economics of litigation literature is certainly important to pri-
vate actors, particularly to companies. For them, the costs of preparing 
annulment litigation are non-trivial, and the expected benefits strongly 
depend on judicial success. In contrast, as we show in the case studies, 
public actors’ individual decisions of litigation do not impose significant 
additional costs, and the utility of annulment litigation does not system-
atically require judicial success. Hence, as public actors are facing differ-
ent incentives and constraints, their decisions to litigate are much less 
dependent on the scope of legal uncertainty surrounding the case than 
for private companies. While the legal uncertainty surrounding the con-
flicts does play an important role, this role is not as dominant as eco-
nomic models of litigation suggest.
Last but not least, our findings emphasize the multilevel and 
 multi-actor nature of annulment actions. Far from being restricted to 
conflicts between the Commission and the member states (in the case 
of infringement proceedings) or formally channelled through an inter-
action between national and European judges (like preliminary rulings), 
annulment actions are a direct strategy to ‘judicialise’ (as we refer to the 
process) conflicts between a wide variety of actors located on different 
governmental levels in the European Union. The material gains motiva-
tion for litigation coins conflicts between member states governments and 
EU institutions and between national companies and the Commission. 
The institutional competences motivation generally drives conflicts 
between member states governments and the EU and between EU insti-
tutions among themselves; the ideological motivation is found in ver-
tical conflicts between member states or NGOs and EU institutions and 
among EU institutions. The political trust motivation generally underpins 
annulment actions in which national or regional governments judicialise 
conflict with an EU institution to send a positive signal to their constitu-
ency at home. In sum, annulment actions truly are a judicial manifestation 
of the multilevel and multidimensional nature of the EU policy process.
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Actor configurAtions in Annulment conflicts
The multilevel governance approach conceives EU governance as 
 composed of a variety of interactions between a wide range of actors 
in the EU public policy process (Benz and Eberlein 1999; Benz 2007; 
Schakel et al. 2015). Judicial proceedings can involve several actors 
and may feature private companies, NGOs, subnational governments, 
and other EU institutions, such as the European Central Bank or the 
European Parliament. In a large number of cases, the number of actors 
engaged in the legal conflict rises beyond the typical face-to-face duel 
between one applicant and one defendant as other actors join the conflict 
to support either applicant or defendant.
Often, it is not only the number of actors engaged in the conflict 
that increases, but also the variety of types of actors involved and gov-
ernmental levels they are associated with. We often see highly complex 
multilevel actors’ configurations, where different conflict lines and litiga-
tion motivations overlap and interact. As discussed in Chapter 6, litigant 
configurations in the context of annulment litigation are highly diverse. 
We employed a rather basic distinction between simple (1 v. 1) config-
urations and complex configurations (all other constellations). Complex 
constellations amount to around 26% of all vertical annulment conflicts. 
They come in many different forms and while they are more frequent 
in horizontal conflicts—a vast majority of all horizontal annulment cases 
are by our definition complex (81%)—they generally emerge in various 
different contexts. How can we explain their emergence? How can we 
account for the rise of multilevel complexity in annulment actions?
We are far from claiming the ability to predict the emergence of 
a complex actor constellation in a specific case. What we do see is that 
complex litigant configurations often emerge in situations of institutional 
turbulence. In situations in which existing institutional arrangements 
are in flux or are going through a phase of substantial revision, annul-
ment litigation dealing with these unsettled institutional arrangements 
often involves more than just two actors. Why is this the case? First, the 
status quo represents a negotiated temporary equilibrium situation that 
tends to involve a substantial number of stakeholders. This temporary 
equilibrium comprises a financial dimension, an ideological dimension, 
an institutional or competence-related dimension, and a political or elec-
toral dimension. Therefore, threats of disrupting the status quo hold the 
potential to trigger litigation by actors based on all four motivations we 
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described in Chapter 5. Institutional turbulence unsettles the established 
order in many different ways. Hence, a wide range of actors, each for its 
own reasons, are likely to be discontented with the change and to engage 
in a struggle to maintain the status quo through litigation. Likewise, the 
multidimensional character of institutional turbulence is likely to appeal 
to a wide range of stakeholders interested in moving away from the sta-
tus quo and ready to engage in the conflict to protect the disrupting 
measure. In short, as institutional turbulence disrupts different dimen-
sions of the existing status quo, turbulence increases the stakes in differ-
ent regards and affects a wide variety of policy stakeholders. Annulment 
litigation gives them a chance to shape their prerogatives within the 
emerging order.
Secondly, situations of institutional turbulence are more likely to pro-
duce legal uncertainty. Unstable situations are critical junctures where it 
is not yet clear which (legal) path will be chosen by a ruling. As con-
tested measures represent a move away from the preexisting legal and 
policy path, whether and how the preexisting case law applies is largely 
unclear. The existing legal stock does not allow drawing clear conclusions 
and making safe predictions regarding the Court’s reaction. For appli-
cants, which have to consider an overall success rate of 24.7%, and in 
view of the legal uncertainty of those cases, which pushes the chances of 
success towards 50%, turbulence thus creates higher incentives to litigate. 
After all, as seen in Chapter 5, the chance of legal success is an important 
factor encouraging the use of litigation—although relatively more deter-
minant for private actors and regional authorities than for member states 
and EU institutions. Likewise, in a situation of high legal uncertainty, 
actors whose interests align with those of the defendant cannot rely so 
much on the Court’s tendency to protect EU measures challenged via 
annulment actions. The unpredictability of the Court’s ruling serves as 
an incentive for these actors to actively engage in the litigation in sup-
port of the defendant, hoping their intervention can make a difference 
in the ruling. Put differently, whenever the status quo is disrupted, the 
unclear legal situation holds a substantial potential for triggering judicial 
law making (Adam 2016). Situations of institutional turbulence increase 
not only the stakes for many different policy stakeholders, they also 
increase the uncertainty about how the Court will rule. That, in turn, 
increases policy stakeholders’ incentives for getting actively involved 
in the legal conflict. While we have highlighted above the danger of 
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overstressing the role of expected chances of legal success promoted by 
economic models of litigation, it is similarly problematic to assume that 
legal uncertainty and the legal merits of a case systematically affect nei-
ther litigants nor the Court. In this sense, we believe legal uncertainty 
has to be taken into account much more than is currently the case in 
political models of litigation and judicial behaviour.
In sum, conflicts that take place at critical institutional junctures or at 
critical policy junctures are most-likely cases to attract not only one but 
several actors. There is a greater probability that different motivations 
are coming into the play. At the same time, there are higher incentives 
to take the conflict emerging from these motivations to court. Taking 
treaty changes as manifestations of potential turbulence, we found strong 
empirical evidence for this theorized nexus between institutional turbu-
lences and complex actor constellations. For years with treaty modifica-
tions entering into force, we observe an average of 15% of annulment 
conflicts featuring a complex litigant configuration where we observe 
only an average of around 7% for years without such events. Our case 
studies further support this argument and interpretation.
The finding that institutional turbulence plays an important role in 
triggering such complex multilevel litigant configurations highlights 
one important difference between the cooperative and the conflictive 
dimension of multilevel governance in the EU. Multilevel governance 
refers to a process dominated by the superposition of coordination and 
interaction practices among different types of policy stakeholders located 
on different levels. While the cooperative side of this multilevel process 
seems to be a pervasive feature of the day-to-day functioning of the EU, 
conflicts within this process—particularly judicialised conflict—are more 
limited and reserved to specific situations, such as situations of institu-
tional turbulence.
success, fAilure, And feedbAck effects
The third analytical focal point of the book is the analysis of effects of 
annulment actions analysed in Chapter 7. We differentiated between 
legal outcomes, based on who was successful in the legal case, and the 
more far-reaching implications of rulings on the multilevel political con-
text from which litigation emerged.
Legal outcomes, in terms of applicants’ success rates, differ substan-
tially depending on the actor configuration involved. We have seen that 
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in cases with certain complex litigant constellations, success rates are 
slightly elevated (for example, to about 32% when at least one mem-
ber state and at least one private litigant jointly accuse an individual EU 
institution). Strategic approaches to judicial decision making assume a 
causal impact of litigant configurations on judicial behaviour since many 
powerful litigants might be able to effectively constrain the Court. We 
propose a fundamentally different explanation for observed correlations 
between litigant configurations and legal outcomes: the relationship 
between complex actor constellations and higher success rates in annul-
ment actions is not primarily a causal relationship. Instead, the empirical 
association is merely a result of the fact that specific conflict situations 
not only affect the emergence of specific litigant configurations but also 
the emergence of certain rulings. More specifically, situations of institu-
tional turbulence not only foster legal uncertainty. Such situations also 
facilitate the emergence of complex actor configurations. In this sense, 
we promote a similar argument as Davies (2018), who claims that the 
recent tendency of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
to side with member states rather than with private litigants over ques-
tions of rights associated with EU citizenship cannot easily be attributed 
to a changing judicial perspective or increasing member state influ-
ence. Rather, one has to consider that it has not been the Court that 
has changed but rather the cases that have been brought before it. With 
less meritorious cases brought by private litigants, lower success rates are 
inevitable.
We do not refute the possibility of a causal effect of litigant configu-
rations on legal outcomes completely. Yet we do focus on the ability of 
litigant configurations to influence judicial behaviour by increasing the 
variety of legal arguments presented to the Court rather than by putting 
political pressure on the Court. While political models of judicial behav-
iour typically treat actor constellations as exogenous factors, we see it as 
important to integrate the theorization of the emergence of these config-
urations into these models. Different policy conflicts not only come with 
various degrees of legal certainty and predictability of court behaviour; 
they also attract different litigant configurations. Assuming that litigant 
constellations are completely independent from the legal merits of cases 
is therefore misleading.
Our findings suggest heading for a new approach of judicial politics. 
Up to now, research on judicial decision making has downplayed the 
impact of the political context and the nature of the conflict at stake, in 
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particular the legal uncertainty underpinning the case, on judges’ deci-
sions. Yet if one acknowledges that case law creates legal path depend-
ence (Schmidt 2012), one has to recognize the highly constraining 
power of the existing legal stock on judges’ decisions. We agree in this 
context with Susanne K. Schmidt, who has pointed out the crucial 
role played by litigants in activating case law to their advantage and, 
thereby, pushing judges into forging and consolidating a given legal path 
(Schmidt 2012, 2018).
We are not, however, simply trying to reiterate the conditioning 
effect of case law or Schmidt’s argument about the role of litigants’ 
legal strategies in creating legal paths. Rather, we emphasize the crucial 
role of the nature of the conflict situation and of the specific political 
context in influencing the eventual impact of case law. The activation 
of existing case law is dependent not only on litigant’s legal strategies. 
Litigants’ capacity to mobilize existing case law highly depends on 
whether the case at hand lends itself to it. When annulment actions are 
directed against a supranational act that is very similar to previous acts 
and was adopted on the same legal basis, applicants enjoy a relatively 
high level of legal certainty. The Court’s past decisions on these simi-
lar acts form well-informed expectations about their ability to win the 
respective case. As soon as previously established case law becomes less 
instructive—because of a changing legal basis or as a result of a changing 
content of the legal act—the less predictable judicial behaviour becomes. 
Consequently, a political context characterized by institutional turbu-
lence produces legal uncertainty, which reduces the predictability of rul-
ings and ultimately brings success rates closer to 50%.
In this sense, research that analyses the relationship between litigant 
configurations and legal outcomes without taking legal uncertainty into 
account risks suffering from a substantial omitted variable problem. In 
the context of annulment litigation, institutional turbulence and the 
legal uncertainty that comes with it act as a confounding variable that 
influences litigant configurations as well as legal outcomes. This only 
comes to light when the political context—most importantly in terms 
of actor motivations and institutional turbulence—is given appropri-
ate analytical space. As a result, our approach can contribute to bet-
ter understand court agency (Saurugger and Terpan 2017) and to the 
debate about court constraint and legislative override (Carrubba et al. 
2008, 2012).
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Moreover, our cases also provide insights into the wider redistributive 
political effects of annulment actions—beyond judicial success or defeat. 
In this respect, two observations stand out. First, we showed that suc-
cessful litigation does not necessarily rely on winning legal proceedings. 
We argue that the success of litigation should always be conceptualized 
broadly and assessed based on litigants’ general objectives and motives 
for entering into conflict. Chapter 5 showed that actors seek different 
objectives when going to court. Hence, there are many cases where the 
redistributive effect of the rulings on policy actors does not coincide 
strictly with the Court’s decision about who the winner of the judicial 
conflict is. This disconnection between redistributive effect and ruling 
is particularly clear when the annulment action is raised with a view to 
maximize political trust domestically or to clarify (rather than maximize) 
the distribution of competences. This finding echoes the literature on 
the legal mobilization of social movements, which highlights the benefi-
cial (secondary) effects of litigation for social movements even in case of 
judicial defeat (Scheingold 1974; McCann 1998; Lobel 2003; NeJaime 
2011; Vanhala 2011). We go one step further by explicitly underlining 
that litigants’ major objective, and therefore major benefit from litiga-
tion, does not need to be connected with judicial success. This argument 
further highlights the potential disconnection between judicial success 
and the functional utility of litigation. We argue that understanding this 
particular functional utility of litigation requires delving into the multi-
level political context from which the conflict emerges. Policy stakehold-
ers use litigation, as one tool among others, to navigate the complex 
EU’s multilevel system. This further underlines the relevance of our mul-
tilevel policy approach to litigation.
Second, complex constellations, as they involve a higher number of 
litigating actors, tend to involve different types of motivations for liti-
gation, which is particularly visible in cases featuring the involvement 
of different types of actors. In other words, different actors, because of 
their diverse positioning in the multilevel political context responsible for 
the rise of the conflict, seek different objectives in the judicial proceed-
ing. When several actors intervene, several litigation motivations overlap 
and several conflict lines are intertwined in a single judicial proceeding, 
the redistributive impact of the ruling is multidimensional. The very 
same ruling can produce more than one winner—and more than one 
loser—on these different dimensions. Wider policy impacts of annulment 
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conflicts with complex configurations are thus particularly nuanced and 
likely to reflect the complexity of their actor configuration.
In Chapter 1 of this book, we underlined the relevance of annul-
ments for seizing substantial impacts on policy and actor relationships. 
We traced these feedback effects on the bases of cases studies. Our case 
studies range from constitutionalisation to adjustment to policy change. 
Examples for constitutionalisation are the insertion of trade negotiations 
related to implied powers into the treaty (Cremona 2011)—EU level—
and the modification of the German constitution following the suck-
ler-cow premiums case (Adam et al. 2015). Adjustments of procedural 
rules governing the interaction of institutions are constituted by Articles 
290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
on delegation in comitology. Policy changes are found in the Autogrill 
and Banco Santander cases, which significantly expanded the scope of 
EU competition law to the detriment of national autonomy in fiscal pol-
icies. Discussing such broader feedback effects, we conclude that annul-
ments are politically as well as economically highly relevant and that the 
increasing frequency with which annulments are used reflects their rising 
importance as a genuine feature of the emerging multilevel conflict over 
supranational decision making and implementation in the European inte-
gration process.
beyond the stAte of the Art:  
how exPlAining Annulment cAses chAllenge  
common reseArch PersPectives
Annulment actions have received substantially less attention than other 
forms of legal conflicts in the EU—wrongly so, as our study hopefully 
showed. The patterns of when and how annulments matter have impor-
tant implications beyond specific empirical analysis. Annulment actions 
are more than technical review mechanisms. They are constitutive ele-
ments of the multilevel struggle for policy making in the EU. As soon 
as one opens annulment analysis beyond the examination of the ruling 
in a narrow sense and engages with the earlier steps feeding into litiga-
tion and with the feedback effects, the importance of underlying policy 
conflicts as a constitutive force in the EU multilevel system comes to the 
fore. Rather than a constraint (Scharpf 2006; Falkner 2011), the mul-
tilevel interaction, coordination, and cooperation of governments and 
non-state actors in the judicial arena can be understood as a continuation 
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of actors’ attempts to influence specific outcomes in the  policy-making 
arena. Analysing the sequence connecting conflict to resulting new 
dynamics, feedback effects, and structuring elements for policy and polity 
allows us to integrate judicial processes into the functioning of the EU 
multilevel system of governance. At a time when the rise of tensions and 
crises on the global scene have intensified the potential for conflict within 
the EU, developing this line of reasoning will further gain relevance in 
the European multilevel system.
Other scholars have studied the chain from societal conflict to legal 
disputes. Referring to a filtering process (Van Waarden and Hildebrand 
2009), a delta (Glenn 1999), or a funnel (Klages 1983), these works all 
look at the chain as a narrowing passageway and seek to understand what 
shapes the amount of litigation at its end. In contrast, the contribution 
of this book consists in promoting a comprehensive approach to judicial 
proceedings as an element of the multilevel policy process. In essence, 
what distinguishes our argument from existing accounts is that we try to 
analytically connect the motivations underlying litigation, the conditions 
that promote the legal actions to unfold, the litigant configurations in 
court, the imminent legal outcomes of litigation, and the larger judicial 
impact of rulings on the multilevel political context.
Our findings reveal the important mediating role of institutional tur-
bulence in the way judicial proceedings integrate into the multilevel 
policy process. The deeper the disruption of the status quo initiated by 
policy measures adopted by EU institutional actors, the wider the range 
of actors concerned by the impacts of the disrupting measure and the 
higher the legal uncertainty of the situation. This has two consequences. 
First, legal uncertainty goes with low legal predictability. Such cases are 
characterized by higher success rates; about half of these EU measures 
end up being annulled by the Court. In other words, the institutional 
turbulence created by the disrupting act creates legal uncertainty, which 
is then further amplified by the difficulty to anticipate the Court’s annul-
ment ruling—whether it will defend or annul the destabilizing measure. 
The chain that links policy conflict to judicial conflict to feedback into 
political contexts shows that status quo disruption is not the end of the 
story; destabilization inevitably comes with a certain level of uncertainty 
as to what the future will bring. Second, situations of institutional turbu-
lence create multidimensional stakes for a wide variety of stakeholders. 
Consequently, annulment rulings also have multidimensional feedback 
effects on the various actors that are part of the multilevel policy conflict. 
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The use of judicial proceedings in situations of institutional turbulence 
thus mediate—and therefore amplify—highly instable, unpredictable, 
and multidimensional equilibria between a wide range of actors located 
on different governmental levels.
Analysing annulment litigation from a perspective of multilevel gov-
ernance, as has been done in this book, complements extant research on 
the nexus between courts and compliance in the EU based on infringe-
ments and preliminary rulings (Carrubba and Murrah 2005; Thomson 
et al. 2007; Hartlapp 2008; Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Broberg 
and Fenger 2013; Kelemen and Pavone 2016). Our focus on annul-
ments needs to transcend the top-down perspective typically applied to 
infringement rulings and the typical bottom-up perspective on prelimi-
nary references. Annulment actions are manifestations of conflict that are 
neither captured by preliminary rulings, which have to be handed up by 
national courts, nor lead to infringements procedures that EU institu-
tions launch against noncompliant member states. After all, annulment 
actions represent a direct channel to the CJEU that can be used by a 
most diverse set of actors willing to challenge supranational actions. The 
conceptual contributions offered by this book reflect the resulting need 
for a truly multilevel perspective. We introduce the distinctions between 
horizontal and vertical conflicts, as well as the distinction between simple 
and complex conflict configurations, to capture essential features of this 
multilevel process while minimizing the risk of getting lost in the vast 
heterogeneity of these conflicts.
Future research might want to compare the use, functioning, and 
impact of these different legal roads to Luxembourg. Comparing the 
frequency with which annulment actions, infringement procedures, and 
preliminary references are used within different political contexts can be 
an interesting first analytical step in this direction. After all, there is inter-
esting variation. In 2016, most infringement procedures were opened in 
the political contexts of the internal market, environment, financial ser-
vices, mobility, and transport.1 Preliminary rulings most frequently dealt 
with questions of the freedom of movement and establishment in the 
internal market as well as with intellectual property (Court of Justice of 
the European Union 2017, 28). Vertical annulment conflicts continue 
to be dominated by agricultural and state aid cases (Bauer and Hartlapp 
2010), while horizontal annulment conflicts emerge most often in the 
area of external affairs (Hartlapp 2018). By analysing quantitative and 
qualitative differences between these different channels, future research 
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should develop a more nuanced understanding of the political role of lit-
igation and the Court within different political contexts in the European 
Union. This should be of interest not only to scholars of judicial politics 
in the EU but also to scholars interested in policy implementation and 
compliance. We hope our book can contribute to these debates.
note
1.  Out of the 1657 infringement cases open in 2016, 270 emerge on ques-
tions of the internal market, industry, entrepreneurship, and SME; 269 on 
environmental policies; 230 from financial stability, financial services, and 
capital markets union; and 191 from mobility and transport. See COM 
(2017) 370 final report from the European Commission monitoring the 
application of European Union law 2016 Annual Report, p. 26.
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• What is the background of the case (Technical/economic/juridi-
cal/political background, actors involved, etc.)?
• What did the controverted Commission decision consist of?
• What kind of economic or political impact did it have on Spanish/
German/regional public or private actors?
• Who made the request for initiating an action and why?
• Was there support (or opposition) by other actors affected by the 
decisions regarding the possibility to raise an action?
• Was there some consultation/cooperation/coordination done with 
these other actors? (for example, exchanging information/legal 
arguments or raising parallel actions or arranging intervention into 
the case).
• Who were the actors involved in the decision to bring an annulment 
action and what was their position?
• In case of divergence of positions, how has the final decision been 
made?
Table A.1 List of interviews
Organization Date Abbreviation
European Commission, Legal Service 16.06.16 COM_1
European Commission, Legal Service 16.06.16 COM_2
European Commission, DG TRADE 17.06.16 COM_3
European Parliament, Legal Service 17.06.16 EP_1
Council, Legal Service 17.06.16 CONS_1
Ministry of Agriculture, Germany 15.04.09 MIN_DE_1
Ministry of Agriculture, Germany 15.04.09 MIN_DE_2
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Germany 04.05.09 MIN_DE_3
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Germany 21.02.16 MIN_DE_4
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Germany 10.05.16 MIN_DE_5
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Germany 17.05.16 MIN_DE_6
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Germany 17.05.16 MIN_DE_7
Ministry for Economic Affairs, Germany 17.05.16 MIN_DE_8
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Germany 17.05.16 MIN_DE_9
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain 29.06.15 MIN_ES_1
Ministry of Justice, Spain 30.06.15 MIN_ES_2
(Former) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain 01.07.15 MIN_ES_3
Ministry of Agriculture, Spain 02.07.15 MIN_ES_4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain 02.07.15 MIN_ES_5
(Former) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain 21.09.15 MIN_ES_6
Ministry of Finances, Spain 21.09.15 MIN_ES_7
Ministry of Energy, Tourism and Digital Agenda, Spain 21.09.15 MIN_ES_8
Ministry of Energy, Tourism and Digital Agenda, Spain 22.09.15 MIN_ES_9
Ministry for the Economy, Germany 20.05.16 MIN_SA_1
Ministry for Rural Development, Bayern, Germany 23.05.16 MIN_BA_1
Ministry for Rural Development, Galicia, Spain 10.09.15 MIN_GA_1
Ministry of the Presidency, Galicia, Spain 10.09.15 MIN_GA_2
Ministry of the Economy, Galicia, Spain 11.09.15 MIN_GA_3
Ministry of the Presidency, Galicia, Spain 11.09.15 MIN_GA_4
Ministry for the Sea, Galicia, Spain 21.09.15 MIN_GA_5
Ministry of the Presidency, Galicia, Spain 22.09.15 MIN_GA_6
Private Law Firm, Spain 01.07.15 LAW_1
Private Law Firm, Spain 03.07.15 LAW_2
Private Law Firm, Spain 07.09.15 LAW_3
Private Law Firm, Brussels 24.09.15 LAW_4
Private Law Firm, Germany 18.05.16 LAW_5
Private company, Spain 30.06.15 COMP_1
Public Company, Spain 07.09.15 COMP_2
Private Company, Spain 22.09.15 COMP_3
Private Company, Germany 04.07.16 COMP_4
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• What were the criteria considered when making the decision to lit-
igate (e.g. probability of success, financial considerations, securing 
citizen support, defend interests of national companies, etc.)?
• If several criteria were involved in the decision, which was the most 
important one?
General questions (for interviews with state attorneys):
• Brief description of the decision-making process for initiation of 
annulment actions against commission (procedure, actors, criteria).
• Are annulment actions against the Commission sometimes initiated 
for the following criteria, and if so, can you give examples and indi-
cate an approximate frequency/share of such cases?
• Governmental finances/budget?
• Finances/budget of an autonomous community?
• Achieving policy change at EU level (if difficult through legisla-
tive route)?
• Influencing long-term development of the ECJ’s legal doctrine?
• Ensuring popular/citizen support?
• Defend the interests of national companies?
• Increase bargaining power/influence vis-à-vis the Commission?
• Increase bargaining power/influence vis-à-vis another actor (e.g. 
autonomous communities, companies, etc.)?
• Increase bargaining power/influence in a context of internal divi-
sions (e.g. intra-party or intra-government divisions)?
• Are there sometimes cases where an actor’s request for initiating an 
annulment action is NOT followed up with an annulment action? If 
so, examples & approximate frequency/rate of such cases?
• Are there sometimes contact/cooperation/coordination with other 
private or public actors affected by the controverted Commission’s 
decision? If so, examples and approximate frequency/rate?
• To what extent are their interests taken over by the state in the deci-
sion to raise an action, i.e. to what extent are they counterbalanced 
by other considerations?
• Are there sometimes divergent positions among actors taking part 
in the decision to raise an action? If so, example and approximate 
frequency/rate?
• In case of divergent positions, how is the final decision made? Who 
are the decisive actors and/or which are the decisive criteria?
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